CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX:

A Philippine Assessment Report



CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX:
A Philippine Assessment Report

Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO)
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A Philippine Assessment Report

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FOREWORD

Caucus of Development NGO Networks

In 2009-2010, the Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) undertook the Philippine Civil Society Index (CSI) project in order to better understand the nature and function of civil society in the Philippines. We were glad to have organised the project, as it helped to deepen our understanding of the nature of civil society in the Philippines and allowed us to collaborate with many individuals and organisations.

When CODE-NGO applied to CIVICUS to be the national coordinating organisation to carry out the CSI project in the Philippines, we were very interested in understanding how Philippine civil society fares in relation to neighbouring countries in South East Asia and to other countries around the world. Even if Philippine civil society has often been characterised as one of the "most dynamic" in the region, it was deemed important to find out its strengths and weaknesses compared to other countries, and to determine priority areas that CODE-NGO and other civil society organisations (CSOs) should pay attention to in terms of their policy advocacy and programme development.

The CSI project in the Philippines was also undertaken as part of a broader program on strengthening the human rights infrastructure in the Philippines which is being undertaken by the Commission on Human Rights in partnership with various CSOs, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme. This recognizes the crucial role of civil society in the promotion and protection of human rights. Citizens, as claim holders, are better able to demand and fight for their rights when they become organised through civil society organisations.

It is hoped that the report will further enrich the understanding of civil society, not only among those who comprise the sector itself, but also among its partners - national and local governments, business, academia and others - in working towards the important goal of Philippine development and democratisation.

Sixto Donato Macasaet
Executive Director

Caucus of Development NGO Networks
Quezon City, 31 January 2011

Message

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) values its strong partnerships with civil society organizations (CSOs) in the pursuit of our common goal of promoting and protecting human rights. In support of these partnerships, the Commission helps mobilize, coordinate and contribute resources for human rights (HR) research and programs. It also strives to synchronizing HR programs implemented by the CHR, other government agencies and CSOs, seeking to enhance complementation, learning and mutual reinforcement between these programs.

As the scope of human rights work broadens, so does the landscape for these partnerships. There is now a broader and deeper appreciation that human rights go beyond civil and political rights. Economic, social, and cultural rights also have to be recognized and protected. The neglect of these often lead to violations of civil and political rights. From such a vantage point, civil society organizations, even those that do not consider themselves human rights organizations, play an important role in the struggle to promote and better protect human rights. One of civil society's valuable contributions towards this end has been its long standing advocacy and promotion of people empowerment, which includes organizing citizens through which they can better articulate their interests and demand for their rights.

A stronger and more capable civil society sector will help strengthen the overall human rights infrastructure of our nation. As such, the Commission on Human Rights has supported this assessment on the state of Philippine civil society, which will help the sector improve and become more effective in its work of people empowerment. This is vital since more empowered citizens will invariably contribute to the improvement of human rights conditions in our country.

LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES
Chairperson
Commission on Human Rights

Message

Since the People Power revolution of 1986, Philippine civil society has burst into life. Countless civil society organizations (CSOs) and associations now operate energetically throughout the archipelago, striving to protect the values and rights of the people that they represent. It is in this respect that civil society is indispensable to democracy - it is the environment for citizens to articulate and advocate their interests, protect their rights, and hold government accountable for its actions.

The Civil Society Index (CSI) is an important assessment tool that gauges the effectiveness and impact of civil society in terms of the extent of their resources, their impact in the communities, and their practice of corporate governance and ethical values. It is an important assessment tool that generates both the knowledge and the momentum needed to deepen democracy in the Philippines.

Given the vibrance of civil society in Philippine political life, it is not surprising the assessment has given the Philippines a respectable CSI score, with high ratings in terms of CSO membership, interaction, and activity. It is especially encouraging to find that there is an extensive number of organized marginalized groups (women, indigenous peoples, and members of the rural population)– many of which were formed by the marginalized groups themselves.

However, the assessment did reveal that the potential of CSOs is constrained by the lack of effective board governance and accountability which is crucial in ensuring that these organizations are well governed and managed. Indeed formal mechanisms that promote accountability and transparency within CSOs can be enhanced. The most notable is the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC), which remains a viable mechanism for promoting CSO governance.

Civil Society has been a powerful force in pushing for change in the Philippines. Networks of CSOs, church, business, and political institutions have shown that, when effective, they have the ability to bring down dictatorships and restore democracy to the people. More importantly, the capacity of civil society organizations is important as the means to not only drive reforms and democratic change but to sustain them as well.

It is in this context that the CSI as an assessment tool become relevant. If used well, it could be a valuable tool in strengthening CSOs as a democratic vanguard, --- a key intermediary between citizens and the state that determines the access of citizens to political institutions. It is vital that we take heed of the recommendations made in this assessment to strengthen Philippine civil society, for it is both an essential ingredient of democracy, and a natural expression of human rights.

RENAUD MEYER
Country Director

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank our partner organisations and the many individuals who helped us finalise the project. They include:

- CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS), for providing us with the research framework and methodologies to undertake the project. Particularly Tracy Anderson, whose advice on research during the implementation of the project has been invaluable, and Andrew Firmin, David Kode and Mark Nowottny for their assistance in finalising this report;
- The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)-Governance Portfolio, especially Dr. Emmanuel Buendia, the Commission on Human Rights and The Asia Foundation, and especially Dr. Steve Rood, for providing us with financial support that enabled us to undertake the project;
- The Social Weather Stations, for undertaking the population survey for the project;
- Patrick Lim, advocacy programme specialist of CODE-NGO, who served as manager of the project, Philip Tuaño and Rachel Sescon, who served as researchers, and Dr. Ma. Oliva Z. Domingo, Professor of the University of the Philippines National College of Public Administration and Governance, who served as adviser;
- The Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO) national secretariat staff, including Dodo Macasaet, Ange Belangel, and Roselle Rasay, for program and research support, and Winnie Carmona, Cecile Delfin and Mike Timajo, for excellent administrative support;
- Members of the CSI Advisory Committee;
- Participants of the external perception survey and the organisational survey;
- Participants in the various workshops undertaken to refine and finalise the project results, including the participants of the 2009 and 2010 CODE-NGO national assemblies.

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AC	Advisory Committee
AF	Association of Foundations (foundation network)
BCI	Basic Capabilities Index
BIR	Bureau of Internal Revenue (government agency)
CDA	Cooperatives Development Authority (government agency)
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CODE-NGO	Caucus of Development NGO Networks
CSI	Civil Society Index
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DOF	Philippine Department of Finance (government agency)
DOLE	Philippine Department of Labour and Employment (government agency)
DSWD	Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (government agency)
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HLURB	Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (government agency)
LAKAS-KAMPI	Lakas - Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (political party)
LGU	Local Government Unit
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NATCCO	National Confederation of Cooperatives (cooperative alliance)
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
PCNC	Philippine Council for NGO Certification
PO	People's Organisation
SWS	Social Weather Stations
WVS	World Values Survey

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the key findings and recommendations made in terms of "measuring" civil society in the Philippines through the Civil Society Index (CSI), undertaken by the Caucus of Development NGO Networks over the course of almost two years (April 2009 to December 2010). The CSI framework and measurement tools were developed by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation, which has been implementing the CSI in more than fifty countries for the past ten years.

Several tools were used to gauge the effectiveness and impact of civil society. First, an organisational survey was carried out with 120 civil society organisations (CSOs) across the Philippines to measure the extent of their resources, the impact of these organisations, and their practice of corporate governance and ethical values. Second, an external perceptions survey was undertaken with approximately 60 influential individuals in government, business, religious institutions, academia, the media and the donor community to assess their views on CSOs. Third, a population survey was conducted in coordination with the Social Weather Stations to measure the extent of participation of Filipinos in civil society groups. Lastly, case studies were commissioned to qualitatively analyse the issues that CSOs are currently facing.

FIGURE 1. Civil Society Index Diamond for the Philippines



The study gives the Philippines a respectable civil society rating. The CSI provides a measure between 0 and 100 for each of the dimensions of civil society. Three of the five dimensions along which civil society was measured received ratings above 60. However, for the Practice of Values dimension, the Philippine rating is quite low (a little over 40).

With regards to civic engagement, participation in CSOs with social concerns is high. Indeed, more than 75% of the population participate in CSOs and almost 50% are

actively involved in CSOs. This figure is comparable to that of Asian countries with a high level of civic participation such as Indonesia and South Korea (Ibrahim, 2006: 10; Joo, et. al., 2006: 29). Membership in CSOs is diverse, with a significant participation from marginalised ethno-linguistic groups and from Mindanao. However, participation in CSOs with political or advocacy concerns is lower, although still quite respectable: about 25% of Filipinos participate in these types of organisations.

The second dimension is the Level of Organisation of CSOs. Almost all the CSOs that took part in the study have formal boards of directors or similar bodies. However, only a small proportion of the boards in the sample meet regularly, while an even smaller percentage of the respondents choose their board members through an election. There are associated issues in terms of board accountability and preparedness in undertaking their tasks. Many CSOs are part of coalitions and networks and most of them relate with other similar groups. Financial resources for CSOs are quite limited and many of the respondents rely on membership dues and service fees, given the limited grants and support from other sectors. Technological resources are more adequate.

Conversely, concerning the Practice of Values, the CSO sector in the Philippines did not score as high as in the other dimensions. A minority of NGOs provide labour rights trainings and have publicly available labour and environmental standards; less than 10% of the sample organisations have staff that are members of labour unions. However, CSOs rank high in terms of perceived practice of non-violence, internal democracy, tolerance, and promotion of peace. But only around 30% believe that the frequency of corruption among CSOs is rare.

The Perception of Impact of CSOs is quite high. In particular, the internal and external perceptions of the impact of CSO work in the areas of poverty reduction and environmental protection are quite high; internal and external perception of general social impact is also quite high. However, the perception of impact on reducing corruption is not as high as the perception of impact on poverty reduction and environmental protection. The impact of participation in CSOs on attitudes is very low; there is very little difference in the attittude of CSO members and non-members in terms of trust, tolerance, and public spiritedness.

The external environment for the conduct of CSOs is acceptable. The socio-political context mark is highest at 62.0, comprising the levels of political and social rights and government effectiveness. The socio-economic context mark is lower at 53.5, reflecting poor corruption perception levels. However, the socio-cultural context mark is lowest at 43.7, reflecting very low trust rating of Filipinos of their compatriots.

Overall, the level of civic engagement can be read as adequate given the external environment (i.e., the ranking for civic engagement is slightly above the ranking for the external environment), while the level of organisation and perception of impact ratings are higher than that of the environment rating.

In light of this, some of the recommendations to improve the civil society are the following:

a. strengthen governance mechanisms within CSOs,
b. develop standards for good governance across CSOs,
c. strengthen networking efforts,
d. improve the financial and human resource capacity of CSOs, and
e. develop consensus on labour and environmental standards for CSOs.

INTRODUCTION

This document presents the results of the Civil Society Index (CSI) for the Philippines, carried out from February 2009 to December 2010, as part of the second phase in the implementation of the international CSI project coordinated by CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation. The CSI is a comprehensive participatory needs assessment and action-planning tool for civil society actors at country level, which, in its current phase, was implemented in 41 countries.

The CSI is an international comparative project conceived with two specific objectives: (1) to provide useful knowledge on civil society and (2) to increase the commitment of stakeholders in strengthening civil society. The first objective is achieved through the measurement of specific country indicators that can be compared across countries. The second objective is implemented through a series of workshops among civil society groups and their partners to strengthen their commitment to advocate for reforms in the civil society policy environment.

The report is divided into the following three sections:

- The first section provides a more specific overview of the CSI project, the details of its conceptual framework and methodology, and an overview of the history of civil society in the Philippines.
- The second section provides an analysis of civil society in terms of the different dimensions of the CSI, including Civic Engagement of Filipinos, Level of Organisation and Practice of Values within civil society, Perception of Impact and the External Environment in which CSOs exist.
- The third and concluding section provides a summary of the findings and overall trends from the CSI study, and recommendations that civil society can follow to improve performance.

The results of this research were reviewed by the CSI Advisory Committee composed of leaders from civil society, media, government, the religious church, and academia, and presented to several assemblies of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and people's organisations (POs) in the Philippines.

It is hoped that this document will provide CSOs, researchers, and other interested persons and groups with useful information on civil society in the Philippines.

I. THE CIVIL SOCIETY INDEX PROJECT AND APPROACH

Civil society is playing an increasingly important role in governance and development around the world. In most countries, however, knowledge about the state and shape of civil society is limited. Moreover, opportunities for civil society stakeholders to come together to collectively discuss, reflect and act on the strengths, weaknesses, challenges and opportunities also remain limited.

The Civil Society Index (CSI), a participatory action-research project assessing the state of civil society in countries around the world, contributes to redressing these limitations. It aims at creating a knowledge base and momentum for civil society strengthening. The CSI is initiated and implemented by, and for, CSOs at the country level, in partnership with CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation (CIVICUS). The CSI implementation actively involves and disseminates its findings to a broad range of stakeholders including civil society, government, the media, donors, academics, and the public at large.

The Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO), an alliance of national and regional (sub-national) NGO alliances, was selected to become the implementing partner in the Philippines for this project. CODE-NGO started the research project in June 2009. Funding support was provided by the United Nations Development Programme Philippine Country Office, through the Fostering Democratic Governance portfolio implemented by the Commission on Human Rights, and by The Asia Foundation.

The following key steps in CSI implementation take place at the country level:

1. Assessment: CSI uses an innovative mix of participatory research methods, data sources, and case studies to comprehensively assess the state of civil society using five dimensions: Civic Engagement, Level of Organisation, Practice of Values, Perception of Impact and the External Environment.
2. Collective Reflection: implementation involves structured dialogue among diverse civil society stakeholders that enables the identification of civil society's specific strengths and weaknesses.
3. Joint Action: the actors involved use a participatory and consultative process to develop and implement a concrete action agenda to strengthen civil society in a country.

The following sections provide a background of the CSI, its key principles and approaches, as well as a snapshot of the methodology used in the generation of this report in the Philippines and its limitations.

1. Project Background

The CSI first emerged as a concept over a decade ago as a follow-up to the 1997 New Civic Atlas publication by CIVICUS, which contained profiles of civil society in 60 countries around the world (Heinrich and Naidoo, 2001: 3-6). The first version of

the CSI methodology, developed by CIVICUS with the help of Helmut Anheier, was unveiled in 1999. An initial pilot of the tool was carried out in 2000 in 13 countries.[1] The pilot implementation process and results were evaluated. This evaluation informed a revision of the methodology. Subsequently, CIVICUS successfully implemented the first complete phase of the CSI between 2003 and 2006 in 53 countries worldwide. This implementation directly involved more than 7,000 civil society stakeholders (Heinrich, 2007:2-8).

Intent on continuing to improve the research-action orientation of the tool, CIVICUS worked with the Centre for Social Investment at the University of Heidelberg, as well as with partners and other stakeholders, to rigorously evaluate and revise the CSI methodology for a second time before the start of this current phase of CSI. With this new and streamlined methodology in place, CIVICUS launched the new phase of the CSI in 2008 and selected its country partners, including both previous and new implementers, from all over the globe to participate in the project. Table I.1.1 below includes a list of implementing countries in the current phase of the CSI.

TABLE I.1.1 List of CSI implementing countries 2008-2010[2]

Albania	Ghana	Niger
Argentina	Italy	Philippines
Armenia	Japan	Russia
Bahrain	Jordan	Serbia
Belarus	Kazakhstan	Slovenia
Bulgaria	Kosovo	South Korea
Burkina Faso	Lebanon	Sudan
Chile	Liberia	Togo
Croatia	Macedonia	Turkey
Cyprus	Madagascar	Uganda
Djibouti	Mali	Ukraine
Democratic Republic of Congo	Malta	Uruguay
Georgia	Mexico	Venezuela
	Nicaragua	Zambia

2. Project Approach

The current CSI project approach continues to marry assessment and evidence with reflections and action. This approach provides an important reference point for all work carried out within the framework of the CSI. As such, CSI does not produce knowledge for its own sake but instead seeks to directly apply the knowledge generated to stimulate strategies that enhance the effectiveness and role of civil society. With this in mind, the CSI's fundamental methodological bedrocks which have greatly influenced the implementation that this report is based upon include the following:[3]

[1]The pilot countries were Belarus, Canada, Croatia, Estonia, Indonesia, Mexico, New Zealand, Pakistan, Romania, South Africa, Ukraine, Uruguay, and Wales.
[2]Note that this list was accurate as of the publication of this Analytical Country Report, but may have changed slightly since the publication, due to countries being added or dropped during the implementation cycle.
[3]For in-depth explanations of these principles, please see Mati, Silva, and Anderson (2010), Assessing and Strengthening Civil Society Worldwide: An updated programme description of the CIVICUS Civil Society Index Phase 2008-2010. CIVICUS, Johannesburg.

Inclusiveness: The CSI framework strives to incorporate a variety of theoretical viewpoints, as well as being inclusive in terms of civil society indicators, actors, and processes included in the project.

Universality: Since the CSI is a global project, its methodology seeks to accommodate national variations in context and concepts within its framework.

Comparability: The CSI aims not to rank, but instead to comparatively measure different aspects of civil society worldwide. The possibility for comparisons exists both between different countries or regions within one phase of CSI implementation and between phases.

Versatility: The CSI is specifically designed to achieve an appropriate balance between international comparability and national flexibility in the implementation of the project.

Dialogue: One of the key elements of the CSI is its participatory approach, involving a wide range of stakeholders who collectively own and run the project in their respective countries.

Capacity Development: Country partners are first trained on the CSI methodology during a three-day regional workshop. After the training, partners are supported through the implementation cycle by the CSI team at CIVICUS. Partners participating in the project also gain substantial skills in research, training, and facilitation in implementing the CSI in-country.

Networking: The participatory and inclusive nature of the different CSI tools (e.g. focus groups, the Advisory Committee, the National Workshops) should create new spaces where very diverse actors can discover synergies and forge new alliances, including at a cross-sectoral level. Some countries in the last phase have also participated in regional conferences to discuss the CSI findings as well as cross-national civil society issues.

Change: The principal aim of the CSI is to generate information that is of practical use to civil society practitioners and other primary stakeholders. Therefore, the CSI framework seeks to identify aspects of civil society that can be changed and to generate information and knowledge relevant to action-oriented goals.

With the above mentioned foundations, the CSI methodology uses a combination of participatory and scientific research methods to generate an assessment of the state of civil society at the national level. The CSI measures the following core dimensions:

1. Civic Engagement
2. Level of Organisation
3. Practice of Values
4. Perceived Impact
5. External Environment

These dimensions are illustrated visually through the Civil Society Diamond (see Figure I.2.1), which is one of the most essential and well-known components of the CSI project. To form the Civil Society Diamond, 67 quantitative indicators are aggregated into 28 sub-dimensions, which are then assembled into the five final dimensions along a 0-100 scale. The Diamond's size seeks to portray an empirical picture of the state of civil society, the conditions that support or inhibit civil society's development, and the consequences of civil society's activities for society at large. The context or environment is represented visually by a circle around the axes of the Civil Society Diamond, and is not regarded as part of the state of civil society but rather as something external that still remains a crucial element for its wellbeing.

FIGURE I.2.1 The Civil Society Index Diamond



3. CSI Implementation

There are several key CSI programme implementation activities as well as several structures involved, as summarised by the figure below:[4]

FIGURE I.3.1 CSI Implementation Process



[4]For a detailed discussion on each of these steps in the process, please see Mati, et. al. (cited in footnote 3).

The Philippines CSI project started in February 2009 with the convening of an advisory group which undertook preparations for the start of the project, including the mapping of civil society groups in the Philippines. The broader CSI Advisory Committee (AC) was formally convened on 11 June 2009, and it included representatives from different sectors such as faith-based groups, peasants, labour, women and youth sectors, advocacy and research NGOs, economic interest and environmental civil society groups, and members of the executive and legislative branches of government. During the meeting, members of the AC were briefed on the process of implementing the CSI and, in turn, the members provided suggestions on carrying out the research process. The AC also identified several items in the surveys, including the identification of major social and political concerns of the country.

Three surveys were undertaken for the project. The first was an external perception survey. The survey had a purposive sample composed of experts exposed to work done by Philippine civil society. The respondents included representatives from national and local government, academia, media, religious leaders, foreign donors and multilateral institutions working in the Philippines. This survey was used to form the measures of the perceived impact of civil society from an external perspective. A total of 54 respondents were interviewed or provided with questionnaires for the survey; 44 respondents were interviewed face-to-face, eight sent their answers via e-mail, one by fax and one via courier. One response was discarded due to problems in encoding. The interviews were conducted from July to September 2009.

The second was an organisational survey. The sample for the study was identified by using the registration data of four government agencies. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) registration database was used to identify non-profit organisations, which includes NGOs, non-profit schools, professional associations, and people's organisations. Cooperatives were identified through the database of the Cooperative Development Agency (CDA), labour unions through the database of the Department of Labour and Employment (DOLE), and homeowners' associations through the database of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). These government agencies were identified as the main sources of civil society databases since, in the Philippines, CSOs are legally classified within four types (non-stock organisations, cooperatives, labour unions, and homeowners associations) that are regulated by these respective agencies.

Random sampling stratified by regions was used to determine the sample. However, the sample was limited to only include organisations that had a phone line or mobile number in their records. This was done for practical reasons since the researchers could only confirm the existence of an organisation by calling them, given resource and time constraints in conducting the survey. The survey was undertaken from August to October 2009.

The final survey conducted was a population survey which the Social Weather Stations, a Philippine survey institute, was commissioned to carry out, as a rider to its regular quarterly survey. A total of 1,200 persons were interviewed, 300 each from the National Capital Region and the three main island-regions of the country: the rest of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. This sample is representative of the entire country, and the survey

has a margin of error of ±3% at the country level and ±6% at the island-region level. The survey was conducted from 1 to 4 October 2009.

The results of the surveys were presented in a CODE-NGO general assembly in December 2009 and in the AC meeting in February 2010. Revisions were made in the analysis of the data, given suggestions made during these two forums. Revisions were also undertaken based on comments made by CIVICUS staff and the project management team, which included the CODE-NGO Executive Director, the project team leader, the project researchers, and the civil society adviser. The revisions were made between May and November 2010. Several case studies were also commissioned to further investigate some of the issues raised in the findings of the surveys. These included case studies on social and political participation of Filipinos, fundraising strategies of CSOs, and political engagement of civil society groups.

II. CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PHILIPPINES

1. Overview of Civil Society

Civil society is a "value laden and highly contested concept" (Department of Foreign and International Development, 2010: 1). Broadly defined, civil society refers to "the aggregate of civil institutions and citizen's organisations that is distinct and autonomous from both state structures and private business" (Serrano, 1994: 3-6). CSOs refer to the whole range of non-state, non-profit organisations and groups, including socio-civic organisations, professional organisations, academia, media, churches, people's organisations, NGOs, and cooperatives (Aldaba, 1993: 2-4; Alegre, 1996: 194-197).

However, according to Clarke (Clarke, 2010: 3-4), it is not necessary that civil society should refer to specific organisations. According to him, there are three distinguishing characteristics of 'civil society': a) an institutional space composed of organisations distinct but overlapping with the state and market that advance the collective interests of their members and provide goods and services to the general public on a non-profit basis; b) a distinct realm of values that deepen democracy; and c) an institutional mechanism that mediates competing demands through political, economic, and social participation.

According to Serrano (Serrano, 2003: 1-2), the term 'civil society' entered Philippine development language in the early 1990s, after the political upheaval in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. The term was initially equated with NGOs, a specific type of organisation within the civil society sector. However, after several years, the term was used to encompass a wider set of organisations and institutions which do not belong to the state or the business sector. In current usage, it usually relates to both NGOs and these other types of groups.

Civil society groups include the following:

- Non-governmental Organisations, which are "intermediate agencies and institutions that tend to operate with a full-time staff complement and provide a wide-range of services to primary organisations, communities, and individuals" (Aldaba, 1993: 3-5; Silliman and Noble, 1998: 4-5).
- People's organisations, which are bona fide associations of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote public interest and with identifiable leadership, membership, and structure. Trade unions, which are groups of workers organised for collective bargaining purposes, and workers' organisations, are some examples of such associations. Homeowners associations (described below) are often also considered as one type of a people's organisation.
- Cooperatives, which are organised to meet common economic and social needs through the operation of a jointly-owned and democratically controlled enterprise.
- Homeowners associations, which consist of groups whose members include families and households living in the same community, (i.e., common area such

as a residential subdivision or condominium), the objectives of which are to uplift the welfare of their members.

In terms of legal definition, NGOs largely belong to a class of groups defined as "non-stock, non-profit corporations." People's organisations (other than trade unions, workers' organisations, and homeowners' associations) also register legally in the Philippines as non-stock corporations. A non-stock corporation is an organisation or association in which no part of its income is distributed as dividends to its members, trustees, or officers and in which profits incidental to operations are used only to further the organisation's purpose. Under the Philippine Corporation Code, non-stock organisations are formed for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, literary, scientific, social, civic service, or similar purposes. Examples include chambers of trade, of industry, or agriculture and the like, or any combination of these services. To be recognised as a non-stock corporation, an organisation must register with the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission. Their status does not permit them to be a source of income, profit, or other financial gain for the units that establish, control, or finance them.

Cariño (Cariño, 2002: 11-15) identifies other types of non-stock, non-profit organisations such as religious orders/congregations, political parties, foundations, civic organisations, trade/industry associations, mutual benefit associations, churches, business/professional organisations and some international groups operating in the Philippines, housing associations and charitable organisations.

2. Historical Overview of Civil Society

A historical sketch of the civil society movement in the Philippines can be found in several sources (Alegre, 1996: 25- 42; Clarke, 1998: 52- 67; Cariño, 2002: 27-62). Filipino social values, including that of *damayan* (bonding or assisting one another), *pagtutulungan* (implying a relationship among equals helping each other), and *paghinungod* (or the offering of oneself to others) which existed before the arrival of the Spanish colonisers, were instrumental in the early development of civil society in the Philippines.

Formal philanthropy started with the development of Church *obras pias* (pious works) undertaken by the Spaniards and the indigenous population in the 17th and 18th centuries. Catholic orders were also instrumental in setting up the first schools and hospitals in the country, and the Church formed religious associations which acted as a force to reduce "immorality" among Filipinos, especially in rural areas. In the late 19th century, cooperative organisations were set up by Filipino ilustrados who were influenced by the concepts and principles of modern "cooperativism" and the philanthropic organisations set up by wealthy families. The roots of the revolutionary movement that fought for independence against Spanish rule began with the creation of Filipino self-help groups.

In the early years of the 20th century, during the American occupation, various welfare agencies set up by the American colonial government, including charitable organisations that provided education and health services to the poor, were instituted by women. The

political environment of tolerance and openness during this period also allowed the creation of new groupings, such as labour unions, farmers' groups, and professional, youth and student groups. The Philippine Corporation Code of 1906 was instrumental in the founding of these groups as it formally recognised the right to create private non-profit organisations.

By the late 1940s and early 1950s, the first generation of NGOs were created. These included the Council of Welfare Agencies of the Philippines (an umbrella of various welfare agencies), the Philippine Rural Reconstruction Movement (which promoted the implementation of health, education, and socioeconomic services in the agricultural sector), and the Institute of Social Order (a Catholic-run institution which helped organise farmers' and workers' movements around the country).

In the 1960s, up until the 1970s, more radical organisations were founded that pushed for more fundamental changes in society. These included urban poor organisations such as the Zone One Tondo Organisation that resisted government efforts against the demolition of informal settlements in Manila, and youth groups such as the National Union of Students in the Philippines that supported the lobby for agrarian reform undertaken by farmers' groups. The Catholic Church also founded social action centres that tackled social problems in various dioceses around the country. Business was also drawn into development work through the creation of the Philippine Business for Social Progress which facilitated economic development efforts in various areas and the Bishops Businessmen's Conference which also advocated for policy reforms. The Association of Foundations was also founded during this time. This period also saw a mushrooming of cooperativism, with the creation of various regional cooperative groups such as the Mindanao Alliance of Self-Help Societies-Southern Philippines Education Cooperative Centre in Mindanao, the Visayas Cooperative Development Centre, the Credit Life Mutual Benefit Services Association (also in Mindanao), and the National Confederation of Cooperatives.

During the martial law period and the Marcos dictatorship between 1972 and 1986, NGOs were created to organise basic sectors to resist the authoritarian government and to assist these sectors in terms of their social and economic needs. The Church was also involved in various socio-political organising campaigns in the grassroots. When democratic restoration started in the mid 1980s, civil society groups were recognised as key players in government and there was a proliferation of these types of groups.

3. Mapping Civil Society

A small group of academic experts and NGO leaders were convened in early to mid 2009 to develop a 'social forces map,' which tried to locate the political, economic and social influence of civil society in the Philippines. The output of this small group became inputs during the discussions of the Advisory Committee that finalised the map. Two maps were developed – one for Philippine society in general, and another for civil society in particular.

The Philippine social map classified socio-economic groups into state agencies, market oriented groups, armed groups, and civil society groups. While there may be overlaps among these different groups, this could be a useful classification in describing the configuration of the sectors in Philippine society. State organisations comprise the Presidency, the two chambers of Congress, the national legislature (the 24-member Senate and the House of Representatives), the Supreme Court (the highest judicial body), LAKAS-KAMPI (the dominant party up to June 2010), and military and foreign financial institutions, especially the World Bank.

The Presidency wields significant powers in the Philippine political system. According to the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the President has full control over the executive or the implementing agencies of the government. Other specific powers expressly designated by the country's fundamental law include the powers of supervision over local government units such as provinces, cities, municipalities and *barangays*, and autonomous regions (which are politico-administrative subdivisions in the country that have some self-ruling powers), appointment of all the heads and officers of the civilian bureaucracy and military, granting of executive clemency, control and supervision of the armed forces, contract and guarantee of foreign loans, entering into agreements with foreign governments, and the development of an annual appropriations bill (Buensalida and Constantino, 2010: 2-13). In addition, the Administrative Code of 1987 grants the President additional powers such as the powers of "eminent domain" and recovery of "ill-gotten wealth" and supervision and control of foreigners. The legislative chamber also specifies the powers of the President in the course of implementing the laws that have been passed by Congress. Thus, the Presidency is a central figure in Philippine society. In fact, more recently, the Presidency has expanded its powers to serve the political objectives of its most recent occupant, who has pushed back attempts to institute a system of checks and balances to limit presidential powers (Rose-Ackerman, Desierto, Volosin, 2010: 6-8).

The Senate and the House of Representatives comprise the main law-making bodies, the powers of which include the passage and enactment of legislation (including the annual appropriations, revenue generating measures and franchises, certificates or authorisation of the operation of public utilities), the conduct of legislative investigations, canvassing of national elections, oversight functions, and providing checks to presidential powers. The political party with the highest number of legislators in the House of Representatives is the LAKAS Christian and Muslim Democrats, which merged with the Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI), to become the dominant party in the House of Representatives. However, after the 2010 national elections, the Liberal Party, the party of the current President, is now the dominant party. The Senate has a mix of parties, with no party being in the majority.

The Supreme Court has played an important role as a final arbiter of laws in the country. The Supreme Court reviews cases decided by the lower courts on appeal or by "original jurisdiction" in areas established by the Philippine Constitution. The Supreme Court also supervises the different courts of the country.

The military has played a large role in Philippine society, particularly right after the declaration of martial law in 1972. Then Philippine president, Ferdinand Marcos, allowed military officers into the civilian bureaucracy and the military "became a partner of [the President] in governance" (Carolina, 2002: 28). Even after the restoration of political democracy, certain sections of the military have launched attempted coups d'état, the most serious being that which took place in 1989. The latest incident occurred in 2007, when high-ranking officers walked out of their trial and marched through the streets of Metro Manila with the support of some political figures.

Regarding the market-led institutions in the country, the main forces include "big business," the "landed elite," the entertainment industry, and the media industry. "Big business" has been used as a term to describe the largest corporations in the Philippines or their owners. The largest corporations (by gross revenues) include the three big oil companies, local affiliates of multinational semiconductor processing firms (many of which export their products), food processing companies, telecommunications companies, and pharmaceuticals and drug retailers. The wealthiest individuals include owners of the largest retail chain in the country, the biggest cigarette and alcohol companies, and a diversified conglomerate mainly in the services sector. Their wealth comes from a combination of luck and business acumen. However, for many in business, their success has also come from their influence in the political system (see for example, Hutchcroft, 1998: 6-12).

Another influential bloc is the landed elite, which mainly controls a significant portion of agricultural land, although the enactment of an agrarian reform programme in 1988 has started to weaken their economic and political base. Many of the members of this class serve as officials in local government units or as members of the national legislature, and as such retain significant power to hinder the implementation of reforms, especially in the area of economic modernisation and assets redistribution.

The mass media, which is mostly privately owned, is also another social power base. They strongly influence people's views and societal norms, especially among young people and lower income classes. Several mass media surveys undertaken by the Social Weather Stations have shown that television and radio are the most important sources of information for the people. Mass media has intersected with the entertainment industry, as there are many personalities that cut across television, radio, and the movie industry.

The last group that impacts society, besides civil society, are the armed groups. The outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines, and its armed wing, the New People's Army, runs one of the last left-wing insurgencies in Asia. They are still an influential force in many areas and are present in 60 of 79 provinces. In addition, they have at least 5,000 armed members (down from around 11,000 in 2001 and more than 25,000 during their peak in the mid 1980s). Their continuing presence is due to the fact that they function as "another state structure" in isolated areas of the country (Human Development Network, 2005: 82-96).

Muslim insurgencies are another force within Philippine society. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was founded in 1969 as a direct result of the massacre of

Muslim military recruits by their Christian officers in 1968 and the massacre of Muslim families by Christian vigilantes in Mindanao during 1970-72. Subsequent negotiations with the government in the 1970s and 1990s resulted in a peace accord in 1996. There are still armed elements that undertake sporadic violent activities. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed in 1984 from a series of organisational splits within the MNLF. This group is currently in peace negotiations with the government. Finally in this cluster, the Abu Sayyaf has been classified as a terrorist organisation due to a rash of kidnap-for-ransom incidents in the 1990s and 2000s in which it was involved.

Major civil society groups include business associations such as the Makati Business Club, church affiliated groups such as the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines, the Iglesia ni Kristo, the El Shaddai movement and the Catholic Educators Association of the Philippines, academic institutions (including those owned by religious organisations) and research groups, unorganised migrant and diaspora groups abroad, NGOs and people's organisations.

In the civil society map identified by the Advisory Committee, the most influential groups were held to be the following:

- The Caucus of Development NGO Networks, which is the largest association of non-governmental organisations in the Philippines. Its members include Philippine Business for Social Progress (a social development organisation founded by business groups), the Association of Foundations (a network of private foundations), the National Confederation of Cooperatives (one of the largest cooperative networks in the country), the Partnership of Philippine Support Service Agencies (a network of NGOs focused on socialised housing), the National Council for Social Development (an association of social welfare focused NGOs), and the Philippine Partnership for the Development of Human Resources in Rural Areas (a grouping of rural-focused NGOs). Also part of CODE-NGO are regional NGOs, including those in the western, central and eastern politico-administrative regions of the Visayas island group, Bicol region (in the southern tip of Luzon island), Cordillera region (northern part of Luzon) and Mindanao;
- Local donor agencies and foundations, including the Peace and Equity Foundation, the Foundation for Sustainable Society Inc., the Foundation for Philippine Environment and the Philippine Tropical Forest Conservation Foundation, which have provided substantial resources for sustainable development and poverty reduction;
- Advocacy groups, including Social Watch Philippines, which promote increased awareness of, and participation in, social development concerns in government. Other advocacy groups include the Freedom from Debt Coalition (a network of NGOs, people's organisations, and individuals that have lobbied for reduction in the dependence of Philippine government on foreign aid), the Philippine Association of Human Rights Advocates, the Transparency and Accountability Network (which provides anti-corruption and good governance programmes),

and the Former Senior Government Officials, a grouping of ex-Cabinet secretaries and undersecretaries that have advocated for good governance reforms;
- NGOs such as the Institute for Popular Democracy, the Alternative Law Group network, and health groups;
- The Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, a militant multi-sectoral group;
- Peoples' organisations and trade unions. The large trade federations include the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, the Federation of Free Workers, the Alliance of Progressive Labour, and the Kilusang Mayo Uno;
- Religious associations, the most prominent being the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, which groups Catholic diocesan leaders. Other religious groups are Protestant and evangelical groups (some of which belong to the National Council of Churches in the Philippines or the Philippine Evangelical Council of Churches), and Muslim groups (such as the National Ulama Conference and other local ulama groups). There are also groups affiliated to, but not part of the Church hierarchy, such as the Catholic Couples for Christ, Legion of Mary, the Protestant Philippine Bible Society, and others. Educational associations affiliated with religious groups are also prominent, such as the Catholic Educators' Association of the Philippines and the Association of Christian Schools, Colleges, and Universities;
- Private academic institutions, which are critical in youth training and in advocacy for social change. Many of these institutions are affiliated with religious educational institutions;
- Survey firms such as the Social Weather Stations and Pulse Asia;
- Professional associations, including the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (for lawyers) and the Philippine Institute of Certified Public Accountants (for accountants);
- The Makati Business Club, one of the most active business groups in the Philippines, founded in 1981 to enable the business community to participate in national affairs. There are other business associations such as the Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (the largest trade federation in the country), the Federation of Philippine Industry (mainly composed of domestic industries), the Philippine Export Confederation, and the Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce;
- Microfinance institutions and corporate foundations (many of the latter are affiliated with the League of Corporate Foundations);
- The Philippine Council for NGO Certification, which certifies non-profit groups meeting public standards of financial management and accountability;
- Electoral watchdogs such as the National Movement for Free Elections and the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting; and
- Socio-civic groups such as the local affiliates of Rotary International, Junior Chamber International (JCI), and the Lions Clubs.

There is currently no single reference that maps the different NGO actors in the Philippines. The abovementioned groups provide a sample of the major networks and groups of NGOs in the Philippines based on the knowledge of the Advisory Committee. It is by no means an exhaustive list of all the various civil society groups in the Philippines.

FIGURE II.3.1 Social Forces Map in the Philippines



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FIGURE II.3.2 Philippine Civil Society Map



III. ANALYSIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY

1. Civic Engagement

TABLE III.1.1 Summary scores for civic engagement dimension

Dimension: Civic Engagement		54.7
1.1	Extent of socially-based engagement	47.6
1.2	Depth of socially-based engagement	43.7
1.3	Diversity of socially-based engagement	95.7
1.4	Extent of political engagement	21.5
1.5	Depth of political engagement	32.2
1.6	Diversity of political engagement	87.7

Civic Engagement is the first core dimension assessed by CSI. It refers to the extent to which individuals engage in active citizenship through various social and policy related interactions (CIVICUS, 2008: 1-3). Social engagements refer to activities within the public sphere where individuals interact with others, while political engagements refer to activities through which individuals advance shared interests of a political nature, such as rallies and legislative lobbying.

The areas being examined more specifically are the following: a) the extent of engagement of citizens as members and/or volunteers of organisations, associations and networks, b) the frequency (or 'depth') of engagement of these individuals in these groups, and c) the diversity of engagement of individuals in these groups, including membership distribution across sex, age, socio-economic background, ethnicity and geographical location. The total score for civic engagement is 54.7, which is the mean of the scores of extent, depth and diversity of engagement in socially-based organisations, and the extent, depth and diversity of political engagement.

Participation in civil society is enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution. The Constitution contains specific provisions on the promotion of 'non-governmental, community-based or sectoral organisations' (Article II, section 23), on respect, by the state, of the role of "independent people's organisations" to pursue their collective interest (Article XIII, section 15), and the right of people and their organisations to participate in decision-making (Article XIII, section 16). Given that the country's laws value the organisation of civil society groups and also that the civil society groups have had a long history in the Philippines, it should be expected that participation in civil society would be quite high.

TABLE III.1.2 Membership in CSOs

Membership	***Active Member***	***Inactive member***	***Do not belong***
All civil society groups	45.7%	37.0%	17.3%

Source: CSI population survey.

Based on the population survey, almost half of the respondents (45.7%) consider themselves as active members of at least one CSO, either an organisation with a political engagement, or one with a social engagement. This compares favourably with civil society participation in other countries in Asia, such as South Korea and Indonesia (Ibrahim, 2006: 10; Joo, et. al., 2006: 29). Table III.1.2 shows membership in CSOs.

1.1 Extent and depth of socially-based engagement

More than four in ten (43.4%) of respondents in the population survey consider themselves active members of at least one organisation engaged in social activities. This includes religious organisations, sports or recreational organisations, art or educational organisations, and cooperatives. Including inactive members, about 76.6% of the respondents are members of at least one social organisation. Table III.1.3 shows membership in social organisations.

TABLE III.1.3 Membership in social organisations

Type of social organisation	*Active member*	*Inactive member*	*Do not belong*
Church or religious organisation	34.2%	20.4%	45.4%
Cooperatives	12.2%	6.9%	80.9%
Sports or recreational organisation	10.1%	8.4%	81.6%
Art, music, or education organisation	6.0%	5.3%	88.7%
All social organisations	43.4%	33.2%	23.4%
Two or more organisations	34.2%		

Source: CSI population survey.

Filipinos are most active in church or religious organisations, with about one-third (34.2%) of the sample being active members. This is followed by cooperatives, with 12.2% of the sample as active members. Sports organisations come next, followed by organisations undertaking youth work and those involved in health. Among active members, 34.2% are active in more than one type of social organisation. As stated in the civil society history above, people's involvement in Church groups pre-dates participation in non-Church voluntary groups.

TABLE III.1.4 Volunteering in social organisations

Type of organisation with social membership	*%*
Church or religious organisation	31.1
Sports or recreational organisation	13.8
Social welfare	10.1
Organisations concerned with health	8.9
Youth work	6.9
Art, music or education organisation	4.3
Volunteering in at least one type of organisation	47.4
Volunteering in more than two organisations	33.2

Source: WVS Philippine population survey (2001).

In addition to the population survey, the study derived data on volunteering from the 2001 World Values Survey. Table III.1.4 shows the proportion of the sample participating in volunteer work. The data indicates that 47.4% of Filipinos volunteer in at least one type of organisation. They engage in unpaid work for various organisations. These include social welfare, church or religious, cultural (art, music or education), youth, sports or recreational and health organisations. Among those who volunteer, 33.2% do so in more than one type of social organisation.

As a means of quantifying community engagement, the survey also sought to identify how often the respondents spent time in sports clubs or voluntary/service organisations. More than half (51.0%) of the sample responded that they do so more than once a year.

1.2 Extent and depth of politically-based engagement

About one quarter of the sample (25.6%) consider themselves active members of at least one political organisation. These include labour unions, environmental organisations, professional associations, humanitarian or charitable organisations, non-governmental organisations, people's organisations, and consumer organisations. Membership in at least one political organisation increases to 35.1% of the sample if inactive members are included in the count. Table III.1.5 presents data on membership in political organisations.

TABLE III.1.5 Membership in political organisations

Type of political organisation	*Active member*	*Inactive member*	*Do not belong*
People's organisations	9.6%	5.0%	85.2%
Humanitarian or charitable associations	9.2%	5.0%	85.8%
Conservation, environmental, animal rights organisations	8.2%	5.4%	86.4%
Labour unions	5.6%	6.6%	87.8%
Consumer organisations	5.5%	3.0%	91.5%
Non-governmental organisations	5.0%	3.6%	91.4%
Professional associations	3.7%	3.6%	92.7%
All types	25.6%	8.5%	74.9%

Source: CSI population survey.

Compared to social organisations, respondents are less active in political organisations. Active membership in political organisations is highest in people's organisations where it stands at 9.6%. Among those active in political organisations, 42.5% are active in more than one type of organisation.

Data from the 2001 World Values Survey shows that, in terms of volunteerism in political organisations, 27.5% of those surveyed indicated they were doing unpaid work for

political organisations. This includes 11.2% of the respondents who indicated that they were doing unpaid volunteer work for a peace movement, and 9.0% who reported that they were volunteering for conservation, environmental or animal rights organisations. Table III.1.6 below shows the data for volunteering in political organisations.

TABLE III.1.6 Volunteering in political organisations

Type of political organisation	*% of sample*
Peace movements	11.2
Conservation, environment, animal rights	9.0
Women's groups	8.8
Local community action	6.5
Human rights	5.7
Political parties	3.8
Labour unions	3.3
Professional associations	2.7

Source: WVS Philippine population survey (2001).

The CSI population survey also sought to know whether the respondents had engaged in any of the following three forms of activism during the previous five years: signing a petition, joining a boycott or attending peaceful demonstrations. Around 15.1% of those surveyed indicated that they had done at least one of these activities, while 3.3% had engaged in more than one type.

TABLE III.1.7 Participation in political activities

Type of political activity	*% of sample*
Attended peaceful demonstration	9.6
Signed a petition	7.0
Joined a boycott	2.5
Undertook at least one activity	15.1
Undertook more than one activity	3.3

Source: CSI population survey.

1.3 Diversity of social and political engagement

FIGURE III.1.1 Diversity in CSOs membership



Source: CSI population survey.

This indicator examines whether participation within civil society is inclusive. The memberships of five groups are examined in particular: women, poorest social class, ethnic minorities, rural population, and the Mindanao population.[5] This could provide a measure of the diversity of participation in civil society groups across different categories – gender, income level, socio-ethnic group, area of residence, and regional location.

Figure III.1.1 shows that among the active members of social organisations, 50% are women, 15% come from the poorest social class, 12% are from minority groups, 43% originate from rural areas and 33% come from Mindanao. Active members of political organisations are composed of the following respondents: 47% are women, 10% originate from the poorest social class, 13% are from minority groups, 49% are from rural areas and 37% originate from Mindanao.

In order to assess if these groups are adequately represented in the membership of civil society organisations, a diversity score is computed by dividing the percentage of a group within all active members by the percentage of a group within the entire population. The scores for the five groups are presented in Figure III.1.2.

For example, half of all active members in social organisations are women, and half of all survey respondents are also women. Thus, the ratio for women's participation is 1.00, which means that their representation in civil society is equal to their proportion in the population. All five sub-groups, except for those with lowest incomes, obtain ratios that are close to or even exceed 1.00. This shows that Philippine civil society is relatively inclusive. The lowest ratio obtained is for the political membership of the poorest class of society.

[5]Mindanao, the second largest island in the southern part of the Philippines, contains the poorest administrative regions and provinces in the country. Eight of the 15 poorest provinces can be located in the island.

FIGURE III.1.2 Diversity scores for membership in CSOs



Source: CSI population survey.

1.4 Comparison of 2001 and 2009 results

The study also compared the results of the 2009 CSI population survey and the 2001 World Values Survey, both of which used roughly the same methodology and were carried out by the same survey organisation. The proportions of the sample of members of various types of CSOs in both surveys are similar in both years. However, the proportion of members of a sports or recreation organisation is marginally lower in 2009 compared to 2001.

TABLE III.1.8 Comparison of active membership in 2001 and 2009

Type of Organisation	***2001***	***2009***
Church or religious	32.8%	34.2%
Sports or recreation organisations	13.5%	10.1%
Conservation or environmental organisations	8.2%	8.2%
Art, music, or education organisations	5.9%	6.0%
Trade unions	3.9%	5.6%
Political parties	4.3%	5.1%
Professional associations	4.4%	3.7%

Source: CSI population survey; WVS Philippine population survey.

Explaining lower rates of political engagement vis-à-vis social engagement (see Appendix 3)

One of the paradoxes that a CSI case study reveals is that there is a relatively lower level of participation in organisations engaged in political activities compared to those engaged in social activities. Oreta, in a CSI Philippine case study (Oreta, forthcoming) explains this contradiction. She notes that Filipinos have a "natural tendency to get involved with the

affairs of others" and Filipino cultural values have allowed them to become readily engaged in responding to social issues. However, civil society groups, according to the study, have not provided a clear framework for citizens to participate in political issues. At the same time, people have become increasingly aware of the shortcomings of the political system, for instance, corruption and abuse of authority, especially in the past several years. This, the study suggests, has not helped to reduce the cynicism of ordinary citizens that inhibits participation in political campaigns, because these are seen as suspect and unlikely to lead to improvements in social well-being. Therefore, it is necessary to effectively institute mechanisms that would allow for more authentic participation, especially of the poor and marginalised, so that people can be motivated to participate in the political system.

CONCLUSION

The civic engagement scores show that participation in civil society groups, especially social organisations, is quite widespread. This is due to the fact that, in the Philippines, there is a long tradition of civic engagement, especially at the *barangay* (village) level and there has been a generally positive association with civil society groups given the sector's role in democratic restoration. Civil society has also provided a mediating mechanism to channel the socio-economic demands of marginalised groups.

However, the participation of the section of civil society associated with political engagement still needs to be improved. Given that the average Filipino tends to have a cynical view of the possibilities of reforming the polity and those who are involved, the civil society sector should engage the citizenry through more intensive political education. Civil society organisations that are undertaking social action should also examine how political engagement could sustain their actions, while those undertaking political action could study how providing support to socio-economic needs of their members can intensify their efforts.

At the same time, there should be increased efforts to integrate the poorest income households and indigenous groups so that they can better participate in civil society. Thus, efforts should be geared towards developing the political and regulatory environment to improve participation by the poorest and the indigenous in civil society groups.

2. Level of Organisation

TABLE III.2.1 Summary scores for level of organisation dimension

Dimension: Level of Organisation		57.9
2.1	Internal governance	94.4
2.2	Infrastructure	63.3
2.3	Sectoral communication	67.3
2.4	Human resources	38.9
2.5	Financial and technological resources	69.3
2.6	International linkages	14.5

The second core dimension of CSI is the level of organisation. This dimension examines the organisational development of civil society as a whole by exploring six sub-dimensions: internal governance, infrastructure, sectoral communication, human resources, financial and technological resources, and international linkages (CIVICUS, 2008). The total score for this dimension is 57.9%.

Internal governance is measured by the presence of a board of directors or a similar body. A board is crucial in offering accountability from the management and staff of a non-profit organisation, helping to ensure that its programmes are in line with the organisation's purpose and that its resources are not improperly used.

Support infrastructure refers to the presence of a network or umbrella organisation that is able to provide support to members within a sector. This is measured by the average number of federations or umbrella bodies of related organisations that CSOs belong to. Connections and networks within civil society are a sign of strength, although not necessarily in all contexts. Networks and umbrella groups that have extensive membership have also been observed within some non-democratic political environments (CIVICUS, 2008).

The human resource dimension examines the sustainability of civil society's human resources, which could provide some indication of the ability of an organisation to retain staff. Financial and technological resource indicators assess the funding sources and financial sustainability of an organisation. Changes in revenues and expenses are used to indicate financial sustainability. This sub-dimension also assesses organisations' access to technology.

The last sub-dimension for the level of organisation dimension is international linkages, which assesses the presence of international networks. This is measured by the number of international NGOs present in the country as a ratio to the total number of known international NGOs.

2.1 Internal governance

Boards of directors or boards of trustees, as they are often referred to in non-profit organisations in the Philippines, are essential as they are accountable for the governance of their organisations and are in a good position to monitor the performance of their organisations' management.

Based on the organisational survey undertaken for this survey, 94.4% of CSOs indicated that they have a board of directors or similar body in their organisations. NGOs put a lot of effort into determining the size, composition and responsibilities of their boards (Domingo, 2005). Large organisations also have formal programme and planning review systems in place. However, this indicator may not present a full picture of internal governance among CSOs in the Philippines. This is because a board is required for any non-profit organisation to be registered and to acquire legal status. While registration per se is not required, organisations need to have a legal personality in order to be able to open bank accounts, enter into contracts and raise public funds (CODE-NGO, 2008).

A better measure would be to see if these boards meet regularly, a prerequisite for a board to function well. Roughly two-thirds of the organisations in the survey reported that they have board meetings at least once every quarter, while close to 10% did not meet regularly. A further indicator of good governance is whether board members are chosen through a democratic process. More than two-thirds of organisational respondents (67.9%) chose their board through an election by members. More than one in ten respondents (11.9%) had boards that were chosen by the board members themselves, while the rest were selected either by a leader or the management and staff.

Aldaba (2001) and Abella and Dimalanta (2003) identify lack of board accountability as one of the internal management issues confronting Philippine NGOs. According to their studies, "most NGO boards are nominal, inactive, and/or disinterested in their governance functions" (Abella and Dimalanta, 2003: 245), and they give several reasons. First, it is common in Philippine NGOs to have board members who are friends or relatives of the founders. Many individuals are also invited to become board members in a bid to use their reputation to lend credibility to an organisation. Second, NGOs "lack the discipline of distinguishing between the policy making functions of the boards and the managing functions of the chief executive officer (CEO)" (Abella and Dimalanta, 2003, p.245). Third, they affirm that board members are often not properly oriented on their roles and responsibilities. Often board members merely approve or disapprove proposals. They only become actively involved when major problems arise.

As a response to this situation, a few umbrella organisations have begun to offer training in board governance. The Association of Foundations (AF), a network of Philippine foundations, and CODE-NGO, have started organising board governance training seminars for their member organisations. However, orientations have proved to be insufficient to instil effective board governance, as governance problems were still encountered in some of the organisations that received training.

It is not easy to become an effective board member, given that the work is voluntary and no monetary compensation is given in the Philippines. The challenges facing CSOs can be daunting, especially those concerning financial sustainability. It becomes more difficult for a board member who also serves as a CEO of another organisation to balance the demands and concerns of both organisations, especially if both have financial difficulties.

In a study of Philippine CSOs, most of which were considered by influential members of society to be performing well, Domingo (2005) asserts that only a small percentage of board members are aware of their expected roles. Most learn the ropes gradually as they become actively involved in an organisation. The study also confirmed that board members do not actually perform the important roles expected of them and that board member training is necessary.

Poor board governance as such leads to situations where leadership is left entirely to the CEO or executive director. The CEO becomes solely responsible for mapping out the strategic direction of an organisation and ensuring its financial sustainability. Often there is no one who effectively checks how an organisation is being managed. There have

been some instances in which CSOs have misrepresented their objectives and activities, and these organisations have had their certificate of registration revoked (Caucus of Development NGO Networks and Charity Commission, 2008: 59).

There have been numerous efforts to strengthen accountability among Philippine CSOs; foremost among them is the establishment of the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC), which is a self-regulating mechanism for ensuring a standard of good governance among organisations through a rigorous process. However, after eight years of existence, PCNC has only certified 1,000 organisations among the tens of thousands of non-profit organisations that exist.

Part of the problem is that many organisations do not feel the need for PCNC accreditation. PCNC accreditation gives an organisation the status of a 'donee institution' recognised by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This exempts donations received by the organisation from the donor's tax. However, this benefit is only applicable to a small fraction of Philippine CSOs that receive local donations. In addition, many organisations find the PCNC certification relatively expensive and laborious to undertake

Also, the Institute of Corporate Directors, a locally based institution, is undertaking several programmes in the business sector but is also extending its services to civil society groups. These could also supplement the initiatives undertaken by NGO networks that have developed codes of conduct to guide their respective members to function ethically. Some examples are the following:

- In 1990, CODE-NGO established a 'Code of Conduct for Development NGOs' that would help the network police its own ranks and strengthen accountability of individual organisations.
- The Association of Foundations and the Philippine Support Service Agencies prepare an annual report card of their members as a form of peer-review of non-government agencies.
- The Children and Youth Foundation Philippines, a funding organisation based in Makati, provides prospective grantees a self-assessment tool that they can utilise to evaluate their own operations before they request financial support from the foundation.

2.2 Support infrastructure

Many networks, coalitions and umbrella organisations have been formed in the long history of Philippine civil society. Networking is beneficial to CSOs as it provides them opportunities for sharing knowledge and resources, as well as greater strength in advancing their shared interests. Several past NGO surveys show that numerous NGOs and POs have connected with each other through coalitions and networks. In the late 1990s, for example, more than half of the respondents (around 56%) in an NGO survey reported that network/coalition-building is one of their greatest strengths (Association of Foundations, 1999).

Among the organisations surveyed for this study, about two-thirds (63.3%) are formal members of a network or umbrella group. At least one-third of farmers/fishers groups, homeowners' associations and religious groups, and at least half of other types of organisations (traders/business associations and socio-civic groups) are members of a network. This shows that membership in networks is widespread across different sectors.

Coalitions and networks have proved to be powerful in pushing for changes in the Philippines. The 1986 People Power Revolution which brought down the Marcos dictatorship was a product of multi-sectoral collaboration between political, business, and church organisations and CSOs. This was repeated 15 years later in 2001 when a similar coalition succeeded in impeaching and forcing the resignation of former President Joseph Estrada, who had been accused, and was later convicted, of corruption and plunder.

2.3 Sectoral communication

Part of the measure of a strong civil society is the frequency of inter-CSO communication. Among the organisations surveyed, 70.6% have had a meeting with another organisation within the previous three months before the survey was conducted, while 63.9% have shared information with another organisation. This is indicative of regular communication and information sharing among Philippine CSOs.

However, the lowest incidence of sectoral communication is among farmers/fishers' groups, which falls below 40%. Out of 11 organisations belonging to these groups, seven have not met or exchanged information with another organisation in a three month period. It is hypothesised that financial constraints could be a factor. Farmers and fishers are among the poorest in the Philippines, and their organisations often rely on the resources of their own members and officers. Meeting with other groups entails transport and other incidental expenses which these organisations may not be able to afford.

Given that the growth of CSOs can be tied to the number of networks that they belong to, that is, networks can lead to sharing of financial and human resources and can contribute to the adoption of new technologies and ways of conducting work, there is a need to support linkage activities in rural areas.

Government and donor support can be critical in this regard. For example, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the government agency in charge of social welfare programmes, continues to support the creation of area-based standards networks, which link different social development groups that are accredited by the DSWD to undertake programs for the socially marginalised. This can also be undertaken by other government agencies to improve the standards of governance for other CSOs with other concerns.

2.4 Human resources

In order to evaluate the sustainability of the human resources of a particular organisation, the ratio of paid staff to the total number of staff and volunteers is calculated. An organisation is deemed to have sustainable human resources if paid staff comprise at

least 25% of the total personnel. Using this measure, only about one-third (34.6%) of organisations surveyed are deemed to have sustainable human resources.

Table III.2.2 below shows the ratio of volunteers to paid staff in various types of civil society groups interviewed in the organisational survey. The ratio of volunteers to paid staff is highest among farmers and fishers organisations and cooperatives, with a very high ratio of 11.3, and education groups with a ratio of 2.9. The ratio is lowest among socio-civic groups such as the Rotary Club or the Lions Club and ethnic-based community groups, with a ratio of 1. On average, the ratio of volunteers to paid staff is around 2.3, that is, 2.3 volunteers for every paid staff member.

TABLE III.2.2 Ratio of volunteers to paid staff, by organisation type

Type of organisation	*Ratio of volunteers to paid staff*
Farmers, or fisherfolk organisation or cooperative	11.3
Education group (parent-teacher association, school committee)	2.9
Cooperative, credit or savings group	1.8
Traders or business association	1.5
Trade union or labour union	1.6
Church or religious organisation	1.2
NGO or human rights organisation	1.2
Civic groups (Lions, Rotary)	1.0
Ethnic based community group	1.0
Others	5.5
Average	2.3

Source: CSI organisation survey.

A major concern regarding the sustainability of human resources of Philippine CSOs identified in the literature is the lack of a "successor generation" in civil society that will replace the first generation civil society leaders that emerged after the era of martial law (Abella and Dimalanta, 2003). Development work and community organising have been fertile training grounds for developing civil society leaders, but only a few young people are becoming interested in taking this career path today. High turnover is also a perennial problem for many organisations, especially since many CSOs are unable to provide competitive compensation and job security to their managers and staff.

2.5 Financial and technological resources

TABLE III.2.3 CSOs revenue sources, by organisation type

Organisation type	*Gov't*	*Corporate*	*Foreign*	*Individual donations*	*Member fees*	*Service fees/sales*	*Others*
Farmer / fisher organisations	8.8%	0.0%	0.0%	10.0%	33.2%	28.4%	19.7%
Trader / business association	0.6%	1.9%	0.1%	8.1%	73.5%	15.8%	0.0%
Trade / labour union	0.0%	0.0%	8.0%	0.0%	92.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Homeowners' association	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	80.0%	20.0%	0.0%
Religious / spiritual groups	0.0%	0.0%	14.2%	46.0%	39.6%	0.2%	0.0%
Cooperatives	1.5%	0.3%	1.3%	7.1%	34.1%	39.5%	16.3%
Education organisations	5.1%	0.0%	9.1%	20.2%	16.2%	39.5%	10.0%
Health organisations	3.8%	1.3%	18.0%	32.0%	18.8%	16.3%	10.0%
NGOs	9.9%	11.6%	48.4%	5.5%	0.9%	12.0%	11.7%

Source: CSI organisation survey.

Table III.2.3 shows the income sources for each type of organisation. It is important to note that the averages can be misleading due to the high variance of income sources within most types of organisations.

The farmers' and fishers' organisations surveyed were primarily dependent on either membership fees or service fees and sales revenue, except for three out of 10 organisations, which obtained most of their funding from other sources such as government grants and individual donations. The situation is similar for cooperatives.

Trade or business associations, labour unions and homeowner's associations were primarily dependent on membership fees, which are supplemented by revenues from sales and services, except for one trade union (out of 10) which obtained 80% of its income from a foreign grant.

Religious or spiritual groups obtained their incomes either from individual donations or membership fees. There was one religious organisation (out of five) that obtained 70% of its income from a foreign grant.

The education organisations included non-profit schools, alumni associations, teachers associations and education-related foundations. The non-profit schools obtained their

funding from service fees, and the alumni associations from membership fees. The other organisations obtained income from either individual donations or foreign grants.

All of the NGOs obtained the majority of their income from a mix of foreign and corporate grants, except for one organisation which obtained 100% of its funding from government sources. The findings are similar to those of a study carried out in the late 1990s where NGOs funding sources were shown to be a mix of foreign grants, local fundraising and donations, and earned and membership fees (Association of Foundations, 2001). However, as a whole, funding from government and corporations is quite low for all types of organisations.

Other sources of financial resources included counterpart funding from service partners/ beneficiaries, interest on income, and production sales.

Respondents to the organisational survey were also asked whether their revenues for the fiscal year 2009 had increased or decreased compared to the previous year. Among the respondents, 38.6% indicated that their revenues increased, 37.6% that they had decreased, and 23.8% that their revenues remained the same. With regard to their expenses, 53.5% experienced an increase, 19.8% a decrease and 27.7% no change.

The changes in revenues and expenses of each organisation were compared in order to give a simplified measure for financial sustainability. Organisations that experienced an increase in their expenses while their revenues decreased or remained the same were deemed not financially sustainable. For 36 out of 108 organisations (33%) surveyed, this is the case. Out of these 36 organisations, 38.9% had membership fees as their main source of revenue. Organisations with donations from individuals, service fees or foreign donations as their main revenue source accounted for 10 to 15% each of financially unsustainable organisations.

TABLE III.2.4 Main source of revenue for financially unsustainable organisations

Main source of revenue (one source for 75 or more of total revenues)	*Number*	*%*
Membership fees	14	38.9
Individual donations	5	13.9
Service fee / sales	4	11.1
Foreign donors	4	11.1
Diversified revenue	4	11.1
Government	2	5.6
Others	3	8.3
TOTAL	36	100.0

Source: CSI organisation survey.

The recent economic crisis and the resulting financial difficulties for people in general may have resulted in the reduction in payments of membership fees, service fees/sales

revenues, and individual donations. Foreign grants, however, have been continuously declining since they peaked in the late 1980s, the period immediately after the 1986 People Power Revolution. Geopolitical priorities for development assistance have shifted to other regions since then (Abella and Dimalanta, 2003). According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (2010), there has been a sizable reduction in the amounts of the ODA grants that the Philippines has received since the mid 1990s (mainly made by bilateral and multilateral agencies and to the national government); from a peak of US$ 900 million in 1993, total grants disbursed has dwindled to a little over US$ 400 million in 2008.

Diversifying sources of income for civil society groups (see Appendix 4)

Because of the dearth of traditional sources of grant income, many CSOs have developed new ways of increasing the availability of their resources. The Venture for Fundraising case study for the Civil Society Index study (Venture for Fundraising, forthcoming) provides two cases of organisations that have diversified their income base. The first case captures the experience of SOS Village Foundation, a Philippine affiliate of an international social welfare organisation dedicated to assisting neglected children, which undertook a 'direct mail campaign' to different organisations and individuals; the organisation was able to raise over P 1 million (around US$ 23,000) net through its campaign. The second case highlights the experience of Pangarap Foundation, founded by religious organisations to provide social protection for children, in widening its resource base outside grant funding; from 2006 to 2009, it raised over P 25 million (around US$ 580,000) by holding special activities, direct mailing and appeals, and soliciting gifts from donors.

In the Philippines, many civil society groups are exempt from payment of income taxes. The 1997 National Internal Revenue Code provides for the exemption of non-stock, non-profit corporations from income taxation, provided they are registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the government agency in charge of collection of local taxes. There are many types of CSOs exempt from taxes, including non-profit labour or agricultural organisations, mutual savings and cooperative banks created for mutual purposes and not for profit, beneficiary societies, cemetery companies owned and operated exclusively for their members, business leagues or chambers of commerce, civic leagues, non-stock and non-profit and government educational institutions, and mutual or cooperative organisations. However, income from properties and from interest earned from bank deposits are subject to tax.

Donations to civil society groups that are non-profit can be tax deductible as long as these organisations are accredited by the Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC). Established in 1999 by six national NGO networks, including CODE-NGO, in partnership with the Department of Finance (DOF) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the PCNC certifies non-profit organisations after a stringent review of their qualifications. The certification becomes the basis for the BIR granting 'donee institution' status to the organisations certified by PCNC. The Philippine tax code provides for limited deductibility for income taxes for individual (in the amount not exceeding 10% of donations or gifts) and corporate donors (in the amount not exceeding 5%).

More recently, the civil society community has diversified its sources of financial support. There are now local foundations that have been created through debt-for-environment or debt-for-development swaps (Foundation for the Philippine Environment and Foundation for a Sustainable Society, Inc.) with the support of foreign governments or by the participation of civil society groups in the capital markets (Peace and Equity Foundation).

The CSI organisation survey also asked organisations whether they had access to a telephone, a fax machine, a computer and the Internet. More than 70% had regular access to a telephone line, more than 60% had access to a computer, more than 50% had access to a fax machine and more than 50% had access to the Internet or e-mail.

TABLE III.2.5 CSOs access to technology

Technology	*No access*	*Sporadic access*	*Regular access*
Phone line	20.2%	8.3%	71.6%
Fax machine	40.4%	5.5%	54.1%
Computer	22.9%	8.3%	68.6%
Internet or e-mail	34.3%	9.3%	56.5%

Source: CSI organisation survey.

Among all the organisations surveyed, 72.5% had access to three out of the four technologies, indicating a high level of access to basic technologies.

2.6 International linkages

About one in six (14.54%) of the international NGOs listed by the Union of International Associations Database operate in the Philippines.[6] However, some NGOs in Mindanao have observed that more and more international NGOs are beginning to implement projects on their own, rather than letting local NGOs implement these for them. This creates further competition for local NGOs in terms of raising funds for projects, which poses serious problems for local NGOs, given the decreasing availability of funds.

CONCLUSION

One of the key findings of this study is that Philippine CSOs have formal processes for accountability; however, this study did not examine whether these mechanisms work in actuality. There have been anecdotal studies which show that, in many instances, board members have not been empowered to or empowered themselves to judiciously oversee the operations of civil society groups. Recognising this fact, many organisations have offered training seminars in order to improve board accountability, and codes of conduct have been devised to improve accountability of civil society groups to the general public. But it has been recognised that good corporate governance in civil society organisations still has a long way to go.

[6]CODE-NGO and CIVICUS are grateful to the Union of International Associations for this information.

Another key finding is that the infrastructure (in terms of the presence of networks), financial and technological resources and sectoral communication are quite good. CSOs have a long history of linking with each other through local and national alliances and coalitions, and these links have thrived over time. For example, the National Council for Social Development, the coalition of social welfare agencies, has been in existence for 63 years, while the National Confederation of Cooperatives (NATCCO), one of the largest cooperative alliances in the country, has been in existence for 34 years. Surprisingly, the indicator score on financial and technological resources is quite good; many CSOs are relying on internal resources (through membership fees and service fees) and thus are quite stable compared to their counterparts that rely more on external resources (such as grants).

Human resources had a low indicator score in this study. Given the voluntary nature of work in many civil society groups, it is not surprising that Philippine civil society groups had a low ranking in this aspect. One of the reasons that may have caused this is that the core value of volunteerism and service to society may have diminished during the past years due to the loss of financial resources available to CSOs and the flourishing of work within the sector as a professional career. Currently, civil society leaders admit that there has been a problem of attracting young people and students in organising civil society groups, given that the current crop of leaders are in their middle age. It has been observed that it is more difficult to retain good middle managers within civil society given that opportunities also exist for development work in government.

3. Practice of Values

TABLE III.3.1 Summary scores for practice of values dimension

Dimension: Practice of Values		48.9
3.1	Democratic decision-making governance	69.7
3.2	Labour regulations	29.4
3.3	Code of conduct and transparency	45.7
3.4	Environmental standards	30.8
3.5	Perception of values in civil society as a whole	69.1

The third dimension of the CSI is the internal practice of values. This dimension assesses whether civil society practices what it preaches in terms of democratic decision-making, labour regulations, codes of conduct and transparency, and environmental standards. Democratic decision-making encompasses how and by whom decisions are made within CSOs. Labour regulations include the existence of equal opportunity policies, staff membership in labour unions, training in labour rights for new staff and a publicly available policy on labour standards. Code of conduct and transparency includes the presence of codes of conduct and the availability of financial statements. Environment standards include the presence of policies with regard to environmental issues.

This dimension also assesses the perception of values such as non-violence, democracy, trustworthiness, and tolerance within civil society. It is important to note that the values being considered here are seen as normative for civil society, and as such CSOs should ideally uphold and promote these values.

3.1 Democratic decision-making

About a third (37.6%) of respondents in the organisational survey indicated that key decisions in their organisations were taken by an elected board (see Table III.3.2 below). Elected leaders made the key decisions in 16.5% of the organisations, while members did the same in 14.7%. Only one organisation operated with the staff taking key decisions. More than two-thirds (69.7%) of surveyed organisations are deemed to practice some form of democratic decision-making. In the rest of the organisations, an appointed leader or an appointed board makes the key decisions.

TABLE III.3.2 Key decision makers in CSOs

Key decision-makers in the organisation	*Number of respondents*	*%*
An elected board	41	37.6
An elected leader	18	16.5
An appointed board	17	15.6
An appointed leader	16	14.7
Members	16	14.7
The staff	1	0.9
Total	109	100

Source: CSI organisation survey.

3.2 Labour regulations

Out of the 60 organisations with paid staff, only seven have employees who are union members, while one did not divulge the figure. The rest had no union members among their paid staff. Two organisations had 100% union membership even though they only had 1 or 2 paid staff. As such, the average union membership among paid staff for these 59 organisations is only 5.3%.

Most of the organisations in the sample have very small staff sizes. Within the sample of 60, 39 have fewer than 10 employees inclusive of managers, 17 have 31 or fewer paid employees and 4 have employees ranging from 62 to 218. It is striking that only 2 out of the 21 organisations with more than 10 employees have union members.

Table III.3.3 shows the percentage of organisations with equal opportunity policies, that conduct training on labour rights for new staff, and that have publicly available labour standards. More than half (52.3%) of organisations have an equal opportunity and equal pay policy for women. However, less than 30% conduct training on labour rights and less than 30% have publicly available labour standards.

TABLE III.3.3 Organisations that report good labour practices

Labour practice	*Percentage of organisations*	*Percentage of organisations with paid staff*
Has equal opportunity and equal pay policy for women	52.3%	63.3%
Conducts training on labour rights for new staff	28.7%	43.3%
Have publicly available labour standards	28.0%	38.3%

Source: CSI organisation survey.

The picture is slightly better when looking only at organisations with paid staff (see Table III.3.3 above). Excluding organisations without paid staff presents a more accurate picture, as it is not practical for these organisations to have labour policies and trainings if they do not have employees per se.

While labour contractualisation[7] is a major issue being opposed by many CSOs, especially trade unions, many CSOs also practice contractualisation through project-based hiring of staff. It is argued by CSO managers that such a practice cannot be avoided given the nature of project based operations and the donor dependent funding of many CSOs, especially non-government organisations. Many CSOs are constrained from putting their employees on a more regular footing since there is no certainty that the organisation will be able to obtain future grants with which it could implement projects and pay salaries. Thus, it is important for the sector to develop standards on labour practices that provide protection and fair salaries and benefits to employees of CSOs, while at the same time taking into account the project-based nature of some CSOs. In one of the consultations conducted for this project, it was suggested that as an initial step towards the creation of such standards, civil society should study the legally mandated labour standards that apply to the construction industry, which also operates on a project basis.

Overall, the survey suggests that Philippine CSOs do not fare well in implementing labour standards.

[7]In the Philippines, labour contractualisation means hiring of employees or workers without a permanent wage contract or only on a short-term basis. Under the Philippine Labour Code (Presidential Decree 244), temporary labour contracts are allowed for up to six months' duration, and beyond this period, employees should be made permanent if they will be kept by their employers. The practice is controversial because many employers, including CSOs, do not confer permanent status on their employees after the six month prescriptive period, and contractualisation is sometimes used in order to deny employees certain benefits and labour rights (such as the right to self-organisation and collective bargaining) available only to those in permanent status.

3.3 Code of conduct and transparency

TABLE III.3.4 Presence of a code of conduct among CSOs

	Very small organisation (no paid staff)	Small organisation (1-10 employees)	Medium organisation (11-50 employees)	Big organisation (more than 50 employees)	Full Sample
Have publicly available code of conduct for staff	28.3%	35.9%	52.9%	50.0%	35.8%
Have publicly available financial information	60.0%	61.5%	41.2%	25.0%	56.2%

Source: CSI organisation survey.

Only 35.8% of all organisations surveyed have a publicly available code of conduct for their staff. Disaggregating the data by size of the organisation as determined by their number of paid employees, it is observed that a higher percentage of medium and big organisations have a publicly available code of conduct.

However, it is surprising to note that, based on the survey, smaller organisations are more transparent with regard to their financial information compared to bigger organisations. Over 60% of very small and small organisations (having between zero and 10 employees) have publicly available financial information, which is in stark contrast to medium and big organisations where only 41.2% and 25.0% have such information. Overall, 56.2% of those surveyed reported that their financial information is publicly available.

Respondents in the survey also show that only three out of ten organisations that receive more than 75% of their revenues from foreign donors have publicly available financial information. A higher ratio of organisations with service fees, membership fees or individual donations as their main source of revenue has this information.

TABLE III.3.5 Civil society organizations, by main source of revenues

Main source of revenues (more than 75%)	*Total no. of organisations per type of revenue source*	*No. of organisations with code of conduct*	*% with code of conduct*
Foreign donors	10	3	30
Individual donations	13	9	69
Membership fees	36	23	64
Service fees / sales	17	11	65
Government	2	1	50

Source: CSI organisation survey.

Previous analysis presents a less rosy picture in terms of financial transparency. Aldaba (2002) states that available SEC registration data suggests that less than 50% of non-profit organisations registered with the SEC submit the required annual reports, which include financial statements. The SEC has delisted numerous non-reporting non-profit organisations in the past few years.

3.4 Environmental standards

Less than a third of the organisations surveyed had existing and publicly available environmental standards. More than half of the education-related organisations, trade unions, and homeowners' associations had publicly available environmental standards, while only one of three environment organisations had them. Lack of a written policy on environmentally-friendly practices that could include recycling, waste reduction and carbon footprint reduction suggests that the majority of CSOs have not yet prioritised the initiation and/or institutionalisation of such practices within their office and work environs. Despite the general awareness of CSOs on environmental issues, there is still a lack of knowledge on how to codify environmental norms. Many technologies necessary to improve waste reduction are still prohibitive in terms of costs.

3.5 Perception of values in civil society as a whole

Questions on the perception of whether CSOs uphold values of non-violence, tolerance, trustworthiness, and democracy were included in the organisation survey. Respondents from different CSOs were asked whether these values were being upheld and practiced by CSOs in general.

Organisational respondents were asked whether they were aware of forces within civil society that use violence. Only 27.1% responded in the affirmative, 70.1% in the negative, and 2.8% said they did not know.

Among the 34 respondents who affirmed that they are aware of violence among civil society forces, 5.9% said that they were a significant mass, 20.6% that they were an isolated mass, 44.1% that they were isolated groups that occasionally resorted to violence, and 14.7% that the use of violence by civil society was extremely rare; see Table III.3.6 for disaggregation.

TABLE III.3.6 Perception of use of violence by CSOs

Description of civil society forces that use violence	*No. of respondents*	*% of sample*
Significant mass based groups	2	5.9
Isolated mass based groups	7	20.6
Isolated mass groups occasionally resorting to violence	5	14.7
Use of violence by CS groups is extremely rare	5	14.7
Don't know	5	14.7
TOTAL	34	100

Source: CSI organisation survey.

With regard to civil society's role in promoting democratic decision-making within their own organisations and groups, 76.0% of respondents affirmed that civil society in general had a moderate to significant impact. Almost a third of the respondents also indicated that they perceive corruption within civil society to happen frequently or very frequently. Only 30.8% of the respondents indicated that corruption was very rare in civil society.

TABLE III.3.7 Perception of corruption within civil society

Frequency of instance of corruption	*Respondents*	*%*
Very frequent	11	11.7
Frequent	23	24.5
Occasional	31	33.0
Very rare	29	30.8
Total	94	100%

Source: CSI organisation survey.

Nevertheless, Philippine CSOs continue to enjoy favourable high trust ratings with the public, ranging from a low of 58% for labour unions to a high of 78% for Women's organisations. Table III.3.8 shows the trust rating for different types of CSOs.

TABLE III.3.8 Percentage of the public that trusts CSOs

Type of Organization	*Trust Level*
NGOs	60%
Charitable Organisations	72%
Environmental Organisations	70%
Women's Organisations	78%
Labour Unions	58%
People's Organisations / CBOs	61%
Cooperatives	61%
Churches*	94%
Political Parties*	41%

Source: CSI population survey
* included in the table for purposes of comparison

When asked how many examples of forces within civil society are explicitly racist, discriminatory or intolerant, 50.5% indicated that they know none, or one or two examples, while 34.8% indicated that they know several or many examples, and 29.4% said they did not know of any. Figure III.3.1 summarises the results.

FIGURE III.3.1 Explicitly racist, discriminatory or intolerant forces in civil society



Source: CSI organisation survey.

When asked how these forces relate to the rest of civil society, 38.8% of those who indicated that there are forces that are explicitly racist, discriminatory or intolerant in civil society felt these forces either dominate or are significant actors within civil society. The results indicate that there is a perception by a significant segment of civil society that there is discrimination against certain sectors of society, but that these are not dominant.

CONCLUSION

This study has showed that while CSOs are perceived to practice democratic values, there are some areas in which the values are not fully ingrained in civil society work. This research has unearthed new findings on Philippine civil society that need to be explored in more depth. These include the findings on the impact of civil society on attitudes and the practice of labour and environmental standards. The low scores may be due to the fact that there are no specific standards that have been developed in these areas, even among CSOs who report that they adhere to specific codes of conduct. It may also be due to the fact that there are too few models of practice or the good practices, in terms of environmental and labour standards, in these areas have not been disseminated well.

Also, many CSO networks admit that there have not been many discussions on labour and environment standards among Philippine organisations. At the same time, the weak enforcement systems by Philippine public institutions of the legal norms that are in place allow for the lack of adherence to these standards.

4. Perception of Impact

TABLE III.4.1 Summary scores for impact dimension

Dimension: Perception of Impact		62.8
4.1	Responsiveness (internal perception)	62.0
4.2	Social impact (internal perception)	78.5
4.3	Policy impact (internal perception)	55.0
4.4	Responsiveness (external perception)	73.0
4.5	Social impact (external perception)	83.0
4.6	Policy impact (external perception)	66.6
4.7	Impact of civil society on attitudes	21.4

The fourth core dimension of the CSI seeks to describe and assess the perceived impact of civil society as it strives to exert influence and take action with regard to major issues concerning society. The study looks into the perception of both those within civil society, through the organisational survey, and external stakeholders, through a survey of experts and stakeholders not coming from CSOs. In these two surveys, respondents are asked to assess the impact of civil society on society as a whole and on three specific issues identified by the study's advisory committee. Respondents are also asked to assess the impact of CSOs on social issues and on government policies.

This section will also explore the impact of membership in a CSO on an individual's attitudes in the areas of trust, public spiritedness, and tolerance. It is hypothesised that civil society has a positive impact on these attitudes, given the nature of many CSOs.

4.1 Responsiveness

The advisory committee identified three issues which are most important for civil society in the Philippines. These are fighting corruption, reducing poverty, and protecting the environment. The majority of the respondents of both the external and organisational surveys had a favourable view of the impact of civil society on these three issues. It is interesting to note that for two out of the three issues, external stakeholders perceive a higher impact of civil society compared to the perception of CSOs themselves. More than three quarters of external stakeholders (77.4%) viewed civil society to have some tangible or a high level impact on poverty reduction, as compared to only half of CSOs. The case is the same with environmental protection, where 79.2% of external respondents viewed civil society impact favourably while only 63.9% of CSO respondents did. However, in the case of anti-corruption, CSOs rated civil society impact on the fight against corruption higher on the average than did external stakeholders.

FIGURE III.4.1 Perception of impact of CS on major social/political concerns



Source: CSI organisation survey, CSI external perception survey.

4.2 Social and policy impact

With regard to the general social and policy impact of civil society, the external perception was also higher than the view within CSOs. Respondents were asked to select two fields in which their CSO had been active (for CSO respondents) or in which they have observed CSOs to be most active (for external stakeholders). Then they were asked to rate the impact of CSOs in these fields, that is, whether there has been a high level of impact, some tangible level of impact, a limited level or no impact at all. Figure III.4.2 above shows the proportion of total respondents in both surveys that indicated that the perception of external stakeholders was higher both in social and policy impact than the perception among CSO respondents.

FIGURE III.4.2 Perception of impact of civil society on major social and policy concerns



Source: CSI organisation survey, CSI external perception survey.

CSOs were also asked to rate the impact of their own programmes. Four out of five respondents (81.0%) of the CSOs surveyed rated their programmes as having some tangible or a high level of social impact, which is a higher average than those that gave a positive rating to the overall civil society social impact. In terms of policy advocacy, however, only 45.4% of CSOs surveyed reported that they had engaged in lobbying for the approval of some policy in the previous two years. Among these organisations, slightly over 61.2% reported that at least one of the policies they were pushing for was approved. See below for an example of the successful lobbying efforts of CSOs in pushing for the passage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Extension with Reform Law.

The campaign to pass the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Extension with Reform Law (see Appendix 5)

During the past twenty years, civil society has lobbied for the passing of many socially progressive bills which seek to enhance the rights of marginalised socio-economic sectors and extend government services to these sectors. These include the Urban Development and Housing Act, Women In Nation-Building Act, Generic Drugs Law, Cooperatives Code, the Local Government Code, Anti-Rape Bill, Act Repealing the Anti-Squatting Law, the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act and the Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act of 1997. Lim, in a case study for the CSI research entitled 'Passing the Unpassable Law' (forthcoming) describes the role of civil society groups in the passing of a law which extended the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This law aimed to distribute land to landless tenants and agricultural workers and to provide support services for the beneficiaries of the law for another five years (2008 to 2013). This campaign was highly successful and led to the passing of the law extending the CARP program despite strong opposition from some legislators and the reluctance of the executive branch of government.

Lim notes that there are several factors that were crucial in the passing of the law. These include: a) the support given by the Catholic Church hierarchy; b) the sponsorship of bills by senior legislators in both legislative chambers of Congress; c) the technical support given by non-government organisations and research groups (which was critical in providing the arguments for the passage of the law); and d) spontaneous lobbying efforts made by farmers' groups. Despite the limited financial resources during the campaign and the inflexible lobbying stance of some of the law's supporters, the campaign provided civil society with experience and confidence that it could lobby for the passage of a bill with sufficient technical capacity in policy formulation, good networking skills with legislators, and the ability to mobilise campaign activities.

4.3 Impact of civil society on values

The CSI also assesses the impact of civil society membership on three attitudes. The first attitude is interpersonal trust. Respondents of the population survey were asked whether they thought people could be trusted in general. Only 4.8% of the total population answered in the affirmative. Members of political organisations had a slightly higher proportion of trust at 6.0%.

FIGURE III.4.3 Differences in values among CSO and non-CSO members



Source: Organizational survey.

The results for tolerance were, however, surprising. Figure III.4.3 shows that non-members of civil society tend to be more tolerant than members. The index scores represented in the figure were computed by averaging the mean tolerance among CSO members and non-members across 10 different categories of people of whom individuals might be intolerant (e.g., people of a different race, immigrants, drug addicts). One explanation could be that since a significant proportion of CSOs in the country comprise church-based organisations, especially those belonging to the Roman Catholic faith, which is conservative in terms of social values, CSO members on average might be less tolerant of specific types of groups that impinge on these values. This is borne out of the fact that tolerance for homosexuals and unmarried couples cohabiting are significantly lower among CSO members.

At the same time, public spiritedness scores lower among CSO members than non-CSO members. This could be due to the fact that CSO members have a healthy disrespect for public rules brought about by their experience during martial law in the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, the government tried to instil concern for social norms, but these efforts were in support of existing dispensation.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from this assessment that the external perception scores are higher than the internal perception scores. One possible reason is that the external perception respondents were chosen on the basis of their working knowledge of and familiarity with the civil society sector, and they may be generally better informed on policy advocacy initiatives compared to other respondents. The scores may also have been affected by the high regard accorded by the general public to civil society groups; it may be noted that during the time this study was undertaken, regard for other public institutions, such as the government, has been quite low due to the numerous corruption scandals in which officials of the executive branch have been perceived to be involved.

At the same time, the trust, tolerance and public spiritedness scores of CSOs can still be improved. Values education and formation could be further strengthened among civil society groups.

5. External Environment

TABLE III.5.1 Summary scores for external environment dimension

Dimension: External Environment		53.0
5.1	Socio-economic context	53.5
5.2	Socio-political context	62.0
5.3	Socio-cultural context	43.7

This dimension assesses the external environment in which civil society exists and functions. This section describes and analyses the overall social, economic, cultural, and legal environment. Several development indicators were gathered in order to provide a general picture of the overall welfare of the Philippines, based on dimensions which included social welfare, the sustainability of public finances, income inequality, political freedoms, the effectiveness of government in implementing public programmes, and the level of trust, tolerance, and public spiritedness of the general public.

5.1 Socio-economic dimensions

The Philippines received a 77.2% rating in the Basic Capabilities Index (BCI) in 2008, which is a composite rating based on three indicators: percentage of children who reach fifth grade, percentage of children who survive until at least their fifth year, and percentage of births attended by health professionals. The BCI is a measurement of the general social welfare of different countries and is undertaken by Social Watch, an international NGO. This reflects the fact that government spending on social services, on a per capital basis, has been declining since the early 2000s (Raya, 2007; Fabros, 2007), and significant institutional reforms have to be undertaken in education (Luz, 2009) and health.

The country's external debt to gross national income ratio, a measure of fiscal sustainability, stood at 58.1% in 2007, while the Gini coefficient, a measure of income inequality, was 0.445 in 2007. The external debt ratio can be said to be moderate compared to other countries, given the fact that the Philippine government has shifted its borrowing from foreign to domestic sources since the mid 2000s; but nevertheless, the current amount of foreign debt has been considered by analysts as not 'sustainable' given that new borrowings are utilised to fund old debt (Diokno, 2007: 8-9). The country's level of inequality is quite high for a Southeast Asian country due to the lack of public mechanisms for asset redistribution and the fact that recent economic growth has improved the situation of higher income, rather than low income, families.

There is a high level of perception of corruption in the Philippines, as reflected in the country's rating in the Transparency International Corruption Index. The Philippines had been given a 2.3 rating in the index for 2008 which ranges from 0 to 10, with the

lower scores meaning a high perceived level of corruption; the average rating received by countries is 4. Several corruption scandals racked the national government in the mid 2000s, including the diversion of an agricultural fund to the coffers of administration-supported congressional candidates and the apparent intervention of the chair of the national election board in the government's computerization program in return for large bribes, which caused a significant worsening of perception of transparency in the country. In 2011, congressional hearings had been started to investigate diversion of funds intended for the Philippine armed forces to the personal use of high-ranking officers.

5.2 Socio-political dimensions

Freedom House's Index of Political rights, the Index of Civil Liberties and the World Bank's World Governance Indicators were used as indicators for the Philippines' socio-political context. In addition, data from the organisational survey regarding the legal and regulatory framework were included in calculations for this sub-dimension.

In terms of political rights, the Philippines scored 23 points in 2008, which is slightly below average for the set of countries that the Freedom House reviewed. The ratings include subjective analyses of the electoral process (the Philippines was given a score of 6 out of 12 points), political pluralism and participation (10 out of 16 points), and functioning of government (7 out of 12 points). In terms of rule of law, the Philippines scored 38 points in 2008, which is an average rating. The ratings include freedom of expression and belief (12 points out of 16), associational and organisational rights (8 points out of 12), rule of law (6 points out of 16), and personal autonomy and individual rights (10 points out of 16).

In terms of state effectiveness, the World Bank Governance Indicators Project examines perception of the quality of public services, the quality of the bureaucracy and its degree of independence from political pressures, and the quality of policy development and implementation, including the government's commitment to undertaking such policies. The Philippines received a score of -0.04, slightly below the average of 0.0 but above the median of -0.17.

As seen in Table III.5.2, more than half of the organisations surveyed view the Philippines' laws and regulations as highly enabling. However, 15.8% of the respondents also reported that they have been subject to illegitimate restriction or attack by central government.

The most grave of these attacks on civil society has come in the form of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances which had become a grave concern between 2001 and 2010 during the Arroyo administration. From 2001 to 2007, between 100 and 800[8] executions have been perpetrated, and these have especially targeted leftist activists, including civil society leaders, human rights defenders, trade unionists, and land reform advocates. (Alston, 2008: 2) Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings, summary or arbitrary executions, has determined that the counter

[8]The number of the executions vary depending on who is counting and how. Task Force Using, the government formed body to investigate the extrajudicial killings has a list of 116 cases. The number of people on the lists of civil society organizations also vary, but are all higher than the count of Task Force Using, the highest of which is 885 cases as counted by Karapatan.

insurgency strategy of the Philippine military and the changes in the priorities of the criminal justice system during that period helps explain why the killings continue.

The case of the Morong 43, which has received much media attention, also shows human rights abuses against members of civil society organizations. On 6 February 2010, forty three medical practitioners and health workers were illegally arrested and detained by the Philippine military under charges of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. The victims' rights against illegal arrest, illegal detention and torture, and right to counsel were violated (Asian Human Rights Commission, 2010). They were kept in military custody for 12 weeks before being transferred to police custody. The Morong 43 were finally released on 18 December 2010 upon orders of President Aquino.

While formal civil and political rights are guaranteed by the Constitution, various independent agencies have noted that the country's performance in terms of rights protection remain weak. Law enforcement and judicial agencies are feeble in the face of rampant abuses by the military, police, paramilitary groups and 'private armies' (Human Rights Watch, 2011: 359- 364). With the change to a new administration, it is expected that extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses will significantly decrease given the new policy and approaches of government.

TABLE III.5.2 CSO perception of laws and regulations for CSOs

Perception of restriction	*Frequency*	*%*
Highly restrictive	9	8.3
Quite limiting	28	25.7
Moderately enabling	50	45.9
Fully enabling	14	12.8
Don't know/missing	8	7.3

Source: CSI organisation survey.

The Philippines has a very progressive legislative framework in support of participatory governance. This principle is enshrined in the Philippines' 1987 Constitution, under Article XII Section 16 which states that "The right of the people and their organisations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision making shall not be abridged. The state shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms." Thus, the ratings of the Philippines in terms of the provision of formal rights to organisation and assembly are quite high.

At the local level, various bodies such as local development councils, local health boards, school boards, and other local special bodies have been mandated to include civil society and private sector representatives by various laws such as the Local Government Code of 1991. It is the intent of these laws to institutionalise consultative mechanisms within local governments.

However, despite the progressive legislative framework supporting people's participation, most local governments in the Philippines are far from practicing participatory governance. Many of the mandated local bodies are either not convened or merely serve as a rubber stamp for the local chief executive who chooses the civil society representatives to these bodies. This has often led to misdirected priorities and poor planning, leading to much waste of scarce local government resources (Capuno, 2007: 222- 226). Instead of programmes that have a high impact on development, many local government units have historically focused their resources on visible projects that have little development impact (such as waiting sheds or dole-out programs) or projects that serve the vested interest of the local politicians (such as roads leading to their property). The situation is made worse by a general lack of transparency on how local governments utilise their budget and what they have achieved as a result (PHILDHRRA, forthcoming: 13).

Under such circumstances, it is often the most vulnerable groups who are hurt the most as their needs and concerns are not factored into the plans of the local government, driving resources away from anti-poverty development projects that could better address their needs. At the same time, CSOs have been vulnerable to "various forces of society," especially to self-serving politicians and other groups who have used these groups to further advance their interests (Buendia, 2005: 363- 364).

CSO Assessment of the Local Government Code (Case Study)
In 1991, the Philippine legislature passed the Local Government Code, the enabling law that implemented the 1987 Constitution mandates to decentralise government powers to the provincial, city, municipal, and barangay (village) government units. The law also provided space for civil society organisations to participate in local government 'consultative' bodies, that plan and monitor the implementation of specific policies, programs, and processes such as those in the areas of health, education (schools), peace and order, development planning and others.

In a case study for this paper (PHILDHRRA, forthcoming) noted that while there are areas of productive relationships established between CSOs and the local government units in these bodies, there are still many areas for improvement, such as strengthening information dissemination within these bodies, strengthening the capacity of these bodies to effectively monitor the implementation of local government programs and projects, and improve the 'functionality' of the bodies.

5.3 Socio-cultural context

Based on the population survey, Filipinos have a moderate degree of tolerance and public spiritedness. However, the level of trust is excessively low, with less than 5% of the respondents in the population survey expressing the belief that people can be trusted in general.

On the average, less than two-thirds of the population survey respondents (62.2%) are tolerant of a list of population sub-groups; this is an average of the proportion of respondents who would not mind having groups such as people of a different race,

migrants/foreign workers, Muslims, homosexuals, unmarried couples living together, people who speak a different language, drug addicts, people with HIV/AIDS, and heavy drinkers as their neighbours.

A similar proportion, 64.1%, can be described as having some level of 'public spiritedness.' This is measured by the degree to which survey respondents disagreed with the acceptability of the following practices: claiming government benefits that one is not entitled to; avoiding fare on public transportation; not paying taxes; and paying/accepting a bribe.

CONCLUSION

The external dimension ratings show that the Philippines has a moderate level of socio-economic development, and despite the problems of corruption and lack of accountability that have plagued the national government in the past years, also a modest level of socio-political development. Nevertheless, both areas can still be improved; there are some serious efforts made by the government to undertake education reforms to improve the efficiency of the public school system, and to re-examine the corruption issues that have plagued the bureaucracy in the past ten years in order to develop more sustainable good governance mechanisms. These are areas worthy of civil society involvement.

At the same time, there is a need to improve the average citizen's public values and norms. One study (Clarke, 2010; 3-4) would describe as a "distinct realm of values," and as such, could assist in broadening the commitment of the public to put the good of the public before the interests of a specific group.

IV. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Philippine civil society is one of the most vibrant and active in Asia. One of its strengths is its deep and expansive roots in society, as shown by the high participation rate of adult Filipinos, an estimated 45.7% of whom count themselves as active members of at least one CSO, compared to only 17.3% of the population who are not a member of a CSO. There is also extensive participation of minorities and marginalised groups (women, indigenous peoples, and members of the rural population) in Philippine CSOs, a substantial number of which were formed by these groups themselves, or by NGOs representing their interests.

CSOs had thrived after the 1986 Edsa People Power Revolution which toppled the Marcos dictatorship through a citizen led non-violent and peaceful revolt. The 1987 Constitution that was put in place after this enshrined the value of people's participation and protects the rights of people's organisations to participate at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making.

In terms of their organisation, Philippine CSOs rate well in terms of having boards that are democratically elected and meet regularly, despite the need to strengthen board accountability and transparency. They are also strong in networking and sectoral communications. The long history of NGOs and other CSOs in the Philippines has allowed these networks and relationships to develop.

Many networks have been organised around different sectoral interests or specific issues. As a sign of their strength, formal and informal CSO networks have been instrumental in the passage of legislation that promotes the interests of the poor and vulnerable sectors. Such legislation includes the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme, Urban and Housing Development Act, Fisheries Code, Social Reform and Poverty Alleviation Act, Party-List System Act, and many others.

Aside from these, CSO networks have also successfully begun three local grant making institutions through debt swaps or participation in the capital markets. These institutions now provide grants and loans that fund projects and programmes of Philippine CSOs. Networks have also helped establish the Philippine Council for NGO Certification, a self-regulatory mechanism recognised by government which certifies CSOs that meet minimum standards in financial management and accountability. These contributions to the enactment of legislation, as well as the many services delivered by CSOs to citizens, have led to a high perception of impact for Philippine CSOs.

Furthermore, peace and non-violence are practiced by most Philippine CSOs. There are only a few groups that use violence and they largely operate on the periphery of civil society. However, these groups do have links with some formal CSOs operating within the legal framework.

In terms of impact on the attitudes of their members, CSOs have less impact on the level of trust, and appear to have a negative impact on tolerance and public spiritedness.

While CSOs are perceived to have moderate to high impact in terms of promoting peace and non-violence, democracy and intolerance, they are perceived to demonstrate little internalisation of labour rights and standards and environmental norms, at least as defined in this study. Only a small number of CSOs have publicly available codes of conduct or ethics that guide their operations.

There is also a perception of pervasive corruption within the sector among CSOs themselves. This is related to the issue of weak board governance within the NGO sector which has been written about in the existing literature (Aldaba, 2001: 3-5; Abella and Dimalanta, 2003:3-8). It is probably the case that problems with board governance are also present in other types of CSOs in the Philippines. However, corruption within civil society needs to be subjected to further research and investigation in order to provide better understanding.

Another weakness of Philippine CSOs is that its members appear to be less tolerant and have lower regard for public-spiritedness compared to non-members. This issue would also merit further exploration. There is also a need to better engage the poor in political issues and engagements.

The data generated by the Civil Society Index suggests low political activism and political engagement in the Philippines, as indicated by lower participation rates in political CSOs and a low proportion of citizens who sign petitions, join boycotts, and attend peaceful demonstrations. However, this data may not provide an accurate picture since the classification between social and political CSOs made by the CIVICUS methodology is not as applicable to the Philippine setting, given that social organisations such as religious organisations and cooperatives also tend to engage in political activities. Nevertheless, it points to an important issue that many CSOs have not gone beyond their local programmes and projects to advocate for more structural reforms at the national level.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on results of the study, the following recommendations are given to address the identified weaknesses of Philippine civil society:

1. On strengthening governance within CSOs

Formal institutional mechanisms that promote accountability and transparency within CSOs can be strengthened. The Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC) still remains a viable mechanism for genuinely promoting and monitoring CSO governance. In order to effectively broaden the reach of PCNC, it is recommended that government and foreign/local donors make PCNC certification one of the requirements for organisations that seek a minimum level of grants from them. They should also include in their grants to non-PCNC registered organisations some support to help the organisation undertake PCNC accreditation.

Another recommendation is for donors to institutionalise a mechanism that would compile and regularly publish lists of negligent grantees that did not satisfy the terms of their respective grants. When institutionalised, this mechanism can serve both as a clearing house and a good governance check among CSOs. The participation of the PCNC and major CSO networks in the development of this mechanism would promote buy-in to the system.

2. On developing standards for good governance across civil society groups

One of the issues that came out from the study is that, while a large proportion of civil society groups meet the formal requirements for governance, it is not clear that they are able to meet adequate standards for good governance. The proportion of the organisational survey sample with formal board membership is high, but there is a significant minority who report that their boards do not meet regularly. Another issue is that there are many civil society groups that are not transparent with regard to financial reports.

Thus, there is a need to develop a consensus on the expected roles of civil society oversight boards. These may include the regularity of holding of board meetings, and the specific powers and responsibilities of the board, including oversight of management of civil society groups, and the areas of policy making that they can undertake. It is also important to specify clearly the policies that can guide civil society groups to improve their financial transparency.

3. On strengthening networking of civil society groups

There are many areas in which CSOs can work at the national and local government level; these include national 'multi-sectoral' and 'sectoral' bodies (e.g. the National Anti-Poverty Commission, the National Youth Commission, the Philippine Commission on Women) that have opened the venues for participation for organised marginalised groups, and local 'consultative' bodies.

Given these circumstances, CSOs should further strengthen their engagement in these institutionalised bodies. They should advocate for the convening of local development councils and other local bodies. Once convened, they should participate proactively in setting the agenda and in providing input to local governance. CSO networks and organisations at the national level should provide capacity building support for their members and affiliates at the local level.

4. On the financial and human resource sustainability of CSOs

Many of the organisations surveyed for this study already rely on membership fees and service fees to support the operations of their organisations. Public giving should be further strengthened and promoted in order to generate greater resources that can support civil society within the Philippines.

Arrangements whereby government facilitates citizen contributions to CSOs should be explored. There are several models from other countries that could be explored which can support the growth of civil society groups. In Germany, for example, the government allows taxpayers to allocate a small part of their tax (around 1% of their total payments) to church groups. This could be adapted in the Philippines by allowing qualified CSOs (perhaps linking this to PCNC certification to also encourage CSOs to undergo certification) to be the beneficiaries of this public support.

Government can tap more CSOs as alternative service delivery mechanisms. There is already a rich history of this in the Philippines; after the 1986 democratic restoration, many government agencies opened NGO-PO desks partly in order to explore the possibility of civil society groups undertaking some public services. Civil society groups are already active in areas such as community-based forestry management, communal irrigation management, family support and counselling, and procurement oversight. However, there are still many areas where civil society can have a comparative advantage in the delivery of social services.

5. On CSO labour and environmental standards

There is still a need for consensus building on what different labour and environment standards are for Philippine CSOs and how these could be made operational in the local context. These include standards for pay and work conditions and the provision of collective bargaining rights for staff. Also, the norms of practice in terms of applying environmental standards need to be deepened. This can be undertaken first through discussion among different groups, and then through model building, before formal decisions can be made across the civil society sector as a whole.

VI. CONCLUSION

This study has analysed the state of civil society by examining several factors that have affected its growth and development in the Philippine milieu. In sum, civil society has made a moderately strong impact in the Philippines, especially in the areas of poverty reduction and environmental protection, and in programme development. There have been some successes in terms of policy advocacy, notably in the area of agrarian reform and other areas of social reform that have helped ensure the integration of economically and politically marginalised groups in the mainstream social order.

The growth of civil society has been helped by adequate levels of civic engagement in the Philippines; participation in organisations with social concerns is quite high, as is the diversity of membership, particularly among those from marginalised ethno-linguistic groups and from Mindanao. At the same time, the level of organisation of CSOs, especially in terms of the development and persistence of coalitions and networks, has sustained these groups. The political and economic environment is also favourable, providing adequate protection of civil liberties and political rights.

The area in which CSOs need improvement is the practice of values. Labour and environmental standards need to be formally enforced and there is a perception among CSOs that some level of corruption is practiced in the sector. This problem has long been recognised. Carino (2002), for example, notes that "[Civil society] has not resolved its identity crisis, especially since its presumed core values are perceived to be diminishing in the population." According to her, the core value of volunteerism and service to society may have diminished during the past years due to the loss of financial resources available to CSOs and the flourishing of work within the sector as a professional career. At the same time, there is need to improve the financial and programme accountability of CSOs, which have been lacking.

Several recommendations have been made in order to address the issues raised in this study. These include better governance and networking, enhanced financial and human resources, and greater application of ethical standards.

It is hoped that the study may have made a contribution toward better understanding the contours of the civil society sector in the Philippines, and that the recommendations will lead to a wider discussion on improving this sector. As Carino (2002) also points out, "Philippine civil society … will always be engaged in the process of refinement… [and how this will play out] will be of great interest to scholars in the discipline and to society at large."

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1. Members of the CSI Philippines National Advisory Committee

Civil Society Organizations:

1. Bishop Reuben Abante, Alliance of Baptist Councils
2. Emmanuel Areño, Regional Coordinator, Western Visayas Network of Social Development NGOs (WEVNet)
3. Moner Bajunaid, Executive Director, Mindanao Integrated Development Center (MIND)
4. Florencia Casanova-Dorotan, Chair, Women's Action Network for Development (WAND)
5. Tessie Fernandez, Executive Director, Lihok Pilipina
6. Ana Marie Karaos, Chairperson, Caucus of Development NGO Networks (CODE-NGO)
7. Neil Lim, Media Liaison Officer, Youthvote Philippines
8. Jun Mabaso, Executive Director, Agri-Aqua Development Coalition (AADC)
9. Christine Reyes, Executive Director, Foundation for Philippine Environment (FPE)
10. Giovanni Reyes, Executive Director, Koalisyon ng Katutubong Samahan ng Pilipinas (KASAPI)
11. Oman Jiao, Executive Director, Association of Foundations (AF)
12. Fely Soledad, Executive Director, Philippine Council for NGO Certification (PCNC)

Government:

13. Erlinda Capones, Director, Social Development Staff, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
14. Nathy Cause, Project Development Officer, Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
15. Ramon Falcon, Social Development Staff, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)

APPENDIX 2. CSI INDICATOR MATRIX

1) Dimension: Civic Engagement			54.7%
1.1 Extent of socially-based engagement			47.6%
	1.1.1	Social membership 1	43.4%
	1.1.2	Social volunteering 1	47.4%
	1.1.3	Community engagement 1	51.9%
1.2 Depth of socially-based engagement			43.7%
	1.2.1	Social membership 2	34.2%
	1.2.2	Social volunteering 2	33.2%
	1.2.3	Community engagement 2	63.6%
1.3 Diversity of socially-based engagement			95.7%
	1.3.1	Diversity of socially-based engagement	95.7%
1.4 Extent of political engagement			21.5%
	1.4.1	Political membership 1	23.3%
	1.4.2	Political volunteering 1	26.2%
	1.4.3	Individual activism 1	15.1%
1.5 Depth of political engagement			32.2%
	1.5.1	Political membership 2	35.7%
	1.5.2	Political volunteering 2	39.2%
	1.5.3	Individual activism 2	21.7%
1.6 Diversity of political engagement			87.7%
	1.6.1	Diversity of political engagement	87.7%
2) Dimension: Level of Organisation			57.9%
2.1 Internal governance			94.4%
	2.1.1	Management	94.4%
2.2 Infrastructure			63.3%
	2.2.1	Support organisations	63.3%
2.3 Sectoral communication			67.3%
	2.3.1	Peer-to-peer communication 1	70.6%
	2.3.2	Peer-to-peer communication 2	63.9%
2.4 Human resources			38.9%
	2.4.1	Sustainability of HR	38.9%
2.5 Financial and technological resources			69.3%
	2.5.1	Financial sustainability	66.0%

	2.5.2	Technological resources	72.5%
2.6 International linkages			14.5%
	2.6.1	International linkages	14.5%
3) Dimension: Practice of Values			48.9%
3.1 Democratic decision-making governance			69.7%
	3.1.1	Decision-making	69.7%
3.2 Labour regulations			29.4%
	3.2.1	Equal opportunities	52.3%
	3.2.2	Members of labour unions	8.7%
	3.2.3	Labour rights trainings	28.7%
	3.2.4	Publicly available policy for labour standards	28.0%
3.3 Code of conduct and transparency			45.7%
	3.3.1	Publicly available code of conduct	35.2%
	3.3.2	Transparency	56.1%
3.4 Environmental standards			30.8%
	3.4.1	Environmental standards	30.8%
3.5 Perception of values in civil society as a whole			69.1%
	3.5.1	Perceived non-violence	76.7%
	3.5.2	Perceived internal democracy	80.6%
	3.5.3	Perceived levels of corruption	40.4%
	3.5.4	Perceived intolerance	65.1%
	3.5.5	Perceived weight of intolerant groups	69.9%
	3.5.6	Perceived promotion on non-violence and peace	81.7%
4) Dimension: Perception of Impact			62.8%
4.1 Responsiveness (internal perception)			62.0%
	4.1.1	Impact on social concern 1	69.4%
	4.1.2	Impact on social concern 2	50.9%
	4.1.3	Impact on social concern 3	65.7%
4.2 Social Impact (internal perception)			78.5%
	4.2.1	General social impact	75.65%
	4.2.2	Social impact of own organisation	81.4%
4.3 Policy Impact (internal perception)			55.0%
	4.3.1	General policy impact	58.3%
	4.3.2	Policy activity of own organisation	45.4%
	4.3.3	Policy impact of own organisation	61.2%

4.4 Responsiveness (external perception)			73.0%
	4.4.1	Impact on social concern 1	77.4%
	4.4.2	Impact on social concern 2	62.3%
	4.4.3	Impact on social concern 3	79.2%
4.5 Social Impact (external perception)			83.0%
	4.5.1	Social impact selected concerns	89.2%
	4.5.2	Social impact general	76.9%
4.6 Policy Impact (external perception)			66.6%
	4.6.1	Policy impact specific fields 1-3	57.7%
	4.6.2	Policy impact general	75.5%
4.7 Impact of CS on attitudes			21.4%
	4.7.1	Difference in trust between civil society members and non-members	0.3%
	4.7.2	Difference in tolerance levels between civil society members and non-members	0.0%
	4.7.3	Difference in public spiritedness between civil society members and non-members	0.0%
	4.7.4	Trust in civil society	85.2%
5) External Environment			53.0%
5.1 Socio-economic context			53.5%
	5.1.1	Basic Capabilities Index	77.2%
	5.1.2	Corruption	23.0%
	5.1.3	Inequality	55.5%
	5.1.4	Economic context	58.1%
5.2 Socio-political context			62.0%
	5.2.1	Political rights and freedoms	57.5%
	5.2.2	Rule of law and personal freedoms	62.5%
	5.2.3	Associational and organisational rights	66.7%
	5.2.4	Experience of legal framework	73.4%
	5.2.5	State effectiveness	49.8%
5.3 Socio-cultural context			43.7%
	5.3.1	Trust	4.8%
	5.3.2	Tolerance	62.2%
	5.3.3	Public spiritedness	64.1%

APPENDIX 3. CASE STUDY ON POLITICAL CYNICISM

Political Cynicism: Analyzing the causes of decline in political engagement

By Jennifer Santiago Oreta

I. Introduction

"Civic engagement… refers to the extent to which individuals engage in active citizenship through various social and policy related engagements (Civicus, 2008). Social engagements refer to activities within the public sphere where individuals interact with others, while political engagements refer to activities through which individuals advance shared interests of some political nature, such as rallies and legislative lobbying" (CODE-NGO, 2010).

This essay further nuanced the distinction between political and social participation. *Participation* in this essay (used synonymously with the terms 'engagement' and 'involvement') means the physical and virtual involvement of an individual to a cause or causes beyond one's limited interest. Participation can be directed to the political system, which is referred here as *political participation*, or it can promote particular issues not necessarily directed to the political system, referred here as *social participation*. Moreover, *'politics'* and *'political participation'* here cover "aspects of life that have public significance," and involves *processes* "through which *power and influence* are used in the promotion of certain values and interests" (Danziger 2003, 4, italics supplied). 'Social' and 'social participation' on the other hand cover aspects that deal with the quality of life which may have either public or private significance, but its fundamental difference with the former is that the processes involved in promoting these concerns need not deal with power and influence. The dichotomy, thus, lies with the proximity of the engagement with the *political system*, and the utilization of measures involving *power and influence*. Both concepts are obviously socially constructed, based on the framing and imagination of the public.

Based on the national survey commissioned by CODE-NGO for the Civil Society Index project in the Philippines, almost half of the Philippine population (45.7%) "considers themselves as active members of at least one civil society organization, either an organization with a political engagement, or an organization with a social engagement" (CODE-NGO, 2011).

A stratified random sampling was done to further nuance the findings. Below are the results of the survey:

Table 1. Membership in Social Organizations and Political Organizations, Percent of Sample

Type of Organization	*Active Member*	*Inactive member*	*Do not belong*
Church or religious organization	34.2	20.4	45.4
Sports or recreational organization	10.1	8.4	81.6
Art, music, or education organization	6.0	5.3	88.7
Humanitarian or charitable associations	9.2	5.0	85.8
Cooperatives	12.2	6.9	80.9
Labor unions	5.6	6.6	87.8
Conservation, environmental, animal rights organizations	8.2	5.4	86.4
Professional associations	3.7	3.6	92.7
Non-government organizations	5.0	3.6	91.4
People's organizations	9.6	5.0	85.2
Consumer organizations	5.5	3.0	91.5

Source: CSI population survey, 2010.

Using the definition given earlier, engagement in labor unions, conservation/environment issues, professional associations,[9] NGOs, people's organizations, and consumer organizations all fall under political engagement, and the rest are considered as social involvement. It is noticeable that active membership in church/religious, cooperatives, sports/recreational, and humanitarian/charitable organizations are considerably higher than the other categories. It is also notable that among political organizations, only people's organizations have an active membership rate of above nine percent of the population

This paper attempts to provide a macro-level analysis regarding the social and political engagement of people and understand the seemingly low interest on political types of engagements. It is expository and does not claim to provide a generalized explanation regarding all aspects of social and political engagement.

[9]Engagement in 'Professional organizations' is regarded as political participation since professional organizations are directly regulated by the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC). All organizations under PRC are required to comply with the requirements set forth by the regulatory body.

II. Revisiting the EDSA Narrative: Promises and Failures

In discussing political participation, the EDSA uprisings, both the 1986 and the two episodes in 2001, must be revisited since these events cast the tempo and mode of political and social participation after the fall of the dictator in 1986.

The 1986 EDSA event was perceived as the culmination of a series of attempts to thwart the repressive martial law regime by Pres. Marcos (1972 -1981). Under the aegis of restoring order and preventing the "conspiracy to overthrow the government" (TIME 1972) by the communist, Marcos imposed martial law on September 21, 1972.[10]

The EDSA narrative, the first one in 1986 and the two episodes in 2001 (the January and the April-May events) can be viewed as a continuous stream that reflects the people's desire for democracy, participation, and good governance. The appreciation, however, of these three events vary. The 1986 uprising was a struggle to reinstate democracy, while the January 2001 episode was a clamor for good governance. In both events, people were euphoric, and the hopes to improve the quality of life were high. The third episode—the April-May event—was considered an aberration.

The democratization *narrative* created by the 1986 and January 2001 "EDSAs" conveys the message that people's participation in political affairs can directly change the system. Two important points must be raised regarding this *narrative*. First is on motivation: EDSA planted hope—high hopes. The fact that both events were able to remove sitting presidents emboldened the people to believe that direct participation matters. The irony, however, is that the higher one hopes, the greater is the disappointment if the desire is not met. Hence, when political administrations failed to satisfy the desires of the people, the backlash of disillusionment is also great.

The second point has to do with the framework or interpretation of the event. The agenda of these EDSAs (i.e. the desire for democracy and good governance) was largely defined by the elite, i.e. a group of people who possess one or all of the following characteristics: the economically rich, highly educated, and politically connected. While the agenda has been embraced by the majority, a keen eye can't help but notice that this narrative leaves little room for the non-elite's interpretation of the events. Non-elite, in this essay, refers to the group of people who possess one or all of the following traits: economically disadvantaged, with lower educational attainment, and with limited political connection. In other words, while the elite couched people's motivation to join EDSA using abstract values of democracy and good governance, the non-elite may have a different interpretation and motivation for participating. Their view, however, is invisible in the dominant EDSA narrative.

It is not surprising, then, that the May 2001 is not regarded by the dominant elite as part of the EDSA narrative, precisely because in this episode, "EDSA" was appropriated by

[10]While the official public announcement happened on Sept. 22, 1972, on paper, the date of the declaration was Sept. 21, reflecting the superstitious belief of Marcos with the lucky number '7,' (that is, the use of '7' or anything divisible by '7').

non-elites, and the agenda does not fall neatly into place with the story-line of the first two events.

As if to stress the inappropriateness of being classified as part of the narrative was the outcome of the May 2001 EDSA event. If the 1986 and January 2001 EDSAs were successful in removing sitting Presidents, the May 2001 on the other hand was unsuccessful in its attempt to reinstate the elected-then-toppled President Estrada. Nevertheless, the May 2001 can be viewed as an attempt of the 'non-elite' to create a counter-narrative to challenge the dominant 'story' promoted by the two previous EDSAs. While the motivation for joining in the May 2001 was controversial, the action of those who participated nonetheless was clearly an act of defiance to the dominant paradigm and its consequent political arrangement which, in their view, had failed to satisfy the needs especially of the non-elite. The failure of the May 2001 EDSA, and the subsequent action and reaction of the different influential groups in society further deepen the chasm that divides the elite and the non-elite in Philippine society.

The outcome of these EDSAs has direct consequence to the motivation of both the elite and non-elite's political participation. This essay believes that the EDSA experience has direct bearing on the cynicism of people with regard to political participation.

Nevertheless, the democracy project remains to be the main political agenda. The ascendancy of Noynoy Aquino in the 2010 elections clearly shows the continued love affair of Filipinos with the charm of EDSA and its promise of political "redemption."[11]

III. The Paradox of Democracy

Despite the allure of democracy, it has its inherent paradoxes. *One*, it privileges majority rule but silences the voice of the minority in order for the majoritatian system to flourish. *Two*, it capitalizes on the principle of people's participation, yet, much openness to people's insistence make the system vulnerable to political instability. *Three*, it claims to be rooted on constitutionalism and rule of law, but the system's legitimacy or the people's deference to the political arrangement is largely dependent on its capacity to perform and deliver its promises.

If statistical measures are indicative, these paradoxes are quite apparent in the imagination of the people. In the Asia Barometer Survey (ABS)[12] held in 2007, it was evident that the people's belief in the democratic system of governance wavers.

"Only 11.9% are convinced of the democratic system (*'very satisfied'*), 50.8% are only partially satisfied (*'somewhat satisfied'*), 21.6% are *indifferent*, 11% are not very

[11]The language used in describing EDSA has always been couched in religious terms, given the strong participation of the Catholic Church in the whole event.
[12]The ABS survey is meant to measure the people's perception regarding the *quality of life*, the *democratic system*, and the strength of social capital in different Asian countries. It runs every 4 years.

happy with the system (*'somewhat dissatisfied'*), and 4.5% are completely unhappy (*'dissatisfied'*)…" When disaggregated along socio-economic lines, data reveals that only 8.4% of the low-income group said they are *"very satisfied"* with the democratic system, compared with "9.7% of the middle-income group and 18.9% of the high-income group" (Oreta 2009, 187).

Contrasting these with other data sets can help contextualize and understand its meaning. In the 2007 SWS "self-rated poverty" survey, it was revealed that 53% of the population views themselves as poor (www.sws.org.ph/ind-eco.htm).[13] Again, going back to the ABS data, when asked to rank their greatest anxieties, poverty (73%) was first on the list, followed by crime (58%), and unemployment (44%). "Only 2.3 percent of the population believes that the government is doing a good job in addressing the unemployment issue, compared to 71 percent who believe that the government's efforts are not enough" (Ibid, 180).

When asked what in their view are the important political concerns, a sizeable number states that "maintaining order" (41%) is the most important. Fighting rising prices (35%) is ranked second, giving people say in the government (18%) third, and protecting freedom of speech (5%) last (Id, 189).

Correlating these data with the confidence level of the people as regards the democratic political system is most telling. The same ABS data set suggests that a significant number of people are contemplating alternative political systems. While 59% rejects outright military rule, 35% believes that it is "fairly good" and 4% says that it is "very good." Also, 5% thinks that a government by a powerful leader is "very good" and 46% thinks that it is "fairly good"[14] (Ibid, 189). These data suggest a pattern of sliding confidence as regards the credibility of the democratic political system.

Hence, based on the figures presented, this essay alludes that in the people's collective imagination, there is a relationship between how the democratic system addresses issues that matter most to them, and the people's commitment to said political arrangement. The paper subscribes to the notion that the social and political participation of Filipinos are affected by the ability of the political system to improve their lives and to listen to their sentiments. The higher is the capacity of the political system to promote progress and development, the greater also is the commitment of the people to the system, and consequently, their preponderance to engage and participate in the betterment of the system. In other words, when people see and feel that their survival is hinged on the survival of the political system, they will naturally gravitate to participate and engage in its improvement. Inversely, if the system fails to deliver, less is also the compulsion for people to participate. Worst, the system's perceived failure creates the basis for people's disenchantment, creating the condition where alternative political systems are considered.

[13]The self-rated poverty in 2009 is 51%, based again on SWS survey. Available online http://www.sws.org.ph/pr091201.htm, accessed Oct 14, 2010.
[14]When further disaggregated, among lower income group, 6.1% think that a government run by a powerful leader is 'very good' and 53.8% think that it is 'fairly good.' Likewise, 6.3% of the low income group think that military rule is 'very good' and 40% said it is 'fairly good.'

A. The Post-Dictatorship Political System

The following historical snapshots feature political events that have affected the motivation and de-motivation of people to participate politically.

1. **The post EDSA Constitution** – The 1987 constitution, months prior to its ratification, has already divided the nation. While the dominant atmosphere was still euphoric, the document produced by the 1986 Constitutional Convention created animosity with some groups, particularly some Muslim segments of the population. A number of scholars pointed out that the proposed Constitution seems to have de-emphasized the value of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).

   Moreover, despite its "dictator-proof" posture, much of the provisions of the Constitution, while generally good, are couched on motherhood statements and require enabling legislation to be put to good use. Given the frame of pushing for democracy and good governance principles, the main issue was that the constitutional guarantees of rights and obligations "do not directly define formal mechanisms to reward or punish erring politicians but merely leave open the door for more informal mechanisms to function" (de Dios and Ferrer, 2004).

   While the Constitution was overwhelmingly ratified,[15] the division it created later on hounded succeeding administrations.

2. **The return to pre-martial law democracy** – Nevertheless, the greatest gain of the 1986 EDSA is the re-establishment of the formal infrastructures of democracy, specifically the reinstitution of formal elections, the convening of Congress, and the guarantee of the peoples' basic freedoms.

   As far as trusting the basic institutions are concerned, ABS Survey 2007 reveals that 75% of the population trusts the central government. When disaggregated, data reveals that 57% of the population in Metro Manila trusts the central government while 33% of the population distrusts it. In Mindanao, 23% of the people don't trust the central government, 24% in Luzon also distrust it, but only 16% in the Visayas registered distrust in the central government (ABS 2007). The central government, hence, seems to enjoy greater confidence in Visayas as compared to Metro Manila, Luzon, and Mindanao.

   The local government is still trusted by 79% of the population; the military is trusted by 71%; and the police has 78% trust ratings.[16] Congress, despite the constant bickering of elected officials, enjoys 72% trust rating; political parties also got a nod of 68.3%; and finally, the legal system is trusted by 67% of the population (Ibid).

[15]The Constitution's ratification was viewed by experts more as confirmation on the legitimacy of Aquino's government rather than affirmation to the provisions of the Constitution. Even the campaign for ratification then capitalized on this formula, using slogans like "Yes to Cory, Yes to the Constitution"
[16]Visayas and Mindanao are more positive about the police: in the Visayas, 81.8% 'trusts the police while in Mindanao, 89.8% trust the police' (ABS 2007).

Election remains popular among the people, with 81% declaring that they always vote during the national elections, and 81% in local elections (Ibid). The popularity of elections perhaps is due to the reality that it is the only sure avenue where the peoples' voice really, and literally, counts.

> "Casting one's vote is the most evident venue where the people (especially the poor) can participate in the political process—not because the system prevents them to participate… but more because the system's participation mechanisms are not in place, or are not popularly disseminated, or are too complicated" (Oreta 2009, 190).

A sizeable portion of the population is satisfied with the government's operationalization of the "right to vote" (91%), "freedom of speech" (80%), and the "right to criticize the government" (70%) (ABS 2007).

Despite the positive tone of the data presented, there seems to be a lingering perception of powerlessness among the people—48% of the population believes that ordinary people have no power to influence the government, and 55% thinks that politics and government are so complicated (ABS 2007). This powerlessness can perhaps help contextualize the following findings that seemingly contradict the rosiness of the findings discussed above.

The present CSI Population Survey (2010) asked the respondents if they have, in their lifetime, participated in any of the three activities: signing a petition, joining a boycott or attending peaceful demonstrations. The result is markedly low: "around 15.1% of those surveyed indicated that they had done at least one of these activities, while, 21.7% had engaged in more than one type of activity" (CSI Phil.: An Assessment of Phil. Civil Society, 2010). Contrasting these data with the ABS 2007 study is indicative of the people's regard for activities associated with activism.

> *"Joining boycotts:* 2.4% said they *have done* it; 19.6% said they *might* join one; and 77.2% said they *would never* join a boycott.
>
> *"Signing petitions:* 11.4% said they *have done* it; 66.6% said they *might sign* one; and 21.6% said they *will never* sign a petition.
>
> *"Joining lawful demonstration:* 2.9% said they *have done* it; 25.7% said they *might* join one; and 70.7% said they *will never* join a lawful demonstration" (Oreta 2009).

Indeed, data seems to show that there is disconnect between appreciation of rights and the actual exercise of it. This 'disconnect' was further amplified by the events and subsequent actions of the political leaders during the 2004-2010 administration of President Arroyo.

3. **Abusing and disabusing the institutions** – While the events in 2004 relating to the questioned Presidential election are not the sole reason for the people's disillusionment in politics, those episodes made significant mark as they apparently culminate the mounting disenchantment of people regarding politics and political actions. This essay will highlight some events to predicate the argument that the abuse on democratic institutions had a lingering after-effect on the political engagement of the people.

   3.1 The "Hello Garci" and the "stolen" elections – The emergence of the "Hello Garci" tapes in 2005 bolstered the assertion of oppositionists that the 2004 Presidential election was rigged, and the taped conversation of a man named "Garci" (whose voice sounded like a COMELEC Commissioner) and a woman called "Ma'am" (whose voice sounded like Pres. Arroyo), discussing the rigging of votes, was proof. The attempts to investigate these allegations (through the impeachment process) were thwarted using technicalities inherent in a presidential system. Unfortunately for the Arroyo administration, these blocking measures simply reinforced the subjective perception that the President cheated her way to the highest seat. Given the people's high regard for the electoral system, "stealing" the election is an obvious demotivator to participate politically. Especially to those who regard election as their only opportunity to influence the government, this event not only 'steals' the election result, but more fundamentally, it also 'steals' their political voice.

   3.2 The failure of the Arroyo administration to satisfy the (good governance) expectation of people – During the Estrada impeachment process in 2001 and anticipating the guilty verdict of the impeachment court against President Estrada, talks were rife among civil society groups regarding the proposal to install an interim/transition government (supervised by the Supreme Court's Chief Justice) that will facilitate a Presidential Election. The basis of the proposal was the mistrust felt by a number of civil society groups against then Vice President Gloria Arroyo. The January 2001 "EDSA," however, facilitated constitutional succession, and allowed the Vice President to take over the Presidential seat. The point here is that even before her assumption to power, Pres. Arroyo was not fully trusted by a sizeable segment of civil society. Nevertheless, the people eventually warmed up, gave her administration the benefit of the doubt, and expected her to deliver on the expectations of the people, primary of which was to clean the administration of corruption—the very issue that toppled Pres. Estrada. Unfortunately, Pres. Arroyo failed to satisfy this demand and was perceived to be more interested in favoring allies and consolidating her support-base rather than addressing the corruption problem of the administration. Many analysts believe that this was due to the many legal questions that hounded the administration due to the controversial circumstance[17] of its ascendancy,

[17]In the 1987 Constitution, the four conditions to declare the Office of the President vacant are (a) death, (b) resignation, (c) removal through impeachment, and (d) declaration of incapacity. None of these conditions are present in 2001, rather, the Supreme Court intervened and declared the Office of the President vacant. The SC used as basis the diary of then Executive Secretary Angara where it was declared that Pres. Estrada was seriously

making Pres. Arroyo increasingly defensive and made her consolidate her support-base even more. These actions, unfortunately, were done at the expense of ridding the government of corrupt practices—actions that are ethically correct, but may be politically unpopular.

It must be noted that since episodes in EDSA were regarded by many as the "Camelot" or the shining moments of Philippine politics, the expectations imposed by the mass public on the administrations produced by EDSA uprisings are also enormously high. Since the Arroyo administration (2001-2004) was a product of the so-called "EDSA 2," it is no surprise that the same high expectation was levied on her, just like with Pres. Cory Aquino after the 1986 people power.

3.3 The party-list system and the bastardization of a noble concept – The 1987 Constitution provides that 20% of the lower house seats are allocated for party-list representatives. The partylist system was meant to democratize political power by allowing sector-based organizations and groups representing the marginalized (e.g. labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth sectors) to take part in the legislative process. The passage of RA 7941 in 1995 facilitated the entry of a number of civil society groups in the formal electoral contest. In the May 1998 elections, 14 partylist representatives, the first batch, formally joined the House of Representatives (Co, Tignio, Lao, Sayo 2005, 89).

Though the intention is laudable, the partylist system is far from perfect. Since 1998, the allocated 50 seats have never been fully filled, reflecting either the low level of awareness of voters regarding the partylist system, or the flaw of the partylist system itself.

Moreover, several political hopefuls (e.g. media personalities, former political appointees, retired police or military, etc.), who do not necessarily represent the marginalized, use the partylist route as an easy entry point to the political arena. In the last 2010 elections, in fact, the son of the former President, Mikey Arroyo,[18] ran as the partylist representatives of security guards. The former military chief of staff Angelo Reyes ran as the partylist representative of jeepney drivers and operators.

The abuse of the partylist system leaves a bad taste in the mouth and strengthens the view that the political system is corrupt, further demotivating people to engage in the state.

contemplating on resigning. However, the fact that there is no resignation letter signed by Pres. Estrada made the SC ruling contentious. (See Supreme Court decision G.R. No. 146710-15. 2 March 2001; and G.R. No. 146738. 2 March 2001). Hence, the swearing in of VP Arroyo was legally questioned.

[18]Mikey Arroyo was the representative of a district in Pampanga in 2007-2010. He gave way to allow his mother, the former President Gloria Arroyo, to run in his place. In turn, he ran under the partylist Ang Galing Pinoy, allegedly representing security guards, farmers, tricycle drivers, and small businessmen.

IV. The Paradox of Civil Society

The social and political involvement of people is mostly, but not exclusively, channeled through civil society organizations or CSOs.[19] Civil society is regarded as the foundation and bulwark of democracy. For purposes of clarity, civil society is regarded as "an unstructured, informal broad agreement among political players and the mass public to collectively pursue an ideal or a principle" (Oreta 2010, 235). It "may emerge immediately before and during the democratization process and later die out once the transition is over" (Kamrava 2000, 191). Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), on the other hand, are formal organizations that pursue specific objectives or causes that, in essence, contribute to the civil society's broad agreement.

Especially after the martial law period in the Philippines, CSOs have effectively played the role of (a) facilitating the social and political engagement of the disadvantaged sectors in the political system; and (b) filling the service gaps of the state by providing the economically disadvantaged services that range from charity/dole-out to developmental or economic empowerment type of assistance. In other words, CSOs are responsible for alleviating the hardships of the people by addressing the service gaps of the state and creating the notion that the system responds to the needs of the people, thereby making the political system less oppressive and more palatable in the eyes of the public.

But more than its pacific and facilitative role, CSOs also oblige society to evaluate and rethink the existing norms, values, and paradigms and how these promote the interests of the majority. CSOs exist in the public sphere, between the "private sphere" and the "sphere of public authority," (Habermas 1989) mediating the discursive space where issues are discussed and negotiated. They form part of the intellectual elite that according to Gramsci (1971) are necessary in constructing an alternative paradigm to the "dominant ideology of capitalism" (Faulks 1999, 36-37). Using all available means—legal and political; local and national—CSOs challenge the long-established and entrenched power structure, pushing the boundaries of traditional power to make it more inclusive and participatory.

Needless to say, CSOs play dual roles in society: one, they are instruments of the hegemonic structure[20] with the primary goal of filling the service gaps of the government, thereby diffusing the possible perception of neglect and the heightening of politicized discontent of those who do not benefit from the system. They are, in effect, responsible for strengthening and/or reproducing the status quo.

Two, CSOs are also among the primary catalysts for change, a transformative force that harnesses the strength of ideas and uses the same to confront and push the traditional boundaries of power to re-create a new society.

This inherent contradiction in the CSO sector affects the cohesiveness in the way it handles political discourses. The 'dialogical conflict' within the CSO sector creates

[19]While political engagement is primarily the function of political parties, a number of politicized CSOs are also serving as channels of political participation.
[20]Credit is due to Mr. Hansley Juliano for inspiring this line of argument.

two contending effects—on one hand it adds to the political education (and hopefully political sophistication) of the people, but on the other hand, it also adds confusion in the public's mind regarding the appropriate framing and evaluation of issues.

A. CSOs and agenda setting

Civil and political rights are products of the unique historical context and political struggles by different societies—struggles whose goal is greater recognition, representation, and access to resources by the people outside the spheres of power. In France and the United States of America for instance, the present day notion of citizenship, (i.e. state recognition of people's civil and political rights) was the outcome of their respective social and political revolutions. In Germany and England, on the other hand, citizenship was more peacefully obtained as they were instigated by the state—mainly due to pressure from a politicized working class.[21]

Risking over-simplification, during the martial law period in the Philippines, the political actors could be categorized into two—those who stood in favor of martial law and those who opposed it. The opposition to martial rule, to a large extent, was composed of human rights NGOs alongside political opposition leaders. When the political opposition leaders were jailed and isolated from their supporter, it was the human rights activists and NGOs who continued the struggle against Marcos and his military.

"Human rights NGOs have been regarded as the flagship of justice and human dignity during the dictatorship. From the moment martial law was declared, NGOs have relentlessly questioned the foundations of said declaration, even if the consequence is putting their people in peril. Human rights might have been these NGOs' battle cry, but the deeper yearning of such call was the demand to respect democracy" (Sunga 2006).

In the EDSA 1986, civil society groups were greatly credited for the event. In the January 2001 EDSA, again, the CSOs were at the forefront of mass mobilizations. In the post-Marcos political landscape, in fact, advocacy CSOs are generally equated with mass actions and protests. It is this high-profile projection of CSOs that also exposed them (and their credibility) to the critical eye of the public.

Especially among the middle and upper class, there is a tendency to adopt a 'back to normal' attitude after every EDSA. Superimposed this with the naturally 'trusting' trait of Filipinos to always give new leaders the 'benefit of the doubt,' and the euphoric feeling of the EDSA experience, protesting CSOs were most often construed by some as being too harsh and biased against the administration in power.

[21] Turner, B. (1994). 'Outline of a Theory of Citizenship' in Turner B. and Hamilton, P. (eds). (1994). Citizenship (London: Routledge). cited in Faulks (1999). p. 131

Moreover, since the physical and symbolic manifestations of oppression (in 1986, it was Marcos and his minions) and malgovernance (in 2001, it was Estrada) have been removed, the attention of most CSOs shifted to poverty alleviation and development concerns. A number of CSOs, hence, were compelled to develop and improve their technical/management capacity and other skills that are necessary in implementing development projects. The net effect of such shift in bias is the (unintentional) neglect of political consciousness-raising (for base groups and the mass public in general), and the de-emphasis on works associated with the political-institutional reform underpinnings of development work.

While it is really the task of political parties to politicize the mass public, and facilitate the formal/direct participation of individuals in politics, by and large the CSOs have functioned as "substitute" channels in terms of interest articulation and aggregation.[22] This process links groups separated by geography in common sectoral or political-economic interests. In a society that has always been divided along ethno-linguistic lines, such kind of political organizing is crucial in collectively problematizing and articulating a common agenda. De-emphasizing political work by CSOs therefore has critical implications in democratic consolidation efforts.

In the absence of concerted effort from CSOs to provide a clear framework to appreciate politics, and to provide mechanisms/processes to forge broad-base consultation and decision making, the gap in the level of understanding between rural and urban based groups is further heightened, and the charting of a common future based on common understanding of problems becomes even more a distant vision.

The shift in focus, from political efforts to development agenda, creates an information-ideation vacuum. Political affairs are thus now conveyed to the mass public through media organizations. The problem in allowing media to be the gate keeper of information is that media can only cover limited events, and thus, would highlight only what it views as important. Sadly, Philippine mainstream media has a tendency to capitalize on sensational issues and less exposure is given on more important albeit "boring" topics (e.g. public hearings in Congress, consensus building in community decision making, conflict resolved through peaceful means, among others). Moreover, media conglomerates, intentionally or not, also protect particularistic interests or privileged positions. Nuanced appreciation of events, hence, is severely compromised.

B. The Push and Pull of Civic and Familial Duty

Filipinos are known to regard the super-ordination of the interests of the family[23] over the individual. The 1996 World Values Survey undertaken by the Institute of Social Research of the University of Michigan and conducted in the Philippines

[22]Political parties in the Philippines are not differentiated along political platforms, ethics, and party "whip" (decisiveness in disciplining the ranks). Hence, critics argue that party system in the country remains underdeveloped.
[23]Jocano, 1998, p. 63

by the Social Weather Station reveal that *family* ranked as the highest in the level of importance of Filipinos, followed by *religion, work, friends, leisure* and *politics,* respectively.[24] Filipinos tend to gravitate and protect their own family, relatives, and circle of friends because of the sense of belonging to it[25] and the belief that in times of need, they can always count on their family.

Family-centeredness contributes to the parochial tendency of people. With limited access to relevant, unbiased political information, and with low confidence on the ability of the political system to address their need, there is an inclination for people to be more concerned on issues that directly affect them and/or their extended family, and pay little attention to issues 'distant' to them. Participation, therefore, on political matters outside of those that affect them/ their family directly remains limited.

Family relation is woven with patronage relations, given the extended family notion of Filipinos. Familial ties by ritual are most common especially in communities where vestiges of patronage relations remain strong. This has far reaching effects in the social, economic and political spheres. Most patrons who are embedded in local-domestic politics maintain their hold on power not only through the legitimate process of elections and patronage relations, but also through more sinister means like maintaining their respective security force (private army). These private armed groups are created to protect the candidate and/or members of their family.[26] More recently, however, private armed groups are also used to coerce and threaten non-supporters and maintain a Machiavellian hold on power.

What results is a patron-warlord-boss fused into one leader/political family and a situation where political clans exercise an almost total control in localities. For instance, some political families control all key positions in the local government—Mayor, Vice Mayor, Congressman, Councilors, Barangay leaders—that the locality is transformed to a modern version of fiefdom. Such a situation reinforces the mistaken illusion of those in power that the position they hold is their entitlement.

This weaving of economic and political powers entrenches the clout of influential families, creating political dynasties and effectively dispossessing clients of the liberty to make free choices during elections. Patronage relation is exacerbated when informal networks have stronger authority than formal structures (Lim & Pascual, 2004). According to Hutchcroft (1997), "In the Philippines… lines of formal authority are weaker and the disjuncture between authority and power is often quite pronounced. In this loosely structured system, where patrons are as often found outside formal structures of authority as within them, there is likely less regularization of corruption from one case to another." The fact that

[24]Phil. Sociological Review Vol. 45, Jan-Dec 1997 Nos. 1-4, p. 204
[25]Wurfel, D. (1988). Filipino Politics Development and Decay. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
[26]Given the very personalistic nature of the electoral exercise, violence against candidates is also high since the easiest way to ensure victory is to physically remove the opponent and hence run unopposed.

in the Philippines informal network (patronage system) has a stronger pull on individuals rather than the political structure (laws, policies), practices that favor one's patron or client appeal more.[27]

V. Problematizing the Social and Political Engagement of the Public

This paper believes that Filipinos have a natural tendency to get involved with the affairs of others. This involvement is a function of Filipinos 'concern for others' and is most evident in times of emergencies or disasters. Regarded as *pakikipagkapwa*, it has manifested itself in more abstract forms, e.g., the promotion of noble causes of equality and the common good that have inspired the various uprisings and revolutions in Philippine history.

However, the coupling effect of the paradoxes discussed above—the paradox of democracy and the paradox of CSOs—frames the social and political engagement of the public. The sliding confidence of the public on the democratic political system together with the inherent contradictions in the CSO sector create the unintended effect of further fueling the people's cynicism regarding what is generally viewed as 'political.'

The hostaged situation in localities trapped in a web of patronage and warlordism greatly discourages people to participate more actively in political issues. Moreover, the vacuum of having a common agenda due to the abandonment of political organizing by a number of CSOs creates an uninspiring landscape as there is no common cause to root for.

Cynicism not only de-motivates people to get more involved politically, it also affects the over-all perception and credibility—rightly or wrongly—of actions by individuals and groups that are political in nature.

The result is a seeming aversion to engagements that is equated with politics, and a natural gravitation to social/apolitical types of actions. In other words, the people's social involvement is directly proportional to the cynicism on what is 'political'—the higher the people despise what is political, the greater is their tendency to get involved in social (safe) issues.

The high participation rate on socially oriented groups clearly shows that the 'concern for others' trait remains strong. It is the dissatisfaction on the performance of the political system, and the inability of the system to effectively institute avenues for real, authentic consultative mechanism, that serve as the greatest de-motivators for people to engage politically.

The fact that involvement in church and/or religious activities remains high validates the argument that Filipinos' concern for others remains strong. Given the increasing

[27]The preponderance of informal networks vs. the formal structures can be attributed to the fact that the institutional design and the legal system in the Philippines are imposed structures, introduced from the outside, and have not really evolved with the people. Patron-client relations, on the other hand, have been well entrenched in both the political and cultural relations, passed on from one generation to the next.

disenchantment with politically-motivated activities, a significant number of people had gravitated towards 'neutral' activities initiated by the church or religious organizations who are widely perceived as non-partisan. While there are also a number of civil society organizations that are non-partisan, it is the far-reaching capacity of the church that perhaps can best explain why there seems to be greater participation in church-initiated activities.

However, it is not just the influence of the church that generates participation. This paper believes that it is the posturing of neutrality that attracts volunteerism.

For instance, the Gawad Kalinga's project of building houses for the poor that was initiated by the religious organization Couples for Christ[28]—from the time of its launching until the present, the project continues to generate huge numbers of volunteers, from students to corporate young professionals. Likewise, during the deluge caused by Typhoon Ondoy in 2009, thousands of volunteers helped several affected communities, from cleaning up to collecting and distributing relief goods. These examples show that the spirit of volunteerism and concern for others remain high.

It is the same spirit of volunteerism that was harnessed by the campaign of Noynoy Aquino.

The people's shying away from politics is the consequence of the people's cynicism with the way politics was administered by those in power. Noynoy Aquino presented himself as an alternative to the current crop of leaders, and has in fact appropriated the unoccupied *'space'* reserved for the reform-oriented leader that the people have longed for.[29] By riding on the memory of his late mother and father, Cory and Ninoy, Noynoy was able to re-capture the imagination of those who participated in the first EDSA of 1986 and this group served as the solid-bloc that supported his candidacy. The promise of reform and good governance, on the other hand, attracted those who have long been yearning for change. In other words, the campaign of Noynoy capitalized on the formula of volunteerism grounded on the desire for change/reform agenda. In other words, more than Noynoy Aquino as the person, he became the symbol of what was needed by the people at that particular juncture.

The winning of Noynoy Aquino, in fact seems to reverse the cynicism that has long shrouded the way people deal with the government. There is a feeling of hope seeping in the consciousness of the people, albeit still in its embryonic stage. It is true that there remains a calculated distance between the people and the administration, but unlike the previous leadership, people are more positive in their disposition with the current government. The Philippine Daily Inquirer (Jan. 30, 2011) explains this as "because many people feel he belongs to them and is within their reach (maybe because he is not perfect but appears intent on doing the best that he can, like most hopeful citizens who are the wellspring of his political power)."

[28]The Gawad Kalinga has since been "spun-off" as a separate NGO, independent of the group Couples for Christ.
[29]There is "vacancy" in the leadership position of the reform-oriented block since the death of the symbolic leaders for reform, Cory Aquino and Cardinal Sin, of staunch nationalists Diokno, and Tanada, and absence from the public sphere of Salonga. Opposition leaders who have attempted to appropriate this 'space' have not been successful since their legitimacy in the public's eye remains wanting.

It remains to be seen, however, if there is real basis for hope and if political cynicism is on its twilight. The author hopes so.

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APPENDIX 4. CASE STUDY ON THE CARPER CAMPAIGN

The CARPER Campaign: Passing the "Un-passable" Law

By Ernesto G. Lim Jr., Coordinator,
People's Campaign for Agrarian Reform Network, Inc. (AR Now!)

I. Introduction

The campaign for the passage of the CARP Extension with Reforms Law was a three-year campaign. It started in mid-2006 with the filing of HB 5743, which was an earlier version of the CARPER bill and ended with former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signing it into law on August 7, 2009 in Plaridel, Bulacan.

In the beginning, there were only a handful of peasant groups, agrarian reform advocacy groups, and personalities who believed that a law extending the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) could actually be passed. More so, a law amending the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL or RA 6657) to introduce "perfecting amendments."

Some groups did not believe that a law extending CARP could be passed which prompted them to take the "sprint to the line" strategy, where their energy would not be exerted on the passage of an extension law but on winning the most number of local land cases before CARP/CARL expires in June 2009.

To complicate matters, there were groups from the extreme left that pushed for the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill or GARB, which proposed a totally new agrarian reform program based on the concept of nationalized land ownership which was confiscatory.

After almost three years of grueling lobbying, mass actions, creative interventions, and networking, not only a law extending and replenishing CARP funding was passed but major reforms or "perfecting amendments" were also incorporated into the CARPER law or RA 9700.

A total of 26 reforms or perfecting amendments have been incorporated into RA 9770 including the indefeasiblity of the Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs), recognition of the rights of landless women to be awarded lands, provision of initial capitalization and socialized credit for agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs), repeal of the Stock Distribution Option (SDO), and the Voluntary Land Transfer schemes.

This paper is being written as a reflection and assessment of the CARPER campaign on the key factors that contributed to its success. This paper will also attempt to identify the major learnings of the campaign in the hope that they contribute to the success of other campaigns.

Box 1
The CARPER Campaign: A Chronology

2006:

- Farmers' groups and agrarian reform advocates, through Akbayan, file House Bill No. 5743, which is the earlier version of the CARPER bill, during the latter part of the 13th Congress. Representative Baham Mitra also files House Bill No. 1265, which proposes the mere extension of CARP. The lack of a counterpart legislation at the Senate makes it impossible to have an enacted law by the end of 2006.

2007:

- In January, farmers' groups and agrarian reform advocates engage in a series of "unity talks" to come up with a unity bill on CARPER. Through these talks, two groups/coalitions of agrarian reform advocates and farmers are formally created. The first is the Reform CARP Movement (RCM) whose mandate is to be at the forefront of campaigns for CARPER. The second, the Rural Poor Solidarity, is mandated to provide, represent, and facilitate a venue for civil society's participation in the Church-led series of Diocesan Rural Congresses (DRCs) prior to the National Rural Congress.
- On July 23, the 14th Session of Congress opens with Akbayan Partylist Rep. Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel filing the "unity bill" on CARPER (House Bill No. 1257).
- On October 10, 55 farmers from Sumilao, Bukidnon start the historic "Walk for Land, Walk for Justice" that calls on the government and the public to restore the dignity of the rural poor, reclaim for the farmers 144 hectares of land in San Vicente, Bukidnon, revoke the land conversion order in favor of San Miguel Corporation, and reform and extend the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.

2008:

- In February, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada agrees to sponsor the counterpart of HB 1257 at the Senate and files Senate Bill (SB) 2047 on February 4.
- On April 23, after five committee meetings and three regional consultations, the House Committee on Agrarian Reform approves Committee Report No. 506, or the CARPER substitute bill, House Bill 4077.
- On July 7, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines convenes the Second National Rural Congress (NRC2).
- The two-day Congress is attended by leaders of different rural organizations, the Catholic Church, religious associations and other stakeholders in the rural areas. Among its resolutions are the (a) appeal for the continuation of the agrarian reform program and provision of support services to farmers, (b) establishment of Bishops-Legislators-Farmers Forum at the local levels, (c) appeal to the government to uphold farmers' EP/CLOA, enact the passage of NLUA and review all laws affecting farmers, and (d) establishment of a Bishops-Peasants Conference to oversee the implementation of NRC2 resolutions.
- On October 7, after four committee hearings and three regional consultations, the Senate Committee on Agrarian Reform approves Senate Bill No. 2666. On World Food Day on October 16, farmers' groups and agrarian reform advocates mobilize a thousand CARPER supporters to call on the government to act on their demands.
- On December 17, Congress issues Joint Resolution No. 19 which "extended" CARP implementation until June 2009 without Compulsory Acquisition, reasoning out that the legislators need time to come up with perfecting amendments to law.

2009:

- On June 1, the Senate approves SB 2666 on its third Reading with 14 affirmative votes and two abstentions. The same day, the SBC farmers submit more than 70,000 signatures in support of HB 4077 at the House of Representatives.
- On June 3, the last session day of Congress, at around 11:30 pm, the House of Representatives approves on third Reading House Bill 4077 with 211 affirmative votes, 11 negative votes and two abstentions.
- On June 9, a day before the 21st CARP Anniversary, the Bicameral Committee agrees on one version of CARPER. The Bicameral Committee Report is ratified by the Senate and the House of Representatives on July 27 and 29, respectively.
- On August 7, Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signs the Bicameral Report in Plaridel, Bulacan. The CARPER bill becomes Republic Act No. 9700.

II. Key factors that contributed to the success of the CARPER campaign

The campaign for the enactment of the CARPER law or RA 9700 can be considered as one of the most significant achievements of the peasant movement (with the support of other sectors) during the post-EDSA revolution era.

In assessing the CARPER campaign, the following would be considered as key factors contributory to its success:

A. A core of committed peasant organizations and support groups – The campaign for the passage of the CARPER law starts and ends with the farmers.

With the establishment of the Reform CARP Movement, the CARPER campaign had a core of peasant organizations that would lead and provide the warm bodies for the campaign. These peasant groups were the Alyansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Kanlurang Batangas (AMKB), Katipunan ng Bagong Pilipina (KABAPA), Makabayang Alyansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas (MAKABAYAN-Pilipinas), Negros Farmers Council (NFC), Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka (PAKISAMA), Pagkakaisa para sa Tunay na Repormang Agraryo (PARAGOS-Pilipinas), Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Samahan sa Kanayunan (PKSK), Samahang Magsasaka ng Macabud, and the farmers from Calatagan, Banasi and the Sumilao.

The initial draft of the CARPER bill was based on consultations with farmers' groups where learnings from their experience on CARP implementation were gathered. Further refinements on the said bill were made during write shops among the support groups and the peasant groups of RCM.

All mobilizations and lobbying activities were led by the farmers' groups themselves. However, the actions taken by the farmers during the campaign went beyond the usual mobilizations which only caused furor among transport drives who are caught in the traffics caused by such mobilizations.

A key element in the actions of the farmers is "genuine sacrifice" for the issue or cause they were pushing. Farmers from Sumilao, Banasi, Calatagan, Rizal, Bulacan, Batangas, Laguna, etc. marched on foot for days to join the campaign for CARPER in Metro Manila. These were marches on foot for hundreds and even thousands of kilometers.

Farmers from Sumilao, Banasi, and Calatagan left their families for months and lived in gymnasiums in Metro Manila under the charity of the different academic institutions and of the Roman Catholic Church.

At the near end of the campaign, the farmers were even willing to endure incarceration just to keep the hope of passing the CARPER law. And on June

3, 2009, the last day of session at the House of Representatives, 97 farmers were arrested and detained at Camp Karingal as they forced themselves into the HOR grounds (after being denied entry for weeks) to make a final demand for the enactment of the CARPER law.

Such acts of genuine sacrifice gave the campaign the sense of authenticity and credibility, which eventually won over the support of media, the church and the public.

On the other hand, the support groups composed of agrarian reform advocacy groups not only provided technical assistance and funds accessing support but also walked side-by-side with the farmers.

Legal groups took on the task of translating into specific provisions in the bill ideas and further amendments introduced by the farmers and during the public hearings and bicameral conference committee meetings.

The support groups also facilitated the networking efforts with the media and the other sectoral groups, and the strategizing sessions for the campaign.

B. **The Sumilao March: Priming and "putting a face" on the CARPER campaign** – Although having a clear legislative agenda for CARPER (in the form of a specific bill) was essential and an advantage in lobbying in Congress, it would have been very difficult for the campaign to raise media and national attention on the issue of extending and reforming the CARP law through mere discussions of the bill's provisions in press conferences or public forums.

Thus, there was a need to "put a face" on the CARPER campaign and issue. Fortunately and coincidentally, the Sumilao farmers were also at that time planning to stage their dramatic 1,700-kilometer, 57-day march from Sumilao, Bukidnon to Metro Manila.

The said Sumilao farmers were the very same group who staged in 1997 the 28-day hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to protest the non-awarding to them of the said 144-hectare Quisumbing estate. The hunger strike was also staged right before the first "extension" of CARP in 1998. As a result of the said hunger strike, national attention was put on the issue of agrarian reform implementation in the country and led to the passage of RA 8532, which extended CARP, replenished the Agrarian Reform Fund with another fifty billion pesos (PhP50,000,000,000), and extended said funding up to 2008.

As a result of the hunger strike, then President Fidel Ramos proposed a "win-win" solution wherein the DAR would award 100 hectares to the Sumilao farmers and 44 hectares to the landowner. However, after the hunger strike

was lifted, the landowner questioned the said "win-win" proposition before the Supreme Court where the landowner won and was allowed to convert the said property.

Ten years after the hunger strike, the Sumilao farmers staged their march to dramatize and raise public attention and support for their demand that the said property be awarded to them as the landowner failed to implement his conversion plan on the property, and instead sold it to San Miguel Corporation (SMC) where a hog farm now stands. Under CARP rules, landowners who convert their properties should complete implementation of their conversion plan within a period of five years otherwise said conversion permit will be nullified.

Ten years after, the Sumilao farmers with their march all the way from Bukidnon were again in the forefront of raising national attention on the issue of CARP implementation and again anchoring the campaign for a second "extension" on CARP.

The said march not only generated national attention on their local land case but also generated media attention on the CARPER issue as the group also carried the said issue. A dry run of the support of the Roman Catholic hierarchy on the CARPER agenda was also manifested during the Sumilao march. This culminated with Archbishop Gaudencio Rosales personally taking on the cause of the Sumilao farmers.

By the time the Sumilao marchers returned to Bukidnon (after reaching an agreement with SMC) and occupied the 50-hectare portion of the 144-hectare contested property, agrarian reform was a national issue again.

C. **A network of key support institutions, individuals and other sectors** – The success of the CARPER campaign also heavily relied on the support of key sectors, institutions and personalities. As the network of advocates for CARPER expanded, more warm bodies could be mobilized for mass actions, more resources (i.e. financial and non-financial) for the campaign also became available, and more coordinated and even independent (from RCM) actions were undertaken.

Broader sectoral support for CARPER also further legitimized the issue of CARPER leading to greater pressure on decision makers and greater support from the mass media.

However, the support of the Roman Catholic hierarchy, mainly the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP), was the most crucial as not only did it open up the resources of the church, but also its vast network in support of the CARPER campaign.

The relationship between the CARPER campaigners and the Roman Catholic hierarchy was cultivated as early as the hunger strike of the Sumilao farmers in 1987 where the Catholic Church also played a significant role. This relationship was renewed and further strengthened during the Sumilao march where Cardinal Rosales personally took on the issue of the Sumilao farmers.

Key also to this relationship is the perfect match between the objectives and principles of agrarian reform, which seeks to restore the dignity of the landless poor farmers by giving them access and ownership to the land they till, to their means of livelihood, and the social teachings of the Catholic Church which espouses the dignity of the rural poor and encourages the faithful to commit to the common good.

In supporting the farmers' cause, the Church invoked its preferential option for the poor. This weighed heavily in the Church's decision to pursue agrarian reform by all means and modes possible. It is the same idea that encouraged the partnership between the rural poor, agrarian reform advocates, the Church, and legislators in pursuing CARPER. This is also why the entire establishment of the Church of the Poor was mobilized to cater to the needs of the farmers and exercised its power to influence decision-making processes to ensure the passage of CARPER.

The Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) was unequivocal in its position in favor of CARPER and it continuously appealed to the members of Congress and Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to act on the proposed law.

CBCP provided venues for farmers and legislators to engage in fruitful dialogue and exchange on why agrarian reform—and CARPER, for that matter—must be prioritized and acted upon. Dialogues became venues for bishops and legislators to respond to the cry of the rural poor. Dioceses issued pastoral statements, parishes read pastoral letters and special masses were held for the farmers. Bishops caring deeply for CARPER fasted for days with the farmers and made it a habit to send daily SMS or text messages to their district representatives to ensure that CARPER would always be in their order of business.

In support of the bishops, the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP) joined the farmers in their call for justice and their struggle for liberation from landlessness.

The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (RCAM) and the dioceses within it, led by Cardinal Gaudencio Rosales, played a more proactive and pivotal role. They sustained and managed the Church's and the farmers' coordinated efforts and actions as the struggle continued.

Manila Auxiliary Bishop Broderick Pabillo, Chairman of the CBCP-NASSA, took the lead for the Church in communicating and working with the farmers. Bishop Pabillo met with legislators, coordinated with the other structures of the Church for support, marched with the farmers, and went on hunger strike for the farmers. He and other bishops supportive of CARPER became the symbol of the Church's solidarity with the poor, which inspired others to be one with the poor in this struggle.

With the blessings of Cardinal Rosales, Caritas, the lead Catholic agency for social services and development in the Archdiocese of Manila, became the main provider for the farmers and advocates engaged in the campaign.

The Church's involvement in the campaign reached the Vatican. His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI issued a statement urging the Arroyo government to continue and strengthen the country's land reform program. For the Pontiff, CARP promotes the right of the farm workers to own the land they work through and fosters the just distribution of wealth and the sustainable development of natural resources.

Conveyed to the Philippine Ambassador to the Holy See, the Pope laid down one of the primary considerations for agrarian reform: Grant Filipino farmers greater opportunities for increasing production and earning what they need to support themselves and their families.

With the Church's involvement, support for CARPER snowballed.

On December 2008, the Catholic Educational Association of the Philippines (CEAP) publicly demanded that "instead of amending the Constitution to expand land ownership rights to foreigners, Congress should work for social and economic development by extending and completing CARP." CEAP stood firm in its belief that CARPER would address the needs of the many that are poor.

CEAP organized and convened circles of discernment in its member schools to facilitate deeper appreciation and heightened awareness on the issue of landlessness consistent with the Social Teachings of the Church. Through this method, CEAP persuaded not only their members but also its networks and partners to launch similar activities like the Watch and Pray Movement (WPM), the Manila Archdiocese Parochial Schools Association (MAPSA) and COCOPEA's supported A-TEACHER Partylist group, to support and work for CARPER.

CEAP, like parishes and convents, opened up schools for the farmers and contributed in the broadening of a pro-CARPER constituency in the academic community. The academe's support added public pressure to the passage of a CARPER law.

Stepping up to the challenges and expectations of academic communities' involvement in pursuing CARPER, the Ateneo de Manila University (AdMU), the De La Salle University (DLSU), and Adamson University (AdU) formed what can be considered as sites of struggles for CARPER.

The three schools provided the farmers and campaigners the much-needed boost of morale and logistical support to carry out the campaign to its end.

The school administrators' efforts to mobilize the academic community for CARPER apparently affected even the students who were always critical of actions by the school administrators. In a rare display of solidarity, school administrators and student organizations set aside their differences to jointly support CARPER.

The Student Council Alliance of the Philippines (SCAP) and the Union of Catholic Student Councils (UCSC), two of the three largest independent national organizations of student councils and student governments, and the militant-activist Movement for the Advancement of Student Power (MASP), joined the campaign for CARPER. These groups extended their support to the farmers, recognizing the fact that social change can only be achieved if all people enjoy the full exercise of human rights.

Even school-based political parties, like the UP Alyansa ng mga Mag-aaral para sa Panlipunang Katwiran at Kaunlaran (UP ALYANSA), advocated for the extension, revision, and reform of CARP. UP ALYANSA recognized the essential role of agrarian reform not only in economic development, but also in the establishment of a more progressively just society where ownership of assets and opportunities are equitably distributed.

Members of the student movement effectively shared their time with the farmers, educated their fellow students and joined mass actions. Their experiences with the farmers and their struggle were popularized with the use of new media technologies.

Students blogged about the cause and the campaigns, they Tweeted and Plurked their moments with the farmers, they Multiplied and uploaded their photos, they lent their Facebook statuses to the farmers shoutouts and shared YouTube videos in their wall posts.

This new media campaign weaved the farmers' stories on the Web and started a viral campaign for CARPER. They transformed the entire cyberspace into their own "solidarity walks" for CARPER, hopping from one blog and wall post to another, to pass the message of support and spontaneous actions. These actions maximized student participations within and outside their ranks and even produced a more animated method of reaching out to the farmers and delivering information in the best way possible.

Catching the viral campaign, Idea!s, a social enterprise run by a group of young creative professionals, helped in the multimedia campaign for CARPER. The campaign dubbed as "Act on It Now!" provided added value in the public awareness and reception on CARPER and the farmers' cause with the campaign line "Every farmer's plight is every Filipino's fight."

Award winning director Ditsi Carolino also produced and organized premieres for her documentary *Lupang Hinarang* with the goal of using them as venues for popularizing the issue of agrarian reform and CARPER.

Lupang Hinarang documented the struggles of the Sumilao and Negros farmers. It was screened in different schools and venues including the Ateneo de Manila University, De La Salle University, Adamson University, University of Santo Tomas, Dolphy Theater at the studios of ABS-CBN (arguably the biggest broadcast network in the Philippines), Philamlife Theater and, recently, at the Cinemalaya Independent Film Festival at the Cultural Center of the Philippines Theater.

Gang Badoy of RockEd Philippines has been involved in the campaign for CARPER since the Sumilao Campaign in 2007. She established a network with other artists and provided her insights in the media and communication angle of the issue. She dedicated a series of her "Sunday Silence" event and segments of her RockEd radio program for the cause of the farmers on its maiden broadcast aired over the FM station Jam 88.3.

Another artist and creative director, Mae Paner, better known in the advocacy circles as Juana Change, made a pitch fitting to become one of her YouTube sensations. She dramatized the farmers' plight for CARPER even more by donning a farmer's persona in one of her acts calling for agrarian reform vouching that it helped the rural poor to have a decent living, ranting against injustices committed by the landed, calling on media for a just and reasonable coverage of the farmers' call, and teaching the value of land in simpler terms. Her YouTube act was followed by her continuous solidarity acts to the call for CARPER. She organized a walk for change with the Banasi farmers and made her presence felt in some of the mass actions and gatherings of the farmers.

In her latest YouTube video, which she called her Christmas Offering to Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Juana Change listed CARPER among the scandals that hit the Arroyo administration, perhaps referring to the efforts of the four Arroyo Congressmen who tried to block or water down CARPER but failed in the end due to people support and public acceptance.

The campaign for CARPER did not only attract new allies in the cause for social justice and sustainable development. It also consolidated, united and rallied the social movements. Aside from students, labor groups and the urban poor rallied to work for a common cause free from ideological baggage

and traditional analytical perspectives on how to go through the issue of landlessness and reforming the agrarian reform program.

Two major labor centers expressed their support for the farmers, namely the Bukluran ng Manggagawang Pilipino (BMP) and the Alliance of Progressive Labor (APL).

APL united with the farmers in their call for land redistribution and they reiterated the need for compulsory acquisition to end to democratize land ownership in the countryside. Their support for CARPER is founded on the belief that it is important and timely that the country should prioritize and strengthen the agriculture sector as a national development strategy and should serve as basis for economic development that may consequently benefit other sectors and industries. APL also believed in the long-term value of agrarian reform in ensuring food security and food sovereignty and so it campaigned against killer amendments to the proposed CARPER law.

Various urban poor groups also formed an alliance with the rural poor while the latter were in Metro Manila. They informally called the alliance the "Urban and Rural Poor Solidarity" as an expression of common advocacy for land.

Urban poor groups such as LUMABAN KA, Urban Poor Associates, Task Force Anti-Eviction, PHILSSA and Urban Land Reform Task Force (ULRTF), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Taga-lungsod (KPML), pursued the issue of landlessness and delivery of basic support services. These urban poor groups participated in almost all mass actions of the farmers. Significantly, the urban poor welcomed the farmers in their visits to communities in Payatas, Tatalon, Tondo, Dagat-Dagatan, Sucat and Potatatan to gather signatures and explain their issues to their fellow poor. In a touching display of support, most urban poor dwellers readily sympathized with the farmers as they both shared approximately the same concerns and the desire to be free from poverty and for security of land tenure.

In a span of three years, CARPER became a people's campaign waged in extraordinary circumstances and met with formidable resistance. The groundwork for influencing politicians in Congress was a painstaking experience since the fate of CARPER would be determined and decided in this political battleground. The strategy seems to be common and that is to influence politicians to support the cause and to convince them to go beyond party lines.

Akbayan Citizens' Action Party, led by Reps. Risa Hontiveros and Walden Bello, together with Albay Rep. Edcel Lagman, no doubt served as a fulcrum in the parliamentary campaign for CARPER. Being the principal authors of House Bill (HB) No. 4077, the farmer-backed bill for CARPER, they recruited more legislative champions for CARPER. They provided the necessary

parliamentary tactics and strategies to ensure its passage from the committee level to the plenary and to the bicameral committee levels. Their parliamentary work, coupled with some research and technical support from advocates, led to a much better number of legislators supportive of the bill.

The Liberal Party, one of the oldest political parties in the country, studied the issue of agrarian reform deeply and laid out its position in unmistakable terms possible as its members voted in favor of HB 4077 and its counterpart proposal in the Senate, Senate Bill (SB) No. 2666.

Other Partylists in Congress, such as AKBAYAN, AMIN, ARC, CIBAC, A-TEACHER, ABAKADA, BUTIL, APEC, COOP-NATCCO and ABA-AKO registered their support for CARPER. They pressured the House leadership to fulfill its promises to the farmers for the deliberation and enactment of CARPER. These groups, in effect, counteracted campaigns of another Partylist bloc that sought to submit to the plenary their own unpopular and unconstitutional version of an agrarian reform bill.

New political formations such as Bagong Pilipinas Movement led by Bro. Eddie Villanueva and Kaya Natin! led by Pampanga Gov. Eddie Panlilio likewise adopted the call for CARPER as part of their agenda for change.

Bagong Pilipinas, a movement that aimed to fuel the presidential campaign of Bro. Eddie, invited the Sumilao, Banasi, and Calatagan farmers at the launch of the movement and allowed the farmers to pitch for CARPER before its thousands of members. With Bagong Pilipinas supportive of CARPER, the Jesus is Lord (JIL) Movement offered its facilities to the farmers for their advocacy calls. JIL shows, such as *Diyos at Bayan* and *Adyenda* aired over free television channel QTV-11, were maximized to dissemiante the information and awareness campaign for CARPER.

Kaya Natin!, a movement for good governance, publicly supported CARPER and issued a statement stressing the need for the government to act on the proposed law. The statement, signed by 12 local government authorities, broke the silence of local government units on the debate for CARPER. It changed the configuration of the growing support base for CARPER and it capitalized on the call for a more transparent and accountable implementation of the program and clear bias for the Filipino farmers over foreign ownership of land.

Some of the signatories included governors and mayors namely Pampanga Governor Eddie Panlilio, Isabela Governor Grace Padaca, Ifuagao Governor Teddy Baguilat Jr., Naga City Mayor Jesse Robredo, Mayor Sonia Lorenzo of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija, Mayor Roque Versoza Jr. of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, Mayor Fermin Mabulo of San Fernando, Camarines Sur, Mayor Florante Gerdan of Sta. Fe, Nueva Vizcaya, and Mayor Marivic Belena of San Jose City, Nueva Ecija. Former local government officials also joined the call for

CARPER such as Mayors Gloria Congco and Mary Jane Ortega of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija and San Fernando City, La Union, respectively.

Interestingly, among the local government authorities who expressed support for CARPER, it was Manila City Mayor Alfredo Lim who provided inspiration for the campaigning farmers. Knowing that Mayor Lim was involved in the infamous "Mendiola Massacre," the farmers were awed when he said, "It is only proper that [CARPER] be turned into law… it's a good and just program." He further said that he would always be supportive of the farmers and would talk to his Senator friends to help them better understand the farmers' cause.

With local government units getting involved in the campaign, the powerful Liga ng mga Barangay ng Caloocan strongly supported the farmers' cause for the immediate enactment of HB 4077 and SB 2666 during a General Assembly of the Punong Barangays of Caloocan City. Further, Rico Judge "RJ" Echiverri, the current National President of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, led the issuance of "Liga ng mga Barangay ng Caloocan Resolution Calling for CARP Extension with Reforms" signed and openly supported by all the 104 Punong Barangays of Caloocan present at the assembly.

Caloocan City Mayor Recom Echiverri was the first to sign the Citizens' Petition for CARPER while Quezon City Mayor Sonny Belmonte allowed the farmers to stay within the city with help and assistance from the Quezon City police.

A key personality who also played a significant role in the CARPER campaign was former COMELEC Chair and Constitutionalist Atty. Christian Monsod. He was at the forefront of the CARPER campaign in lobbying and convincing legislators and other decision-makers on the validity and necessity of extending and reforming the agrarian reform law. His influence also extended to the mass media through the support of Mrs. Winnie Monsod and the business sector where he was able to convince the Bishops-Businessmen's Conference for Human Development (BBC) to support the passage of the CARPER law. Atty. Monsod's active involvement in the campaign further contributed to the credibility of the campaign.

D. **Gaining national media coverage and support** – A major factor that tremendously helped the CARPER campaign was gaining national media coverage and gaining the support of national media. Clearly, the fastest way to make a campaign issue a national issue is to get it covered by national media. It is also the most effective way of sending one's messages to the public and the decision makers. It can also create pressure to decision makers and to "opponents" of one's advocacy agenda.

Favorable media coverage also greatly boosts the legitimacy of one's campaign issue. Making the front pages, especially the banner headlines, and having

editorials written on one's campaign issues are major indicators of successful media coverage. TV news coverage, which has lesser "space," are also important. Tabloids and radio news coverage are specifically targeted for harnessing public awareness and support for one's issues.

During three years of CARPER campaigning, the "banner headline" and "editorial" goals were breached numerous times. The main streaming of the term "CARPER" itself, which stands for "CARP extension with reforms," also serves as an indicator of the success of the media work of the CARPER campaigners.

However, the tricky part really is on how to get covered in the first place.

For the CARPER campaign, the situation was trickier as campaigners had to overcome several obstacles, namely:

1. The CARPER bill was not a simple bill;
2. The campaigners had to take a "half full, half empty" stand on the existing CARP law. The campaigners had to claim limited success for CARP to be able to push for its extension and yet had to be critical of it at the same time to justify its reform agenda. A "grayish" position is not media friendly which tends to prefer the "black or white" positions;
3. There was a general perception among the legislators, media practitioners, academics, and even the public that CARP was a "failure;"
4. The CARPER campaign had to compete with a parallel campaign by extreme left groups for the passage of their Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill (GARB) which usually "confused" the public, legislators and decision-makers, and even one's constituents and supporters; and
5. Agrarian reform at the start of the campaign was virtually a "non-issue."

To overcome said obstacles and launch a successful media campaign, the CARPER campaigners had to do the following:

1. Put a "face" on the campaign by launching the Sumilao March and other activities (i.e. land marches, signature campaigns, school hopping, etc.) led by farmers' groups or communities;
2. Conduct "small but dramatic" and "genuine" actions, such as the "siege" of Speaker Nograles' office (although this one was really spontaneous), plenary disruption actions, sit-down strikes inside the plenary hall, hunger strikes, breaching of House Reps' gates, etc. The key here is the "genuineness" of the actions. "Staged" actions may get media coverage but real sacrificial actions are the ones that get the support of "sincere" media people which in the long run will sustain support and coverage of one's campaign and activities;

3. Conduct "big and broad" (i.e. multi-sectoral) mobilizations, which are also effective but may not be as cost-efficient as "small but dramatic" actions;
4. Conduct regular media briefings with beat reporters and columnists;
5. Conduct "creative" photo ops during mobilizations and press conference; and
6. Regular issuance of clear and targeted press statements and releases.

E. **Valid proposition, strong technical capacity of support groups and existence of studies on CARP** – The first three key factors contributory to the success of the CARPER campaign have been related to the building of a strong and broad constituency behind one's advocacy. This has been mainly for the purpose of creating stronger political pressure on decision makers and opposing groups through the show of force in terms of numbers.

However, equally important to creating strong political pressure is the formulation of credible, convincing and evidence-based arguments to support one's proposals (in this case the "extension" and introduction of perfecting amendments to CARP) and counter the arguments of critics.

Also, the inclusion of "reform" or "perfecting amendments" to the overall framework of the legislative proposition may have proven to be crucial in the successful outcome of the campaign.

In contrast to the proposition to merely extend CARP, the CARPER framework accommodated the interests of both supporters and critics of CARP.

To supporters, it provided an opportunity to continue a social justice program that would allow landless farmers to acquire land and support services.

To critics, the CARPER framework says, "we agree with you that CARP is problematic so let's correct the problems by introducing 'reforms' in the law and its implementation."

The said framework made it more palatable and even difficult to reject for "fence sitter" legislators or even critical lawmakers, as rejection can be perceived as being anti-reform.

Even Representative Edcel Lagman originally filed a bill calling for a mere extension of CARP but later on became one of the champions of CARPER. Senator Chiz Escudero was also critical of CARP and yet said that he would only support a bill that would "reform" CARP.

On the need to set up a core of competent technical people who will back staff the campaign, the Reform CARP Movement organized a core of technical staffs, lawyers and researchers who prepared the arguments and data to support

every provision in the proposed draft bill including those later introduced in the latter of the CARPER bill.

CARP studies and assessments were analyzed, synthesized and formulated into "briefers" for the use of legislators, specifically for legislative champions in Congress. Cases of CARP success stories were also documented and published as part of the public education component of the campaign. A team of lawyers also prepared answers to every possible legal question on CARP and on the CARPER bill.

Counters for arguments against CARP and for proposed "killer amendments" of anti-CARP legislators were also prepared by this core of technical people.

Furthermore, said technical people provided back staffing not only to the legislative champions (i.e. Reps. Risa Hontiveros and Edcel Lagman at the House of Representatives and Senator Gringo Honasan at the Senate) but also to the Committee Secretariats for Agrarian Reform at the House of Representatives and the Senate.

The technical staff also conducted briefings on CARPER to legislative allies and to those who were still undecided. During the plenary sessions (at the HOR and Senate) and the Bicameral Conference Committee meeting on CARPER, they were allowed to back staff Reps. Lagman and Hontiveros and Senator Honasan, allowing them to directly provide inputs and actual wording of provisions and revisions of said provisions for said champions.

The commissioning of several studies on CARP implementation (i.e. CARP Impact Assessments, etc.) by DAR and the existence of several independent studies on CARP (i.e. Borras, AR Now!, MTPDP-AR Assessments, etc.) also benefitted the CARPER campaign as data were already available in the light that peasant and agrarian reform advocacy groups did not have the funds to conduct such comprehensive assessment studies.

F. The X-factors – Although the factors cited above played significant roles in the success of the CARPER campaign, there were several crucial developments that were baffling, unexpected, and unplanned that significantly affected the outcome of the campaign. One could attribute these to luck and coincidence or to divine intervention. However, without these occurrences, the CARPER law could have not been passed or would have significantly altered the provisions of RA 9700. These developments were:

- ***Enrile's surprising conversion*** – The lobby for the enactment of the CARPER law took its first major boost when the House Committee on Agrarian Reform, chaired by Congressman Bulut, approved for second reading on April 23, 2008 Committee Report No. 506, or the CARPER

substitute bill, House Bill 4077. Since then, much of the delay in the passage of the CARPER law was being attributed to the Senate which was only able to approve its own committee report (SB No. 2666) on CARPER by October 7, 2008 or almost six months after the House issued HB 4077.

Such delay was mainly attributed to the non-support of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile on the bill. During the earlier public hearings on the CARPER bill, Senator Enrile (who was not yet the Senate president at that time) was the most critical of the bill. On one occasion, he even prevented a representative of the CBCP to read during a public hearing the position paper of the bishops on the CARPER bill and demanded that the bishops themselves should read their statement in the hearings.

And yet, a few months later, it was Senator Enrile, now Senate President, who facilitated the passage on third reading of SB 2666 on June 1, 2009 two days before the end the 14th session of Congress.

The passage by the Senate of SB 2666 law exerted pressure on the House, specifically on House Speaker Nograles, to pass on third reading its version of the CARPER law. Thus, on June 3, 2009, during the last session day of Congress, at around 11:30 pm, the House of Representatives passed on third reading HB 4077 with 211 affirmative votes, 11 negative votes and two abstentions.

It remains a mystery what transformed a Senator highly critical of CARP into its "champion."

- ***Villafuerte-Nograles break-up*** – After the House and the Senate approved on third reading their respective versions of the CARPER bill, the next step was the consolidation of the two versions during the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting on CARPER.

  It was being expected that Congressmen Villafuerte and Garcia would join the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting to ensure that the "killer amendments" they inserted in the House version of the CARPER bill are preserved in the final draft of the CARPER law. Congressman Garcia had basically three "killer amendments" while Congressman Villafuerte had 20-plus pages of his own "killer amendments."

  Fortunately, Speaker Nograles and Congressman Villafuerte had a falling-out just before the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting over the issue of charter change. As a result, Congressman Villafuerte was not included by Speaker Nograles in the list of representatives of the Lower House in the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting.

This allowed Representatives Lagman and Hontiveros the opportunity to "soften" the three "killer amendments" of Congressman Garcia. If Congressman Villafuerte was in the Bicameral Conference Committee Meeting, then this may not have been possible.

- ***Botched plan of disturbance*** – On the last day of session on June 3, 2009, when the House of Representatives finally approved on third reading HB 4077, there was a plan by some of the peasant groups and support organizations to create more disturbance than just forcing through the gates of Congress at the north entrance and holding a rally in front of the front entrance of the plenary hall of the House of Representatives.

  For some reason, the contingency of some groups came late, converged at the south gate and not at the north gate, or simply backed-out of the plan. This led to the arrest and detainment of 97 farmers who participated in the rally in front of the plenary session. The botched plan of disturbance allowed the Lower House to continue their session and deliberations on the CARPER bill which eventually led to the passage of RA 9700 at 11:30 pm of the same day. Had the "disturbance" been carried out then the session for the day would have been suspended and time would have ran out on CARPER.

  Was this luck, coincidence, or divine intervention? Sometimes, there is someone up there who really knows what is best for us.

III. Key Learnings

The success of the CARPER campaign can be attributed to the commitment and hard work of the people involved, valid and just agenda, good strategizing and networking, outstanding technical and back-staffing work, winning the media, and sometimes pure luck or divine intervention.

Three years of CARPER campaigning also established the following realizations and learnings:

A. **The Catholic Church remains to be a major force** – There have claims that the influence of the Catholic Church on government and society as a whole has been declining. Some even go further to claim that the influence of the Catholic Church in the Philippines is no longer decisive. However, the CARPER campaign and the critical role that the Catholic Church and its network played in the said campaign validated that it remains to be a formidable political and social force, whose support (or opposition) for an advocacy agenda should be carefully considered and sought.

B. **Getting a senior legislator from the majority block will help tremendously** – The role that Representative Edcel Lagman played in the CARPER campaign was decisive. Aside from being one of the authors of the original CARP law his experience (being a senior legislator) in the parliamentary procedures and debate allowed him to go "toe-to-toe" with Representative Pablo Garcia (also a formidable senior legislator) and the other anti-CARPER legislators. Coming from the majority block also allowed him to exert influence on members of the majority block.

At the Senate, Senator Gringo Honasan also held his ground against Senators who were not convinced of the need to extend CARP. However, it was the support of Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile that was the tipping point for the passage of the CARPER law at the Senate. The support of Senators Pangilinan and Pimentel during the plenary debates was also crucial.

One will not always have the luxury to have such champions but said factors will tremendously help.

C. **Balance between "force" and "reason"** – Some campaigns rely too much on political force (i.e. mass actions) and neglect the technical aspects of the issue or legislative proposition. Sometimes, one may win his/her agenda by having the legislative proposition enacted but because of lack of influence on the technical aspect of the campaign the contents of the enacted law are insufficient and even unacceptable.

On the other hand, some campaigns rely too heavily on the technical validity of one's propositions, positions, arguments and counter-arguments. But without the threat of a formidable "force" or constituency behind one's advocacy agenda these arguments merely fall on deaf ears.

Thus, the need is to be able to show both political "force" and sound "reasoning."

With the CARPER campaign, the CARPER advocates were able to produce the warm bodies (i.e. big mass actions) and "disturbances" (i.e. dramatic actions in the plenary halls, hunger strikes, etc.) to show the "force" and constituency of the CARPER movement and at the same time formulate a comprehensive bill calling for the "extension" and "reform" of CARP, arguments and data to support every provision in the said bill, and counter-arguments against points being raised against the bill's provisions, on CARP in general and on the proposed "killer amendments" of anti-CARP legislators.

With such preparations, one can claim that the CARPER advocates and champions won the debate against the anti-CARP and landlord legislators.

Because of the strong relationships and support provided by the technical staffs of the CARPER movement (including Atty. Monsod) with the Committee Secretariats and the legislative staffs of the champions, influence on the actual wordings of the provisions and additional amendments to the CARPER bills were exerted allowing for the preservations of provisions and "neutralizing" killer amendments.

D. Genuine spontaneous actions are more effective – One of the major concerns of a campaigner would be how to get the support and attention of the media. This has led to careful designing, "staging" or "dressing-up" of events, photo-ops and mass actions. This has made the use of "props" and "gimmicks" almost a necessity to be able to land that 15-seconder in the TV news or that article or picture in the dailies.

This usually tends to make such dramatic actions look "staged" or "choreographed" and lacking in authentic emotions, which the media people and the public can sense. This usually leads to the apathy of the public and the media to one's advocacy.

During one of the plenary sessions at the House of Representatives where discussions on the CARPER bill was suspended due to the questioning of the quorum (a tactic usually employed by legislators from the minority to delay discussions on bills they feel will be railroaded) by one of the members of the "Negros block" the farmers then attending the said session were so frustrated that they decided to right there and there hold a sit down strike at the entrance of the office of Speaker Nograles and vowed not to leave until the Speaker met with them. The sit down strike was never planned and was a spontaneous reaction of frustration.

The media people had already left as it was already around 8 pm but when they were informed that the farmers had staged a "siege" at the Speaker's office they went back. But they were not allowed by the House security to enter the Batasan grounds which only further fueled the drama of the situation. Eventually, Speaker Nograles came out of his office and dialogued with the farmers. The said incident was covered by media through feeds from the G3 cell phones of staffs of Akbayan who were still at the premise when the farmers decided to hold the "siege."

The farmers eventually raised their "siege" at around 11 pm with TV news crews still waiting at the gates of the Batasan compound. It was at this stage that media support, attention and coverage of the CARPER campaign picked up.

The genuineness of the emotions and the spontaneity of the action gave the campaign that feel of "authenticity." It showed that these farmers are

really fighting for something that is really important to them and that the campaign was for real and not for publicity or a political agenda.

E. It is not over until the fat lady sings – The CARPER bill at the House of Representatives was passed on third reading at 11:30 pm of June 3, 2009—on the last session day of the 14th of Congress. Two days earlier, Senate approve on third reading their version of the CARPER law. Had the Lower House failed to pass their version of the CARPER law on June 3, 2009 CARP would have ended that day as there would be no budget for the program.

On the last hours of the CARPER campaign, the farmers and the support groups were still there, lobbying and getting arrested. Yet there were some groups within the CARPER movement that had lost hope at the legislators and have abandoned the legislative lobbying tract and focused on the "People's Initiative" tract. This was after Congress issued on December 17, 2008 Joint Resolution No. 19, which "extended" CARP implementation until June 2009 but without Compulsory Acquisition (CA). This greatly demoralized most of the CARPER advocates as it was deemed a major reversal on CARP as CA was considered the heart of CARP. And if Joint Resolution No. 19 was to be an indication of what was to come after the temporary extension then that future appeared mightily bleak.

The CARPER campaign only showed that victory, sometimes even under the most challenging circumstances, can still be won at the last hour or even minutes. Thus, the lesson is not to give up until the "fat lady sings."

IV. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the CARPER Campaign: Assessing the role of CSOs in policy advocacy

The CARPER campaign experience demonstrated the strengths of CSOs in advocacy and campaign work. However, it also revealed weaknesses that will have to be addressed for it to continue to be effective in advocacy work.

For its strength, CSOs involved in the CARPER campaign, particularly the NGOs, demonstrated:

1. Very strong technical capacity in research and policy formulation including the preparation of arguments supporting CARPER and those debunking arguments of the anti-CARPER legislators and lobby groups;

2. Very good networking skills in consolidating the pro-CARPER groups and involving other sectoral groups, the church groups, media and business groups; and

3. Although significantly reduced, mainly due to limitations in funding support, CSOs during the CARPER campaign still demonstrated capacity to mobilize "substantial" mob forces. Gone are the days of mob forces of ten thousand-strong peasant groups.

   However, what the CARPER peasant groups lacked in numbers they overcompensated in creativity, boldness/courage, and willingness to sacrifice. Farmers during the CARPER campaign marched for hundreds and even thousands of kilometers, showed willingness to take bolder actions (even with the threat of being incarcerated), and left their families in the provinces for months just to sustain the campaign.

   The CARPER campaign also revealed that the mass base of peasant groups have remained intact and committed, although mobilizing them have become difficult due to the distance from Metro Manila and limited funds.

On the other hand, the following weaknesses and challenges for CSOs involved in the CARPER campaign were revealed and will have to be addressed:

1. Limited funding for advocacy – CARPER campaign was mainly funded through small grant windows of a few donor organizations and the "contribution" of groups coming from their own organizational funds. Mobilizations were also augmented through mob forces mobilized through fund support generated by the support group themselves as the church organizations and labor groups. Funding was so limited that decisions where to get mob forces were less based on equal representation from the participating peasant groups but more on "cost effectiveness."

   The overall shrinking of developmental funds have also tended to pit NGOs and POs against each other as they become competitors for said funds. This tends to dampen the spirit of cooperation among CSO groups as some groups tend to "out project" the other groups in the effort to establish their groups as the "lead" group of the campaign for better positioning in the attention of donor agencies.

   The shrinking developmental funds also tend to focus the attention of some NGOs and POs in their respective "projects" and hesitate to participate in "un-funded" or "non-program related" advocacy and campaign initiatives.

   Shrinking funds specifically for advocacy activities also jeopardizes policy advocacy capacities of CSOs. With lesser groups involved in advocacy and policy advocacy, in particular, the lesser the capacity

of civil society groups to effectively lobby for developmental policies and legislations; and

2. Dogmatic and lack of flexibility in engaging the legislature – This weakness applies more to the other peasant groups that did not join the core of CSOs that led the CARPER campaign. During the CARPER campaign, some peasant groups have remained dogmatic in their positions regarding CARP and in engaging the legislature. What is really strange is that some of these peasant groups engage the legislature but at the same time openly declare that nothing can be expected to be achieved in engaging said institution. Also, the attitude is to set forth policy and legislative proposals with the ultimatum that anything less than their proposal would be unacceptable. The legislative process is always that of compromise between the proponents and those who are against the proposed legislation. Groups unwilling to compromise (to a certain extent) have no business in legislative advocacy.

   Such positions and framework have led some groups to declare CARPER a failure even though significant policy reforms and extension of the agrarian reform program was achieved.

Overall, the CARPER campaign can be considered the best example of an "issue-based" coalition campaign.

Since the disbandment of the Congress for People's Agrarian Reform (CPAR), which was the biggest and broadest coalition of peasant organizations, campaigns and coalition building within the peasant movement has been mainly "issue-based" in contrast to the "formal" and "structure" coalitions. Before the Reform CARP Movement (RCM), which was the main coalition that pushed for the passage of the CARPER law, there was the Kilos AR which campaigned against the Farmland as Collateral (FAC) bill and MORE AR which campaigned to block the proposal to exempt commercial farms from CARP.

All were "issue-based" coalitions where peasant groups and NGOs only came together to address the issue at hand and then disbanded when the issue was already addressed.

The preference for and effectiveness of such "loose" coalitions have been mainly based on the thinking that groups of different political/ideological leanings can "work together sometimes (against a common enemy or issue) but not all the time (when together for a long time the tendency is to go after each other's throats)."

However, on the possibility of moving towards the formation of a broad and more formal people's coalition, there are several factors to be considered:

1. Trust building – The negative experiences in past coalition-building efforts have been one of the main factors why formal coalitions have not worked. Dealing with maneuverings of political blocks, organizational dynamics, and ideological differences is simply exhausting. However, "issue-based" and "loose" coalitions should have been geared towards "trust-building" among the different groups. For the peasant sector, particularly those involved in the CARPER movement, there may have been enough "trust" built over the years and may be ready to move on to the next level of coalition building. However, there are certain groups that have not yet earned enough level of "trust" from the other groups to "force" a coalition. Formal and structured coalitions should be left to the "like-minded" and those who have earned enough "trust" towards each other through years of coalition work;

2. Willingness of each group to subsume their organizational identity and agenda for the coalition's – Submitting one's organizational interest for the good of the whole coalition is key to any alliance. Tension and disunity among the CARPER groups usually arise when one or two organizations "grand stand" for media and donor projection. On the other hand, the CARPER campaign succeeded due to the willingness of most of the groups involved in the campaign to sacrifice individual projection and be subsumed to the RCM banner. Willingness of the majority to be also "tolerable" of minor infractions allowed for the coalition to be relatively intact to "finish the job."

3. Formulation of an acceptable, efficient and equitable structure and decision-making process – Equally important with the first two factors cited above is the formulation of a coalition structure that would ensure an efficient and equitable decision-making process. Without such, a formal coalition would not last long.

Given said assessment of CSOs' capacity for policy advocacy, the question now really is whether or not CSOs still have the capacity to push for or influence the more "controversial" or "difficult" policy issues.

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APPENDIX 5. CASE STUDY ON RESOURCE GENERATION STRATEGIES

Exploring Resource Generation Strategies of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): The cases of SOS Children's Villages Philippines (SOS) and Pangarap Foundation

By Ventures for Fund Raising

I. BACKGROUND

The civil society sector in the Philippines consists of non-stock corporations, NGOs, people's organizations (POs), cooperatives, community organizations, academia, churches, charitable institutions, and other voluntary associations. (Abella, C.T. et al. 2003)

Civil society organizations (CSOs) play a critical role in shaping communities—communities with diverse people, challenges, and resources. CSOs in partnership with other institutions are very passionate about putting forward advocacies that match the needs of different sectors. It is a synergy of effort and interplay of powers. Social service and social justice become an everyday agenda. While social service provides immediate relief, social justice aims at providing holistic view and solutions to certain development issues.

Suffice it to say, CSOs need resources to continue to operate and provide services. Ironically, the farther they reach and the bigger they would like to become, the more challenging for them to sustain their operation, primarily due to unstable availability of resources.

Financial sustainability is a factor CSOs need to control and manage, for financial sustainability is a critical determinant of an organization's ability to sustain its operation.

A. Diversifying Funding Source

The work of CSOs is categorized as a not-for-profit exchange. Given the increasing number of program overlaps among CSOs, diminishing support from funding organizations, and the rising cost of program implementation, CSOs are expected to be continuously successful in the program that they provide. At the same time, the demand for greater CSO accountability requires the organizations to become more effective in governance and management.

Sustainable programs need sustainable funding. Given the importance of financial sustainability and viability, it is imperative for the organizations to diversify their

funding source and explore several fund raising strategies. A diversity of fund sources provides protection against fickle donor trends.

Notably, a lot of CSOs are now investing resources to slowly move away from being grant dependent. Rather than focusing all their energies towards bagging large grant amounts from big funders, they have started developing individual donors, corporations, and groups with various degrees of affinity for the organizations' programs. The support comes in the form of large or small gifts—sometimes unrestricted, one-time, and/or long term donations. Some CSOs are expanding their individual givers to tap more unrestricted funds. There are also CSOs who have professionalized their earned income activities to a point where results have significant impact on the organizations' financial viability. These alternative approaches encourage a healthy mix of funding sources, thereby reducing their financial risk in the event that one source dries up.

B. Fund Raising and Funding Source

Fund raising is often seen as merely raising money for an organization. While this remains true, fund raising is more than just about money. It is a management process that identifies people, corporations, and institutions that share the same values of the organization and takes steps to manage that relationship. Successful fund raising requires relationship building, communications, and organizational management and development.

Evidently, several non-profit organizations adopt two or three fund raising strategies and tap different types of funding sources. These different funding sources are grants, gifts and contributions, and earned income.

- Grants are sums of money given to organizations by funding institutions, usually private foundations, bilateral or multilateral organizations, or governments. These are usually given after an organization submits a proposal and requests for funding.

  Grants are generally restricted and time-bound, which means they have to be spent in accordance with the proposed project parameters and time lines. Any change needs approval from the funding institution. Also, savings need to be accounted for, returned, or deducted from the total project fund.

- Gifts and contributions are funds donated by individuals or a group, often resulting from a solicitation (also sometimes known as "the ask") made by an organization. Gifts and contributions are characterized as unrestricted, since these give organizations the freedom to use the funds more flexibly. These can be a small amount given out of compassion, or a large bequest left in the will of a donor. Examples include donations put in the basket passed around at church, coins dropped in a special box at the mall, or loose change handed to Christmas carolers.

- Earned income is composed of funds obtained from the sale of goods or services provided by an organization. Organizations earn income from selling mugs or t-shirts, offer special training courses, rent out facilities, among others. Income raised from these transactions can be used to support the organization's programs. Earned income requires a different management skill, compared with grants and gifts. It requires a marketing expertise to ensure that the items and services are of good quality and that the pricing accounts for the real cost, with maybe even a minimal amount going to the organization. Funds derived from the earned income of a non-profit organization must not be distributed to members and trustees of the board in the form of dividends, stocks, or commissions as doing so would be unethical.

  Exchange of goods and services for cash does not necessarily conflict with the noble intentions of non-profits, particularly when income sources and the use of the profit stay within the legal bounds that distinguish non-profits from for-profit enterprises. However, earned income should not keep non-profits' minds off their reason for being—mission first, survival second.

Each source has a variety of fund raising strategies, forms and requirements and it depends on the organization as to what specific fund raising strategy will suit its profile and needs. Table 1 shows several strategies according to type of fund source, which many CSOs now are doing. (See Annex 1 for the description of fund raising strategies.)

Table 1. Summary of funding source and sample strategies

Type of Fund Source	Example
Grants	Grant proposal
Earned income	Income from merchandising Income from professional services Income from rental fees Income from endowments Income from membership dues / fees
Gifts and contributions	Special events Direct mail Major gift solicitation Capital campaign Planned giving Corporate partnership

Other Fund Raising Strategies to get gifts and contributions

- Online/Internet Fund Raising
- Direct Response Marketing
- SMS Fund Raising
- Direct Dialogue
- Coin Collections
- Champions, Ambassadors, and Celebrities

II. Case Presentation: Learning from fund raising experiences of other organizations

Different fund raising strategies allow non-profit organizations to continuously provide programs and services to their beneficiaries. It is just a matter of deciding what strategies to employ vis-à-vis the organization's program needs, target funds to raise, existing and prospect donors, and fund raising readiness. Non-profit organizations must remember that there is no "one-size-fits-all" strategy for fund raising, which means that fund raising strategy must be paralleled to the needs and target of the organization. Several CSOs might be doing the same strategy but results technically vary.

In the next part of this paper are two (2) different case studies. The first case is capturing the experience of SOS Village Foundation in doing a Direct Mail Campaign; and the second case highlights the experience of Pangarap Foundation in getting funding from the three (3) sources of funds: grants, gifts and earned income.

A questionnaire and interview-scheduled were employed in framing the case studies. The questionnaire covered areas on fund raising experience, implementation of fund raising strategies, financial and data analysis, record keeping and database management, and communication and constituency building. The information gathered are limited on what has been provided in the questionnaire and from the interview with key informants of each organization.

CASE 1: SOS Children's Villages Philippines

"Fly High" – The Test Direct Mail Campaign Experience

ABSTRACT

This case highlights the experience of SOS Children's Villages Philippines (SOS Philippines) in implementing a Direct Mail Campaign dubbed as "Fly High" – The Test Direct Mail Campaign Experience. The case looks at the stages on how the foundation carries on with the campaign.

INTRODUCTION

The SOS Children's Villages Philippines (SOS Philippines) is part of the SOS Kinderdorf International, a private organization for World War II orphans. The

SOS Children's Village was born out of Dr. Hermann Gmeiner's conviction that help for orphaned, abandoned and neglected children can only be effective when they grow up within a family and a home. SOS's vision and mission is to provide a place for orphaned, abandoned, and neglected children, and children in extreme difficult circumstances to belong to a home and family; where competent and responsible SOS Mothers and SOS co-workers provide unconditional love and inspiration, support and encouragement for these children to take their place in society, enriched with their God-given talents, and contribute their share to the progress of the human family.

In 1967, Mrs. Susie Winternitz, wife of then Consul of Austria to the Philippines Dr. George Winternitz, established a liaison office here in the Philippines. SOS Children's Villages Philippines has its first home in Banay-Banay, Lipa City, which opened its doors in 1968 to 24 children. Six more villages followed—Tacloban, Calbayog, Cebu, Davao, Manila, and Iloilo—with the eighth village in Bataan, which opened in 2009. The National Coordination Office began operations in 1990 adjacent to the SOS Children's Village in Manila. It is the National Office that coordinates all activities of the villages at the national level.

FUND RAISING EXPERIENCE

Fund raising as a concept was introduced to SOS Philippines between 2003-2004. Each SOS Village in the Philippines, as well as the National Office, established a Publicity and Fund Raising (PFR) unit. Today, the Fund Raising Coordinator for each village is the one in charge of donor acquisition and donor care.

Although each village is autonomous in planning and implementing their own fund raising activities, the villages develop their annual Village Fundraising Plan based on the National Association Fund Development Program. The National Office provides support to the villages including equipping them with the skills and trainings needed to achieve their fund raising targets.

Some of the fund raising strategies implemented by SOS Philippines are: grant proposal writing, partnering with corporations, special events, face-to-face solicitations, etc. All the villages and the National Office have fund raising experience.

In 2008, SOS Children's Villages Philippines sought the assistance of Venture for Fund Raising to help develop its capacity to raise resources for their programs through a fund raising consulting engagement. SOS has already created a Publicity and Fund Raising (PFR) group within the organization but would like to further build the group's capacity to raise funds to meet their target.

Particularly, SOS Children's Villages Philippines, after a series of capacity building workshops, decided to conduct its first Direct Mail Campaign. Although the organization has fund raising experience, its "Fly High" direct mail campaign in 2009 was one of its biggest campaigns to be launched.

CAMPAIGN IMPLEMENTATION

During the fund raising implementation stage, Venture assisted and mentored SOS Philippines in preparation for its direct mail campaign.

The main objective of the campaign was to acquire new donors, and build a large base of committed individual givers, that would support the long-term programs of the organization. The initial commitment of new or first time donors can be nurtured so that they will progress into more committed donors and move to higher forms of committed giving as depicted in the Fund raising pyramid shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Fund raising pyramid



With a planned budget of Php 1.3 million, the 3-year target income for the campaign was Php 1.4 million. The bulk of the income was expected to be received in the first year and additional funds were expected to be generated from pledge donations in the succeeding years. The return on investment (ROI) was estimated to be at 1.07, still a little above average of the expected ROI for acquisition mailings, which is 1.

The campaign targeted a total of 67,540 mailers to be sent out, with 1% response rate, or a target of 675 new donors. In order to achieve this, target donors were those belonging in the high-income and above average-income range. Also considered in profiling the target donors are job positions, purchasing power, and history in giving to children's causes.

CAMPAIGN RESULTS

The "Fly High" campaign launch was originally set for October 2009. But due to the devastating effects of "Ondoy," a storm in September 2009 that resulted to flooding in Metro Manila and nearby provinces, the campaign was moved to November 2009. It was just in time for Christmas, and a few weeks past the terrible incident of September.

The results have been unexpected, but remarkable! Just one month after the launch, SOS Philippines was able to achieve its target for the first 2 years. In December 2009, "Fly High" earned a total of Php 1.8 million worth of donations and pledges. By

February 2010, just 3 months after the first roll out, the campaign hit a Php 2 million mark. Below is a table, summarizing the campaign results:

	Target	*Actual*	*% of target*
Number of target donors	67,540	67,540	100%
Number of responses	756	638	84%
Response rate	1%	0.9%	
Total Cost	Php 1.3 M	Php 1.3 M	100%
Gross Income	Php 1.4 M	Php 2.3 M	164%
Net Income	Php 43,836	Php 1 M	2, 281.23%

CASE 2: Pangarap Foundation

Sustainability through multiple funding sources

ABSTRACT

This case looks at multiple fund raising strategies of Pangarap Foundation to sustain their operations and programs. It highlights the three different sources of funds, which any CSO can adopt.

INTRODUCTION

Pangarap Foundation was founded in 1989 by the Sons of Mary, Ina-anak, Inc. and the Ladies of Charity of Pasay. Pangarap Shelter for Street Children is now under the auspices of Pangarap Foundation, Inc., offering a Gospel-based integrated ministry not only to children in need of special protection but also to their families. Guided by their Vision, Mission, and Philosophy, the foundation offers children who need special protection and their families a life based on gospel values, and helps them become compassionate, self-reliant, and responsible citizens in a society where their rights are acknowledged, defended, and respected.[30]

The foundation's two key programs are Pangarap Shelter for Street Children and Paliparan Community Development Program. Pangarap Shelter for Street Children aims to reach recovery and sustained reintegration of street children with their families and society through projects such as Street Education Program, Drop-in Center/Night Shelter, Residential Shelter, and Community Outreach Program and After Care. On the other hand, Paliparan Community Development Program was started by the foundation in 1995 in order to sustain the recovery of the children who have been reconciled with their families and to prevent other children from going to the city streets.[31]

Pangarap Foundation is a Cordaid Partner in the Philippines. Through Cordaid's support, the foundation became one of the organizations who received a fund raising technical assistance conducted by Venture for Fund Raising.

[30]"About Us" pangarapfoundation.org.ph August 13, 2010 <http://www.pangarapfoundation.org.ph/aboutus.php>.
[31]"What we do" pangarapfoundation.org.ph August 20, 2010 <http://www.pangarapfoundation.org.ph/whatwedo.php>.

The foundation was selected to be featured in this case study because of its rich fund raising experience. It has diversified sources of funding and full-time paid professional staff managing and implementing their fund raising program. Board members are also active in helping raise funds for the organization by identifying potential donors and helping in the solicitation of funds. They also give their own contributions to the foundation.

FUND RAISING STRATEGIES

Pangarap Foundation generates income from the three funding sources for non-profit organizations: (1) Grants, (2) Gifts, and (3) Earned Income. These make them not dependent on a single source of funding and keep them on the right track towards financial sustainability.

Figure 2. Percentage distribution of fund raising strategies



From 2006 to 2009, Pangarap Foundation has generated most of its income from Grants at 61%, followed by Direct Response campaigns at 22%, and then Earned Income at 12%.

1. Grants

   Pangarap Foundation verified that they still have 12 partners who provide them grants. These include Cordaid, Misereor, Consuelo Foundation, UNICEF, Assisi Foundation, ADB Staff Community Fund, In-Touch. With a total of P9.8M grants received last 2009, they now have a total of grants amounting to P11M in 2010 (a significant P1.2M increase since last year). Since 2006, they have received more than P37M worth of grants. P3.5M is the largest amount of grant received by the foundation. Good track record, accountability and transparency to its donors are the considered factors by the foundation that helped them in getting an increased amount of grants.

2. Gifts

Under Gifts, several strategies are employed by the foundation; these are Special Events, Major Gift Solicitation, Direct Response, E-mail/Internet Fund Raising, Telephone Solicitation, Legacy, and Corporate Partnerships.

The special events that Pangarap Foundation have conducted are The Annual Lenten Lugaw, Pangarap Product Launching and Exhibit, Mini-fund raising events (Host a Party For Me), Painting Exhibit, 2nd Mass Collection at Holy Trinity Parish, and Pangarap 20th Anniversary. It was in 2007 that the foundation generated the highest income. The major events they conducted that contributed to their highest income were the Annual Lenten Lugaw and the Pangarap Product Launch and Exhibit, which they held twice. Selling of tickets to meet the target amount and confirmation of attendance with their invitees were the challenges considered by the foundation.

Pangarap Foundation seeks major gifts from their individual donors through solicitation, which is either face-to-face or through phone. The foundation's Board Members, Executive Director, Sustainability Core Team and regular sponsors/donors make "the ask." For prospective major donors, they have developed communication materials that include brochures, newsletters, Host-A-Party kit, product catalogues, coin cans, and AVP.

In order to get direct response from donors, Pangarap Foundation used brochures and newsletters. The foundation mails more than 3,000 copies of the newsletter every year to their existing donors and supporters. About half of them respond either through post or email. The foundation made it possible for donors to have an option to pay through credit card, bank deposit, and/or check. Donors also give cash and in-kind donations during their personal visits to the organization.

Pangarap has a website that features its programs and how people can extend their support to the organization. They also included ways of sending donation. Emails are also used by the foundation for sending their newsletters, solicitation letters and proposals.

The foundation has also started a legacy program which makes them more advanced than a lot of other non-profit organizations in the country. Through this program, they request individuals to include them as a beneficiary in their last will. This appeal is included in the foundation's brochure and website. Three individuals have already expressed interest in this program. The challenge the foundation considers in conducting this appeal is the sensitivity of the topic because it is about giving or donating after one's death.

When it comes to Corporate Partnerships, the foundation still currently has 255 corporate donors. They have 210 local corporate sponsors while the

remaining 45 are international corporate sponsors. Looking for corporate sponsors is deemed as a challenge for the organization because they feel that many corporations are committed already to other causes or priorities and some have put up their own foundations. Also, a decline in the income from corporate contributions was attributed by the foundation to financial crisis and recent calamities. Because of this, the funding from corporate partners was diverted to emergency relief and response to other organizations in need.

3. Earned Income
   Pangarap Foundation generates income from the sales of their products and rental of commercial spaces and function rooms owned by the foundation. Some of the items that they sell are decorative candles, rosaries and bracelet rosaries, among others. The wonderful thing about Pangarap's products is that some of them are made by the children beneficiaries themselves making them more appealing for donors to buy. The foundation gets regular orders from their partner organizations. Their other customers are those who would visit the foundation and those who would rent their facilities for specific functions. The foundation is also sometimes invited to participate in bazaars to sell their products. A catalogue of the foundation's products is also included in their website.

   The foundation realizes that by doing more pro-active marketing and by looking for other venues to sell their products, they can still significantly increase the resources that they can generate from this funding source.

DONOR DATABASE AND DONORS' CULTIVATION

Donor Database is very important to Pangarap Foundation due to the continuous increase in their donor base. The database system helps them with ease in monitoring and managing donors' data like profiles, donation tracking, donation reports, etc.

In terms of Donor Acknowledgment and Cultivation, Pangarap's practices include sending an acknowledgment to their donors within 1 week of receipt of donation. They give acknowledgment letters, which are sometimes given personally, or sent through post or e-mail. In addition, the foundation issues a receipt for every donation and purchase of their products. Other ways to express their gratitude and appreciation are through tokens like their products or cards that are personally made by children are also sometimes given to donors, giving of awards, holding spiritual banquets for them and sending of Christmas gifts.

Furthermore, Pangarap nurtures their relationships with donors by sending them updates about the organization, sending of reports on fund utilization, inviting the donors to tour Pangarap's centers/facilities, inviting donors as guests to special events, luncheon with the head of the organization, and recognition events for donors. When it comes to Pangarap's brand-building activities, the foundation lets the public know about their work through print media, radio and television, bazaars,

regular orientation for visiting groups, corporate partners' invitations, and children's performances in various networks' activities and gatherings.

FUND RAISING RESULTS

The various fund raising strategies and activities implemented by Pangarap Foundation from 2006 to 2009 helped generate funds of over P60 million (around US$1.4M) for the foundation. Outside of grant funding, more than P25 million (around US$580,000) have been raised through Special Events, Major Gift Solicitation, Direct Response, E-mail/Internet Fund Raising, Telephone Solicitation, Legacy, and Corporate Partnerships.

As in the experience of Pangarap Foundation, it is recommended that non-profit organizations try to diversify their funding sources to help them become more financially sustainable.

III. Summary and Conclusion

There is no easy way to get funds. As shown in the cases presented, each organization has different needs, styles, and expertise. One organization can focus on one big fund raising campaign while others can do simultaneous fund raising projects.

While some CSOs are taking bold steps to institutionalize fund raising in their organizations and consistently tap different sources of funds, still, majority of the CSOs (NGOs in particular) in the Philippines are grant dependent. This can be attributed to the organization's lack of fund raising skills or a common issue of having no right person to handle the fund raising activities. Lack of seed funding to develop and implement a fund raising campaign is a common cry among the majority of local CSOs. However, with the many fund raising strategies to choose from that can be adapted and matched up to the organizations profile and resources, seed funding should no longer be a major issue – it all boils down to the organizations' skills to develop and manage a fund raising campaign and their readiness to take on the challenge, the tasks and responsibilities involved in the entire process.

It is noteworthy that international funders like Ford Foundation, DISOP, and David and Lucile Packard Foundation have taken the initiative and have invested in developing the skills and capacity of their Philippine NGO partners in doing fund raising to help their partners diversify their funding source and prepare them to slowly move away from being grant dependent. The intervention was timely done and it is hoped that the effects will ripple out to other CSOs as more international, even local funding agencies, are gradually shifting funding priorities.

As far as capacity to raise financial resource is concerned, local CSOs can learn from the international organizations. They are very active and purposive in their fund raising campaign efforts. They proactively take steps to learn the fund raising process and create an environment that encourages more people to give. More importantly, local CSOs can take cues from the fund raising case experience of SOS Philippines and Pangarap Foundation and can consider the following common lessons that the two organizations learned to have diverse and sustainable funds and resources:

1. It is ideal to have an appropriate mix of funding sources—grants, gifts, contributions, and earned income. More sources of funds help the organization achieve its financial sustainability.

2. Start at the bottom of the fund raising pyramid to get to the top, and upgrade the donors through the various vehicles. It is important that the organization build its donor base and the relationship with them to move them up the pyramid, keeping in mind that there are different fund raising strategies that are appropriate to use for different types of donors.

3. Organizations need money to raise money. The organizations need to allot budget to set up systems and institutionalize their fundraising. Investments are also needed for them to implement various fund raising strategies.

4. There are no quick fixes in generating resources. Careful planning is needed and implementation will take time.

In general, successful fund and resource generation activities require relationship building, communications, and organizational management and development. An organization must have the ability to build relationships whether with individuals, corporations, or funding agencies. The organization must also communicate its mission, vision, and goals to various publics. As good governance and financial management are also keys to having a positive public image and credibility, an organization should also be prepared with the systems and structure that would allow it to generate funds and other resources legitimately and transparently. This will include setting up a legal entity, with the ability to issue receipts, access to an organizational bank account, and certification as a done institution, to name a few.

ANNEX A: FUND RAISING STRATEGIES

Below are some of the common fund raising strategies and their basic descriptions employed by CSOs depending on their fund raising targets and type of existing and prospect donors.

A. Special Event

A common and frequently used fund raising strategy is the special event. In fact, most people would often think that fund raising and special events are the same. Special events are public occasions that try to achieve one or more of the following objectives:

- Raise money
- Make the organization's cause known
- Enhance the group's cohesiveness
- Offer something for the spirit

Some examples of special events are:

1. Art/music festivals, auctions, bazaars
2. Charity or gala dinners, balls, pageants, fashion shows, street parties
3. Concerts, musicals, play
4. Conferences, exhibits, trade fairs
5. Book launches
6. Bingo socials, raffles, garage sales
7. Sports tournaments/exhibitions, walkathons, marathons/fun runs

Most non-profit organizations hold special events to create publicity and at the same time, generate support from their publics. However, most of them choose to conduct events that are unlikely related or appropriate to their mission. For example, would it be relevant to stage a beauty pageant for an organization that helps underprivileged women in rural communities through social development programs? Would it be more appropriate for the same organization to organize an exhibit and auction of works of well-known female artists?

The significance of perfect timing and target audience

Non-profit organizations conduct special events to commemorate significant occasions in their history, such as their foundation day or anniversary, or a day that celebrates the advocacy of an issue or cause related to the organization's mission, such as Earth Day.

There are also certain times of the year when non-profit organizations can draw out better fund raising results through special events. Some organizations stage events that suit a specific season in their countries. For example, in the Philippines, fund raising events are most often held in the last quarter of the year (October to December), because people tend to be more generous and charitable at this time. The rainy or typhoon season is considered the worst time for special events, because there is a risk of having to cancel events due to bad weather and most people would avoid spending more during this season.

B. Direct mail

Direct mail (DM) is an appeal for donations, money, sale, or thought made through a mailing package. It is a means of communication, which involves sending individualized information by mail, with the aim of getting a response from donors or potential donors.

Direct mail gives organizations the opportunity to personalize appeals and expressions of gratitude, since letter writers mention certain facts that they know about the reader, like the amount he or she previously gave and how much he or she gave the last time. Direct mail is also targetable: you can send different messages at different times to different groups of donors or prospects.

Many of the prospects may not give outright, but in the process of reading your mail, your "cold" prospects become aware about your cause. Fund raising letters

are a vital source of information. By describing the harsh and urgent realities that your organization is trying to address, you are giving people the opportunity to share in your cause and to make it theirs as well. Direct mail can also encourage citizen participation and action that can lead to creating stronger political voice for your cause. It can also draw more volunteers for your organization.

C. Pledge giving

Pledge giving refers to a donor's promise or commitment to give regularly to a cause. One way of getting this type of commitment from donors is by sending them a direct mail pack that gives donors the option to give monthly or recurring donations using their credit card. Pledge giving is also a way of upgrading the contributions of your donors. Instead of increasing the donation amount, they will be giving the same amount, but this time 12 times a year. In other words, your direct mail pack can yield 12 times the amount of the donation you originally receive from donors. Getting pledge donations therefore gives you higher income at a lower cost.

When asking for pledge donations, make sure that you communicate clearly the reason your NGO needs a reliable flow of funds. The reason to give regularly is a critical success factor for pledge giving.

Your best prospects for pledge donors are those who already gave one-time gifts to your organization, particularly those who gave the average amount of donations during your previous campaigns. Pledge giving must also be monitored so that donations can be successfully and continuously processed.

D. Major gifts

Major gifts are donations given to an organization that is significantly larger than the average recorded gift. Major gifts take time to mature and may be given as a one-off donation or a periodic gift. Major gifts usually come from happy and satisfied donors and will require time and effort to cultivate and nurture. Non profit organizations seek major gifts to fund its regular programs and services, upgrade existing programs, and fund recurring operations costs.

Major gifts provide the organization with substantial funding from among its base of donors. These gifts provide a way for donors to move from mere awareness of the organization to that of commitment to the organization. While it is easy for donors to give a small contribution, it takes more thought and dedication to allocate a substantial amount for an organization that is seeking donations.

There may still be disagreements in fund raising circles on the indispensability of face-to-face solicitation, but personal contact is regarded as the most appropriate way of asking for major gifts.

In determining the right gift size to ask from a particular donor, organization should consider the following: ability to give, perception of your organization's mission importance, fund raising goals, what others have given, who will do the asking, and the prospective donor's opportunity for recognition.

E. Capital campaign

Capital campaign is a carefully organized, highly structured campaign for specific needs (e.g., a new hospital wing, a school building, etc.). Focused on a large goal set against a deadline, it is the ultimate test of an institution's fund raising skills.

The characteristics of a capital campaign include: a carefully planned goal, with corresponding rationale, theme, structure, plan, budget, and name; a defined, intensive time period—usually two to seven years; a well-organized development office; putting a premium on quality amount over quantity of gifts.

There are three types of capital campaigns: a. Bricks and mortar, where the object of the capital campaign is tangible assets such as buildings, renovations, and equipment; b. Endowments, where the object of the campaign is to raise resources that will enhance future funding for programs and general operations through increasing the principal revenue base of assets to be invested. The organization can draw interest earnings from the investment to fund its future operations, and; c. Comprehensive, where the objective of the campaign is for the bricks and mortar plus the endowment.

F. Planned gift

Planned gift is a donation legally provided during the donor's lifetime, but whose principal benefits are not received by the beneficiaries until a later date. The most common form of planned giving is through legacies or bequests.

Legacies or bequests can be the ultimate test of a donor's belief in your cause, since the donor pledges to give to your organization, even beyond his or her lifetime. A legacy or bequest is usually done when a donor includes an organization as a beneficiary in his or her last will and testament.

This strategy may be challenging for many fund raisers, since many consider death and inheritance as sensitive subjects that many people do not want to talk about. However, this should not discourage you from using this fund raising strategy, since an organization being included in someone's will is not impossible.

Aside from legacies or bequests, there are other forms of planned giving.

- Gift annuity. As opposed to bequests, the donor transfers assets to the donee even while still living, leaving the donee free to invest the donation accordingly. In exchange, the donee agrees to provide the donor with an agreed yearly income and shoulders the corresponding income and tax. This agreement is governed by a contract between the donor and the donee.

- Pooled-income fund. This is a donation made up of gifts from several donors. It is expressly invested to earn interest that will yield an agreed-on amount to be made available to the fund's donors during their lifetime. As in the case of gift annuities, the donee acquires jurisdiction over the principal of the donation only upon the death of each donor. Upon death, a donor's percentage of the pool is transferred to the donee.
- Charitable remainder unitrust. It involves donated funds, which a donee invests to yield income. The funds are fully transferred to the donee upon the donor's death. This is similar to the pooled-income fund, except that a charitable remainder trust involves a single donor.
- Charitable lead trust. This works like the charitable remainder unitrust except that the income paid during the fixed term accrues to the donee, while all the assets, distributed upon completion of the agreed terms, go to the donor's family. For the donee, the charitable lead trust's advantage over the charitable remainder unitrust is that it is freed from tax obligations arising from asset transfer.

Whichever planned giving instrument you include in your fund raising program, it is necessary that you consult a professional/an estate lawyer before taking any step. Remember that the availability of these instruments depends on the legal environment of the country that your organization operates in.

G. Corporate partnerships

Corporations and non-profit organizations can go into partnerships that intend to raise funds for a particular cause or program, often driven by the two parties sharing the same vision and values. There are several ways of having this type of partnership. Examples of these are:

1. Cause-related marketing

Cause-related marketing refers to a commercial activity where companies and non-profit organizations form alliances to market an image, product, or service for their mutual benefit. The usual way of raising resources through this corporate tie-up is by assigning which percentage of the sales goes to whom, or designating a certain amount for donation for every product sold.

This strategy provides good publicity for the company at minimal or zero expense on the part of the non-profit. It also expands reach to an alternative audience.

However, cause-related marketing is difficult to sell to companies and may generate small return. This also provides risk of being associated with the sponsoring company and the partnership may be misconstrued.

2. Event sponsorships

Non-profits may offer corporations sponsorships for special events. Sponsorship packages, which detail Corporations and non-profit organizations can go into partnerships that intend to raise funds for a particular cause or program, often driven by the two parties sharing the same vision and values. There are several ways of having this type of partnership.

Examples of these are: what amount the non-profit is asking for and what the corporation is bound to gain from the sponsorship, should be prepared by the non-profit. Benefits usually include visibility of the company's brand in the marketing collaterals and in the media. Booth spaces may also be offered to the corporate sponsors.

3. Employee giving

In employee giving, donations are made through payroll deductions, with the consent of the employees. Non-profits need only to link up with a corporation and orient the corporation's employees on the non-profits' mission, vision, and programs.

Corporate partnerships must be monitored and nurtured so that continued support can be achieved. It will be good to bring in corporate partners, to show them how your organization's programs are being implemented. Interacting with your beneficiaries can also motivate them to continue working with your organization.

H. Online fund raising

Online fund raising is a strategy of generating resources and getting support for your cause with the use of the Internet. This strategy can enhance and extend your organization's reach, with no geographical constraints. It is dynamic and provides personalized content that helps generate a revenue stream through online pledges, credit card gifts, online auctions, games, and digital cash.

Some ways to conduct online fund raising are:

1. Asking for donations through your organization's website
2. Sending e-newsletters and e-mail appeals
3. Developing partnerships with online giving portals
4. Placing your banner on a website of another organization
5. Use of social networking sites for fund raising appeals

One of the advantages of raising funds online is that it requires a relatively low cost, compared with other fund raising strategies. Unlike in direct mail, for example, where postage is a major cost, e-mail appeals can be sent out to as many individuals as you want, and all you have to pay for is your Internet connection.

Another advantage of online fund raising is its ability to provide an easy way for people to donate. People can send their donations with the click of a button, and by filling out a donation form online. The payment transaction can be completed in a few minutes after your donor receives your appeal.

Using online fund raising may also have some disadvantages. For instance, this strategy may fail to reach or attract older audiences, because some of them may not be as receptive to computer technology as younger prospects.

There may also be people who are still uncomfortable in providing personal information, including credit card details, via online transactions.

Tips that can make online fund raising more successful:

- The name of your website should be simple and easy to remember, and the site should take your donors directly to your appeal's landing page.
- Place a large, colorful, and distinct "Donate" button on your home page.
- Offer pre-set donation amounts, which your donors can easily choose from. Include a short description of how the donation can help make a difference.
- Provide an "other" option where your donors can indicate an amount that they would like to give.
- Work with reputable online payment gateways that will handle the processing of online donations for your organization. Look for a company that has a relatively long operating history and good customer service.
- Promote your website by including your website address in all your other collaterals and in your business cards.
- Consult a Web Developer or an Information Technology (IT) Specialist on how to get your website a higher ranking when people use an Internet search engine.

I. Direct response marketing

Direct response marketing is an effective strategy that can build a broad supporter base for an organization. This allows the public to respond to a print, TV, or radio advertisement by: returning a coupon, making a phone call, sending a fax, and using other technological means like short message service (SMS) or e-mail.

Direct response marketing is targeted, measurable, provides room for testing and room for advocacy. However, it is costly and provides modest returns.

J. SMS Fund Raising

Mobile or cellular phones have become an essential gadget for any individual. Aside from being an important medium for communication, it is also now being used as a means to send donations to organizations.

In the Philippines, SMS fund raising is usually made possible by partnering with a telecommunications company or a payment gateway. A key word can be assigned to your organization (usually the acronym of the organization's name or your organization's campaign) which people can text to an assigned number to send in their contributions.

In some cases, people are free to text the desired amount that they would like to give to an organization. In other arrangements, a percentage or portion of the cost of sending the text message or a downloaded message is given to the beneficiary.

One advantage of doing SMS fund raising is that you can get an immediate response from donors since people always have their mobile phones with them. Some organizations have experienced the power of this technology during emergency or disaster situations, when people send in their immediate help. Another advantage of this medium is it offers a quick, easy, and convenient way for donors to send in contributions, with just a few seconds of pressing their cellphone keys.

Though a powerful medium, SMS fund raising is usually just used as a support rather than a main fund raising activity. This activity, as the case in the Philippines, does not allow you to get the names of your donors; thus will not be a strategy to use for building your donor base. However, there are telecommunications companies that forward the cellphone numbers of donors to the organization benefitting from the campaign. In which case, you may want to send to these mobile numbers a thank you message as well as a request to provide you with their name and address so you can send them updates on your projects.

This way, you get an opportunity to build your donor base. There are also some SMS softwares that can help you capture your donors' and prospects' mobile phone numbers and record them in a database. With the use of SMS softwares, organizations can also do a text blast (sending a text message simultaneously to the mobile numbers in your database).

While the opportunities to raise funds through this technology seem to be very promising, the chance of getting big amounts of donations may be greater for well-known or high profile organizations. And, because donation amounts offered are usually in small amounts, you should also manage your expectations on the total amount that you can raise from this strategy.

K. Direct Dialogue

You may have seen individuals approaching passers-by in public places to contribute for a cause. This fund raising strategy is sometimes called Direct Dialogue or Face-to-Face fund raising.

Direct Dialogue fund raising is one of the strategies that some non-profit organizations do to make their cause known while at the same time appeal for a donation. Greenpeace, UNICEF, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and World Vision are some non-profit organizations who use this strategy.

The streets (that is why it is also called street fund raising) and the malls are popular venues for this type of fund raising strategy. In the Philippines, you will see non-profit organizations putting up booths in malls with their representatives approaching prospective donors to explain what the organization does and how their contribution could help.

Usually, the representatives distribute brochures describing the programs of the non-profit organization. When the prospective donor expresses interest in the organization, they are asked to sign a donation form.

Some non-profit organizations assign their own staff to conduct face-to-face solicitation. Others request their volunteers to help. There are also non-profit organizations who hire a professional group to implement the Direct Dialogue strategy for them, especially if they do not have the skills, manpower, or the network to conduct the activity. Because it requires special skills and a positive disposition from those implementing it, Direct Dialogue fund raising is considered by some as very challenging. Those who do this strategy must be persistent enough to carry on despite being rejected by prospective donors. Aside from these traits, they must be committed to and convinced of their cause.

The advantage of doing Direct Dialogue fund raising is that you actually get to meet the prospective donors and discuss how they can help. Because of the face-to-face interaction, you can immediately answer queries and address concerns that are raised. And, you have a good chance of getting a pledge or a donation on the spot.

L. Coin Collection

You have probably seen coin banks or donation boxes for different causes placed in various establishments. This is another way to raise funds.

In the Philippines, it is common to see coin banks placed near the cashier in department stores, groceries, hotels and even restaurants. Putting the coin banks near the cashier seems strategic. Many people tend to just drop their loose change from their purchases in the coin banks. It is an easy way to help and the value of a few coins is too small for people to even think about giving them away.

Though the value of a few coins may be small to an individual, pooling them together can raise a significant amount for your organization. You will be surprised by how much it can help you raise in the long run. Some organizations have raised thousands or even millions through coin collection.

To be able to do coin collection successfully, you must partner with various establishments where you can place your donation boxes. If you work in a network, you may also ask your members and partners to put up coin banks in their offices. Some would also partner with corporations and display their donation boxes in the corporate building lobby.

Coin banks come in different forms. We often see organizations use cans and acrylic donation boxes for coin collection. Organizations are also starting to use recycled materials such as empty soda cans and water bottles. It will help if you have volunteers who will help you count the coins that you will collect. A partnership with a bank will also help facilitate the collection and banking of the funds that you will be able to raise through coin collection. Try it even in a small scale and experience the power of loose change to help your cause.

M. Champions, Ambassadors, and Celebrities

Champions, Ambassadors, and celebrities play a big role in building awareness and raising funds for various causes. Because of their popularity and influence in the society, they are able to catch people's attention and convince them to join their campaigns.

Some examples of International Goodwill Ambassadors and Celebrity Spokespersons are Angelina Jolie for UNHCR (a UN Refugee Agency), Antonio Banderas for UNDP (United Nations Development Program), Nicole Kidman for UNIFEM (United Nations Development Fund for Women), and Jackie Chan and David Beckham for UNICEF (United Nations Children's Fund). In Holland, actress Leonti has been working and going to the field as the Cordaid Goodwill Ambassador.

In the Philippines, some of the popular goodwill ambassadors and spokespersons include Gary Valenciano (for UNICEF), KC Concepcion (for World Food Programme), and Lea Salonga and Karen Davila for World Vision.

When choosing a celebrity to be your spokesperson, do a little research and consider personalities who have the same views, concerns, and advocacies as yours. If you are launching an anti-smoking campaign for example, it will not be appropriate to choose a smoker as a spokesperson. If your organization is into reproductive health, your spokesperson must agree to the different contraception methods that you are advocating. It is important to get a spokesperson who believes in your advocacy, or else it will be difficult for him or her to convince others to support your cause.

APPENDIX 6. CASE STUDY ON PARTICIPATORY LOCAL GOVERNANCE

A Look at Participatory Local Governance in the Philippines from the CSO Perspective

INTRODUCTION

The Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 has provided venues for participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in local governance through the various bodies at the barangay, municipal, provincial, and regional levels. However, the literature describes poor compliance with the mandated establishment of Local Consultative Bodies (LCBs) and the adoption of the other governance features of the LGC (Capuno, 2005). In the absence of these mandated consultative structures, venues for interface and convergence between and among CSOs, local government units (LGUs), and the business sector have been limited, arbitrary and oftentimes, unpredictable. In addition, Gotis (2008) describes the state of local planning in the Philippines as having an "inactive local development council (LDC), indifferent or unsupportive Sanggunian, and the lack or total absence of horizontal and vertical linkages between different government bodies responsible for implementation of local public services." This in turn results to a planning process where the sector or department level plans are not spatially integrated or coordinated, public investment plan serves as a shopping list instead of a set of investment priorities, and investments don't get the necessary legislative support due to a number of reasons, mostly political (Medalla, 2004). It is therefore imperative to look at the status of these consultative bodies and explore possible actions to promote meaningful participatory governance.

This study aims to generate basic information from CSOs that are valuable in their efforts to promote participatory governance. In addition, other intended users of this research report are the various LGUs, policymakers, and the DILG, to raise their awareness on the status of participatory local planning in the Philippines. Specific objectives of the research are as follow: 1) to determine the current status and functionality of the LSBs, 2) to know the degree of compliance of LGUs in accrediting CSOs and reconstituting the LDCs, 3) to identify the awareness and level of participation of CSOs in the LSBs, and 4) to determine the transparency and accessibility of information within the LGU.

METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Methodology for the assessment will include primary and secondary data gathering. For the primary data, a survey will be administered through electronic submission, e-mails, and phone interviews of 100 non-government organizations. The data collected from the survey will be encoded and processed using SPSS. For the secondary data, existing studies and references will be reviewed, particularly those which utilized indicators and indeces on participatory local governance (i.e., Local Governance Performance Monitoring System). The survey results and the review of literature will be consolidated in a draft report.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

A number of studies had looked into the status of participatory governance in the Philippines. A study by Capuno (2001) stated that the sluggish regional development during the last 20 years is partly due to the overall low levels and quality of local public services, arising in turn from weak local governance mechanisms. The quality of local governance is low overall and uneven across regions because of poor compliance with the mandated establishment of local consultative bodies and the adoption of the other governance features of the LGC of 1991.

In 2001, the DILG spearheaded a study in people's participation in the LDCs, in collaboration with Urban Resources and the Evelio B. Javier Foundation, Inc. (EBJFI). Methodology for data gathering was through focus group discussions and participatory workshops. Both LDC members and non-members were consulted. The study cited the following areas of commonalities between members of NGOs and personnel from government:

- There is a widespread desire for both LGUs and NGOs to cooperate in local development-oriented LDC activities
- Both groups wish to work together in the planning, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of development projects that would lead to improved local conditions
- There is a genuine desire among the majority of both bodies to expand the role of LDC activities and to share responsibility in dealing with new issues
- In most provinces and urban areas, there is a high degree of mutual respect of NGO members for LGU personnel and vice versa

In addition, the following areas of concern were highlighted in the study:

- Dissemination of information, both about the LDC as an institution and about its activities, powers, and procedures
- Improving the possibility for people's participation in local government decision-making by increasing the proportion of functional LDCs
- Improvements to the method by which members are appointed
- A consideration of the issue of the size of the LDC
- The relationship between the LDC and the Sanggunian
- The problem of political interference

Recently, the Social Weather Station (SWS) conducted a Survey on Good Local Governance , with support from The Asia Foundation (TAF). Relevant results on local governance are found in the table below. The survey found 67% of household heads satisfied and 23% dissatisfied with the performance of the local government, for a good net satisfaction rating of +44. In addition, the local government obtained moderate net satisfaction ratings on public-private collaboration. Meanwhile, poor net satisfaction rating was obtained by the local government for the issue on eradicating graft and corruption. In terms of trust ratings for local government officials and institutions, the mayor and the barangay council obtained the highest trust ratings. The survey also found very good net satisfaction rating (+50) for the services of the employees of the local government.

Table 1. Results of the SWS Survey on Good Local Governance

Items	*Satisfied (%)*	*Dissatisfied (%)*	*Net satisfaction rating**
Satisfaction with the local government	67	23	+44
Satisfaction with public-private collaboration			
Consulting the people	52	22	+29
Setting up of monitoring systems for development projects and programs with NGO/PO participation	46	20	+26
Implementing development plans with effective citizen participation	48	24	+24
Satisfaction with the issue on eradicating graft and corruption	32	47	-15
Trust ratings of local government officials and institutions			
Mayor	78	12	+66
Barangay council	71	17	+54
City/municipal council	64	17	+47
Local police	63	20	+42
NGOs	42	18	+25
Business associations	39	21	+17
Satisfaction with the services of the employees of the local government	66	17	+50

* % satisfied minus % dissatisfied, correctly rounded

In terms of the respondents' perception on public-private partnerships, a majority doesn't know or was not aware of citizens' participation in crafting of policies as well as in the formulation and implementation of local development plans.

Table 2. Perception on public-private partnerships

Condition	*%*
Perceived frequency of coordination between local government and the private sector or NGO/PO in crafting policies, laws, or undertaking programs or projects for the welfare of the citizens (in the past 6 months)	
Once or twice	18%
3 to 5 times	8%
More than 5 times	8%
No coordination at all	15%
Don't know/can't tell	51%
Awareness as to whether ordinary citizens participate in the formulation and implementation of the local government's development plans	
Personally know that citizens participate	35%
Others say that citizens participate	20%
Nobody can say if citizens participate	44%

On the one hand, the DILG has developed its own system of monitoring local governance performance. Started in 2008, the Local Governance Performance Management System (LGPMS) is a self-assessment tool for local governments that generates information that are useful in policy and program development, both at the local and national level. The tool is answered on-line by the local government and results can be publicly accessed. Five

performance areas subject to assessment are as follow: 1) administrative governance, 2) social governance, 3) economic governance, 4) environmental governance, and 5) valuing fundamentals of governance. For each performance area, indicators were identified, with corresponding scale or level for benchmarking.

Of interest in this study is the fifth performance area—Valuing Fundamentals of Good Governance. Three parameters of governance were identified: 1) participation, 2) transparency, and 3) financial accountability. The table below shows the indicators for each parameter and the corresponding scaling method.

Table 3. LGPMS Indicators on the performance area: Valuing Fundamentals of Good Governance

No.	*Indicator*	*Applicability*	*Indicator Type*	*Scaling Method/ Benchmark*
I. Participation				
1	Representation of NGOs, POs, and private sector in the Local Special Bodies	Province, City, Municipality	List	NGOs, POs, and /or private sector should be represented in all local special bodies
2	Presence of feedback mechanism to generate citizen views on the reach and quality of LGU services	Province, City, Municipality	Exclusive list	Feedback mechanism established
3	Involvement of NGOs, POs, and private sector in the implementation of LGU development projects	Province, City, Municipality	Exclusive list	More than 70% of LGU development projects were implemented in partnership with NGOs, POs, and private sector
II. Transparency				
1	Presence of Public Information Office or Desk	Province, City, Municipality	Exclusive list	Public Information Office or Desk present
2	Extent of communication mediums used to update the public on local government plans, programs, and special events	Province, City, Municipality	List	Should be able to update the public through various communication mediums
3	Accessibility of public documents such as transaction records and contracts	Province, City, Municipality	Exclusive list	All public documents should be accessed by the public
III. Financial Accountability				
1	Effectiveness of the LGU's Financial Management System	Province, City, Municipality	List	Should meet all criteria set on effectiveness of the financial management system
2	Functionality of the Bids and Awards Committee (BAC)	Province, City, Municipality	List	Should meet all criteria set on composition, meetings, and performance of the BAC
3	Timely liquidation of cash advances	Province, City, Municipality	List	Cash advances should be liquidated within the prescribed period
4	Availability of status report on actions taken by the LGU on COA Audit Findings and Recommendations	Province, City, Municipality	Exclusive List	Status report of actions on COA Audit Findings and Recommendations should be available

The online system can generate electronic reports for each municipality or city, as well as provincial, regional, and national summaries. The regional summary for participation, transparency, and financial accountability are shown in the succeeding tables. These are the aggregated results at the various local levels. Assessment is based on a 5-point scale (very low, low, fair, high, excellent).

Table 4 shows the results for the indicators on participation. A majority of the LGUs rated their performance from high to excellent. However, the provinces from CAR gauged their performance at low to fair.

Table 4. Results of the LGPMS indicators on participation

Region	*Province*	*HUC**	*City*	*Municipality*
NCR	--	Excellent	--	High
CAR	Low to Fair	Excellent	--	High
Region I	Excellent	--	Excellent	High
Region II	High	--	High	High
Region III	High	High to Excellent	Excellent	High
Region IV-A	Excellent	Fair	High	High
Region IV-B	High to Excellent	Excellent	High	High
Region V	High	--	Excellent	High
Region VI	High to Excellent	High to Excellent	High	High
Region VII	High	High	High	High
Region VIII	High	High	High	High
Region IX	High	High	High to Excellent	High
Region X	High	High to Excellent	High	High
Region XI	High to Excellent	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
Region XII	High to Excellent	High	High	High
CARAGA	Excellent	Excellent	High	High
ARMM	High	--	--	High

* HUC – Highly urbanized city

The results for the indicators on transparency are shown in Table 5. The performance ratings were also in the range of high to excellent.

Table 5. Results of the LGPMS indicators on transparency

Region	*Province*	*HUC*	*City*	*Municipality*
NCR	--	Excellent	--	High
CAR	High	Excellent	--	High
Region I	High to Excellent	--	Excellent	High
Region II	High	--	High	High
Region III	Excellent	Excellent	High	High
Region IV-A	Excellent	High	Excellent	High
Region IV-B	High	Excellent	Excellent	High
Region V	Excellent	--	High	High
Region VI	Excellent	Excellent	High	High
Region VII	Excellent	High	High	High
Region VIII	Excellent	High	High	High
Region IX	Fair to Excellent	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
Region X	High	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
Region XI	Excellent	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
Region XII	Excellent	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
CARAGA	High	Excellent	Excellent	High
ARMM	High	--	--	High

* HUC – Highly urbanized city

Table 6 shows the results for the indicators on financial accountability. A majority of the LGUs reported a high performance.

Table 6. Results on the LGPMS indicators on financial sustainabilit

Region	*Province*	*HUC*	*City*	*Municipality*
NCR	--	Excellent	--	High
CAR	High	Excellent	--	High
Region I	High to Excellent	--	Excellent	High
Region II	High	--	High	High
Region III	Excellent	Excellent	High	High
Region IV-A	Excellent	High	Excellent	High
Region IV-B	High	Excellent	Excellent	High
Region V	Excellent	--	High	High
Region VI	Excellent	Excellent	High	High
Region VII	Excellent	High	High	High
Region VIII	Excellent	High	High	High
Region IX	Fair to Excellent	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
Region X	High	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
Region XI	Excellent	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
Region XII	Excellent	Excellent	High to Excellent	High
CARAGA	High	Excellent	Excellent	High
ARMM	High	--	--	High

* HUC – Highly urbanized city

It must be noted that the LGPMS is a self-assessment tool, thus, the performance ratings were not subjected to citizens' or CSOs' validation.

SURVEY FINDINGS

Selection of respondents was done through a purposive sampling method. The target number of respondents is 100. The directory of members of CODE-NGO was utilized to identify these respondents. However, as data gathering progressed, some challenges were encountered by the project team. For instance, some of the contact information in the directory was not updated and the Researchers had to resort to referrals and the use of existing CSO directories to get the accurate information. There were also some identified respondents who refused to participate in the survey, since they feel that their engagement with their LGUs is not sufficient for an assessment, or that their organizations' work is not directly involved with their LGUs. It was also a challenge to send and gather the furnished surveys since some areas do not have internet access or access to a fax machine.

The survey was divided into five sections: 1) profile of CSO respondents, 2) general state of civil society participation, 3) status of accreditation, selection, reconstitution, and functionality of the local development councils, and local special bodies, 4) transparency and accessibility of information, and 5) CSO capacity building needs and recommendations to improve LDC functionality.

PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

After less than two months of data gathering, 91 CSOs were covered by the study. 75 respondents answered municipality/city surveys (82%) and 16 CSOs responded to the provincial surveys (18%). A distinction had to be made between the two LGUs (municipality/city and province) so as not to confuse the respondents. Target respondents were the heads of the organizations or program staff who are familiar with the organization's operations and engagement with their LGUs.

38 provinces were covered by the study, as shown in the table below. A plurality of the CSOs covered by the study are in Visayas, since the Visayas networks of CODE-NGO were very cooperative to the study.

Table 7. Regions and provinces covered by the study

Region	*Province*
LUZON	**21 respondents** (23%)
CAR	Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Mountain Province
NCR	Metro Manila
I – Ilocos Region	Ilocos Sur
II – Cagayan Valley	Nueva Vizcaya, Quirino
IVA – CALABARZON	Laguna, Quezon
IVB –MIMAROPA	Palawan
V – Bicol Region	Camarines Sur
VISAYAS	**45 (49%)**
VI – Western Visayas	Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental
VII – Central Visayas	Bohol, Cebu, Negros Oriental
VIII – Eastern Visayas	Eastern Samar, Leyte, Southern Leyte
MINDANAO	**25 (28%)**
IX – Zamboanga Peninsula	Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Sur
X – Northern Mindanao	Bukidnon, Camiguin, Lanao del Norte
XI – Davao Region	Davao, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental
XII – SOCCSKSARGEN	Cotabato, Sarangani, South Cotabato
XIII – CARAGA	Surigao del Norte, Agusan del Sur
ARMM	Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao

GENERAL STATE OF CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION

The CSO who participated in the survey are diverse in terms of sectors served and thematic areas, as shown in table 8. A majority of them serve the rural sector.

Table 8. Sectors served and thematic areas of CSOs who participated in the survey

Sectors	*Freq.*	*%*	*Themes*	*Freq.*	*%*
1. Farmers	81	89%	1. Agrarian reform	49	54%
2. Fisheries	52	57%	2. Environment	75	82%
3. Indigenous peoples	45	50%	3. Education	73	80%
4. Women	80	88%	4. Health	70	77%
5. Children, youth	65	71%	5. Agricultural development	70	77%
6. OFW	17	19%	6. Rural employment	34	37%
7. Senior citizens	11	12%	7. Livelihood/microfinance/coops	77	85%
8. Urban poor	13	14%	8. General family welfare	45	50%
9. Others	17	19%	9. Infrastructure	38	42%
			10. Disaster relief & rehabilitation	42	46%
			11. Local governance	64	70%
			12. Peace and order	42	46%

The Local Government Code (LGC), enacted in 1991, is a milestone legislation, which provided venues for participation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in local governance through the various bodies at the barangay, municipal, provincial, and regional levels. The respondents were asked if they are aware of the provisions of the LGC, and 96% of them affirmed. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest, the respondents were asked to rate their level of awareness on the LGC. The average awareness rating of the respondents is 3.9.

Almost three-fourths (74%) cited that they attended trainings/seminars on the LGC. A majority of these trainings (75%) were initiated or organized by CSOs (Example: CODE NGO, IPG, IPD, SALIGAN). In addition, a majority (96%) stated that they are aware of the composition and functions of the LDC. When asked to rate their level of awareness using a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest, average awareness rating of the respondents is high, at 4.1.

STATUS OF ACCREDITATION, SELECTION, RECONSTITUTION, AND FUNCTIONALITY OF LOCAL SPECIAL BODIES

In August 2010, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 2010-73 to reiterate the provisions of the Local Government Code and provide guidelines relative to the accreditation of people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and other organized groups, and in the selection of their representatives to the local special bodies.

According to the MC, the Planning and Development Office of all LGUs should conduct an inventory of all people's organizations, non-governmental organizations, and business and professional groups. On the basis of the said inventory, a directory or database of civil society organizations should be prepared. When asked if their LGUs have a database or directory of CSOs, two-thirds of the respondents (69%) answered affirmatively, while only half (51%) of those with database or directory said that these were regularly updated. In addition, almost half (48%) stated that a meeting or dialogue for all CSOs has been called by their LGUs to validate the said directory or database of CSOs.

MC 2010-73 also mandates the Sanggunian to issue a Notice of Call for Accreditation to all organizations listed in the CSO directory. Sixty-four respondents (70%) cited that their Sanggunian indeed issued a Notice of Call for Accreditation this year. From all the respondents, 67% or sixty-one affirmed that they are currently accredited by their respective LGUs, with only half of them (59%) issued a Certificate of Accreditation or Sanggunian Resolution.

Moreover, only 12% of the respondents stated that that the current list of accredited CSOs was posted in a publicly accessible place within their LGUs. Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest, the respondents were asked to rate their general satisfaction on the efficiency, effectiveness, and compliance of the CSO accreditation process in their LGU. The average satisfaction rating is 3.2.

The respondents were also asked to justify the ratings they gave on the accreditation process. The table below shows the various reasons provided by the respondents with the corresponding rating. A plurality cited that information dissemination by the LGU on the accreditation process is insufficient. There were also a number of respondents who said that not all CSOs were involved in the accreditation process. Meanwhile, some respondents cited that their LGUs complied with the accreditation guidelines.

Table 9. Reasons for accreditation process rating

Reasons for Accreditation Process Rating	*Rating on Accreditation Process*					*Total*
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	
Efficient/speedy accreditation process	-	-	-	2	2	4
LGU complied with guidelines	-	-	1	5	3	**9**
All CSOs were involved/better informed	-	-	-	2	3	**5**
Requirements for accreditation can be easily complied with				2	-	**2**
Biased accreditation process	1	4	2	-	-	7
Not all CSOs were involved	-	2	5	2	-	**9**
Info dissemination on accreditation process is insufficient	4	2	10	-	-	**16**
Cannot comply with tedious accreditation requirements	-	-	4	3	-	7
Inefficient/slow process	2	1	2	1	-	**6**
Did not provide reason for rating	1	4	5	4	1	**15**
Total	**8**	**13**	**28**	**22**	**9**	**80**

Under the LGC, various bodies were created to serve as venues for participation of CSOs in local governance. These local special bodies are the Local Development Council (LDC), Local School Board (LSB), Local Health Board (LHB) and the Local Peace and Order Council (LPOC). The LGC also mandates that at least one-fourth or 25% of the total composition of these bodies should come from civil society. The respondents were asked if the various local bodies exist in their municipality. They were also asked to assess these bodies' functionality using a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest. No definition of functionality was given so the respondents were asked to expound what they meant by a functioning local special body. Finally, they were asked if there are CSO representatives in

the various bodies. Table 10 below shows the results. The LDC exists in their localities, as stated by a majority of the respondents (90%).

Table 10. Existence, functionality rating, and CSO representation in the LSBs

Local Special Bodies	*Existing*	*Average rating of functionality (1 = not functional, 5 = very functional)*	*With CSO representatives*
Local Development Council	82 (90%)	3.43	67 (82%)
Local School Board	76 (84%)	3.42	50 (66%)
Local Health Board	72 (79%)	3.40	47 (65%)
Local Peace and Order Council	72 (79%)	3.31	44 (61%)

The table below shows the various reasons given by the respondents in their rating of each local special body. Tabulating these reasons shows diverse results. Worth noting is that a plurality of respondents associate the local special bodies' functionality with the frequency of meetings they convene.

Table 11. Reasons for LSBs' functionality rating

Reasons for Local Special Bodies' functionality rating	*LDC*	*LSB*	*LHB*	*LPOC*	*Total*
Members of the Local Special Body are active	5	6	5	4	20
CSOs have significant role; there is CSO participation	2	4	4	4	14
The Local Special Body is functional	6	5	3	8	22
The Local Special Body convenes meetings	8	6	5	8	27
Planning is being done; local plans are responsive to people's needs	1	2	5	2	10
Complied with LGC guidelines	2	3	1	-	6
Not functional	4	3	5	4	16
Lack of or insufficient CSO participation	8	3	3	3	17
Planning not efficiently done, local plans are not responsive to people's needs	2	-	1	1	4
Meetings were not convened	6	2	2	2	12
Did not comply with LGC guidelines	3	2	1	2	8
LSB is tainted with politics	2	4	4	5	15
Reconstitution is merely for LGC compliance	5	4	4	1	14

Aside from the local special bodies, there are other Code-inspired venues for CSO participation established at the local level. Respondents of the municipality survey (75 respondents) were asked if the following Code-inspired bodies shown in Table 12 exist in their municipality. They were also asked to provide rating of the body's functionality (using a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest) and if there are CSO representatives in these bodies. The Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council was cited by a majority of the respondents while the Municipal Council for the Elderly has the highest average rating, at 3.65. Finally, the Municipal Agriculture and Fishery Council got the highest affirmative response in terms of CSO representation.

Table 12. Existence, functionality rating, and CSO representation in Code-inspired bodies

Code-inspired Bodies	*Existing (n=75)*	*Average rating of functionality (1 = not functional, 5 = very functional)*	*With CSO representatives*
Municipal Anti-drug Abuse Council	37 (49%)	2.89	20 (54%)
Municipal Agriculture and Fishery Council	49 (65%)	3.18	32 (65%)
Municipal Cooperative and Coordinating Council / Municipal Cooperative Development Council	45 (60)	2.98	25 (56%)
Municipal Council for the Elderly	46 (61%)	3.65	29 (63%)
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (formerly the Disaster Coordinating Council)	59 (79%)	3.44	33 (63%)
Council for the Protection of Children	52 (69%)	3.47	33 (63%)
Municipal Council for the Elderly	46 (61%)	3.65	29 (63%)
Municipal Fisheries and Aquatic Resource Management Council	34 (45%)	3.10	21 (62%)
Municipal Gender and Development Council	37 (49%)	3.25	21 (57%)
Municipal Price Coordinating Council	15 (20%)	2.29	4 (27%)
Municipal Council for the Welfare of Disabled Person	32 (43%)	3.22	18 (56%)
Municipal Sustainable Organic Agriculture Council	26 (35%)	3.09	14 (54%)

Based on the MC, the Local Government Operations Officer shall convene a meeting with the executive officers, or with the duly authorized representatives of all accredited organizations where such groups shall choose from among themselves the representative-organizations to the local special bodies. When the respondents were asked how the CSO representatives in the various bodies were selected in their areas, 45% of the respondents stated that they were elected among the CSOs themselves. 13 respondents (14%) revealed that the representatives in their areas were appointed/selected by the local chief executives. The remaining respondents (41%) revealed that they do not know the CSO representative selection process in their areas.

Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest, the efficiency, effectiveness, and compliance of the CSO representative selection process was rated at 3.14 on average by the respondents. The table below shows the reasons cited by the respondents for their rating.

Table 13. Reasons for CSO selection process rating

Reasons for CSO Selection Process Rating	*Rating of CSO rep selection process*					*Total*
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	
Complied with guidelines on CSO representative selection process	0	0	2	3	3	**8**
Consultative process, several CSOs were represented	0	0	3	6	5	**14**
CSO representatives appointed by LCE	2	5	5	0	0	**12**
No or minimal CSO participation	2	2	5	0	0	**9**
Insufficient information on CSO representative selection process	3	1	4	1	0	**9**
Did not provide reason for rating	3	0	10	9	2	**24**
Total	**10**	**8**	**29**	**19**	**10**	**76**

In addition, the LGC outlines six major functions of the Local Development Councils. These are shown in Table 14. The respondents were asked which of the following functions their organizations participated in or were crucial in their organization's advocacy. They were also asked to rate their level of participation. A plurality of the respondents (58%) stated that they participate significantly in the formulation of development plans and policies (with a 3.24 average level of participation).

Table 14. CSO participation in LDC functions

LDC functions	*CSO Participation*	*Level of participation*
Formulation of development plans and policies	53 (58%)	3.24
Formulation of annual public investment programs	34 (37%)	2.90
Appraisal and prioritization of development programs and projects	33 (36%)	2.97
Implementation of development programs and projects	36 (40%)	3.02
Formulation of local investment incentives	15 (17%)	2.56
Monitoring and evaluation of development programs and projects	37 (41%)	2.76

Section 112 of the LGC also stated that the LDC may form sectoral or functional committees to assist them in the performance of their functions. The various sectoral committees are shown in the table below. It is worth noting that the sectoral committees are created in only less than half of the LDCs, as cited by the respondents.

Table 15. Existence of sectoral committees in the LDC

Sectoral committees	*Existing in the LDC*
Social development committee	38 (42%)
Economic development committee	39 (43%)
Physical and infrastructure committee	39 (43%)
Environment and natural resources committee	38 (42%)
Administrative and institutional development committee	32 (35%)

OTHER ENABLING MECHANISMS ON PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

There are LGUs that initiate mechanisms and venues for CSO participation in their locality, aside from the Code-mandated mechanisms. These are varied, and include setting up of CSO desks, convening of local consultations and other means of gathering citizens' feedback, and enactment of local policies that support CSO networking and strengthening. The respondents were asked which of the various enabling mechanisms are being practiced in their areas.

Less than one-third of the respondents (31%) stated that a CSO desk or support mechanism for CSOs was established in their LGUs. In addition, a feedback mechanism was established to generate citizens' views as reported by 39% of the respondents. Examples of feedback mechanisms include availability of feedback forms and suggestion boxes, regular radio programs where citizens' views are received, text and phone hotlines within the LGU, convening of community forums, consultations, and assemblies. Further, half of the respondents (52%) stated that public consultations were organized by the LGU to generate citizens' feedback or inputs on a particular policy, legislation, program, or project, for instance, during a State of the City Address, public hearings or consultations before the passage of local legislations, barangays assemblies.

Further, almost one-fourth of the respondents (24%) cited that there are existing local policies that directly support CSO networking, strengthening, and expansion activities or similar endeavors. Examples of these include: 1) an initiative to create a Civil Society Municipal Network, 2) the Shelter Code of Davao City provides representation for urban CSOs in the Local Housing Board, 3) an annual NGO week organized by the LGU, 4) ordinance providing allocation from LGU funds for CSOs support and development.

When the respondents were asked to rate their LGU on the level of openness or receptivity to participatory governance (on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest), the average rating is 3.2. The table below shows the reasons cited by the respondents to justify their ratings. There are a number of respondents (31) who stated that their LGUs are open and receptive to CSO participation. There are also a number of respondents (10) who stated otherwise.

Table 16. Reasons for rating on LGU's level of openness to participatory governance

Reasons for rating on LGU's level of openness	*Rating on LGU's openness*					*Total*
	1	*2*	*3*	*4*	*5*	
CSO participation is welcome, LGU is open and receptive	0	3	10	7	11	**31**
Accepts suggestions (plans, programs) for inclusion in the LGU's plans	0	0	2	1	2	**5**
Provided support to CSOs (financial, technical)	0	1	1	2	2	**6**
Limited or no support to CSOs by LGUs	1	2	1	0	0	**4**
Limited or no venue for CSO participation	2	4	4	0	0	**10**
Involving CSOs is for compliance only, no meaningful effort from LGU to involve CSOs	1	5	1	0	0	**7**
LGU does not accept CSOs views/suggestions	2	3	0	0	0	**5**
Did not provide reason for rating	1	1	6	6	1	**15**
Total	**7**	**19**	**25**	**16**	**16**	**83**

TRANSPARENCY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF INFORMATION

For citizens to effectively participate in governance processes, transparency within the LGU and accessibility of public information such as the local budget, plans, and policies are imperative. The respondents were asked on the status of these two aspects in their respective areas.

A majority of the respondents (80%) stated that local ordinances and resolutions are accessible in their LGU. Forty-one respondents (68%) reported that a public information office or desk is established in their LGU. In terms of information on their local government's plans and programs, less than two-thirds of the respondents (60%) stated that these were disseminated through various means (example, LGU website, bulletin board, local radio programs). However, a high percentage of respondents (69%) reported that their LGU's budget is not publicly disclosed. Still, there are efforts or initiatives by CSOs to promote transparency in their locality, as cited by 56 respondents (62%).

PROBLEMS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CAPACITY BUILDING NEEDS

The respondents were asked what they perceived were the most pressing problems in their LDC. A plurality cited that the most pressing problem is the insufficient capacity or technical skills of the LDC members, which hinders the efficient functioning of the body. Another pressing problem cited by the respondents is the lack of transparency and accountability within their LGUs.

Table 17. Problems in the LDC

Problems	*Freq.*	*Rank*
Insufficient capacity/technical skills of LDC members	31	1
Lack of transparency and accountability in the LGU	26	2
Politicized LDCs	24	3
Limited or no CSO participation	19	4
Non-functional LDCs	18	5
Lack of cooperation, communication among LDC members	15	6
Limited CSO representation, biased CSO rep selection process	15	
Financial constraint	13	7

The respondents were also asked what their recommendations are to improve the functionality of their LDCs and to enhance CSO participation in local governance in their areas. A plurality of respondents recommended the promotion of active CSO participation in planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation. In addition, the respondents cited the need to conduct capacity building activities for LDC members.

Table 18. Recommendations to improve LDC functionality

Recommendations	*Freq.*	*Rank*
Promote active CSO participation in development process (planning, budgeting, monitoring, and evaluation)	53	1
Capacity building of LDC members	29	2
Promote transparency and accountability	20	3
Efficient monitoring of LDC status by the DILG	14	4
Provide incentives to functional LDCs, sanctions to non-functional LDCs	13	5
Provide secretariat and logistical support to LDCs	11	6
Promote CSO-LGU partnerships in project implementation, monitoring, and evaluation	11	
LDCs should not be politicized	10	7
Conduct awareness raising activities to encourage people's participation	5	9

Finally, for CSO representatives to effectively participate in the LDC, the respondents were asked what they think are the areas where CSOs' capacities can be enhanced. Top of the rank is capacity building on development planning and budgeting. A number of respondents also cited the following areas where the capacities of CSOs can be enhanced: roles and functions of LDC members, participation on local governance, and laws and policies, including and in-depth understanding of the Local Government Code and related policies on decentralization.

Table 19. Capacity building needs of CSOs

Topic	*Freq.*	*Rank*
Development planning and budgeting	58	1
Roles and functions of LDC members, including CSO reps	28	2
Participation on local governance	28	
Laws, policies	28	
Monitoring and evaluation	17	3
Policy advocacy	14	4
Networking, partnership building	12	5

CONCLUSION

The findings of the study are summed up in the table below.

Table 20. Summary of findings

Section	*Study Findings*
General state of civil society participation	96% are aware of the provisions of the LGC; average awareness rating is at 3.9.
	Almost three-fourths (74%) cited that they attended trainings/seminars on the LGC. A majority of these trainings (75%) were initiated or organized by CSOs
	A majority (96%) stated that they are aware of the composition and functions of the LDC; average awareness rating is at 4.1.
Status of CSO Accreditation	Two-thirds of the respondents (69%) cited that their LGUs have a database or directory of CSOs, while only half (51%) of those with database or directory said that these were regularly updated. Almost half (48%) stated that a meeting or dialogue for all CSOs has been called by their LGUs to validate the said directory or database of CSOs.
	Sixty-four respondents (70%) cited that their Sanggunian issued a Notice of Call for Accreditation this year.
	67% or sixty-one respondents affirmed that they are currently accredited by their respective LGUs, with only half of them (59%) issued a Certificate of Accreditation or Sanggunian Resolution.
	Only 12% of the respondents stated that that the current list of accredited CSOs was posted in a publicly accessible place within their LGUs.
	The average satisfaction rating of the respondents on the efficiency, effectiveness, and compliance of the CSO accreditation process in their LGU is 3.2.
Reconstitution and Functionality of LSBs	The LDC exists in their localities, as stated by a majority of the respondents (90%). Average rating of functionality for the 4 LSBs is in the range of 3.31 to 3.43. CSO representatives are present in the 4 LSBs as cited by more than half of the respondents.
	Less than half (47%) stated that a meeting of all accredited organizations was convened by their LGUs for the selection of LSB representatives.
	Code-inspired bodies exist in some municipalities, where the Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council was cited by a majority of the respondents. Further, the Municipal Council for the Elderly has the highest average rating, at 3.65.

	45% of the respondents stated that CSO representatives to the various local bodies were elected among the CSOs themselves. 13 respondents (14%) revealed that the representatives in their areas were appointed/selected by the local chief executives. The remaining respondents (41%) revealed that they do not know the CSO representative selection process in their areas. the efficiency, effectiveness, and compliance of the CSO representative selection process was rated at 3.14 on average by the respondents.
	A plurality of the respondents (58%) stated that they participate significantly in the formulation of development plans and policies (with a 3.24 average level of participation).
	Sectoral committees are created in only less than half of the LDCs, as cited by the respondents.
Other enabling mechanisms on participatory governance	Less than one-third of the respondents (31%) stated that a CSO desk or support mechanism for CSOs was established in their LGUs.
	Feedback mechanisms were established to generate citizens' views as reported by 39% of the respondents.
	Half of the respondents (52%) stated that public consultations were organized by the LGU to generate citizens' feedback or inputs on a particular policy, legislation, program, or project
	Almost one-fourth of the respondents (24%) cited that there are existing local policies that directly support CSO networking, strengthening, and expansion activities or similar endeavors.
	When the respondents were asked to rate their LGU on the level of openness or receptivity to participatory governance, the average rating is 3.2.
Transparency and accessibility of information	A majority of the respondents (80%) stated that local ordinances and resolutions are accessible in their LGU.
	Forty-one respondents (68%) reported that a public information office or desk is established in their LGU.
	Less than two-thirds of the respondents (60%) stated that information on their LGU's plans and programs were disseminated through various means.
	A high percentage of respondents (69%) reported that their LGU's budget is not publicly disclosed.
	There are efforts or initiatives by CSOs to promote transparency in their locality, as cited by 56 respondents (62%).
Pressing problems in the LDC	1) Insufficient capacity or technical skills of the LDC members, which hinder the efficient functioning of the body, 2) Lack of transparency and accountability within their LGUs.
Recommendations to improve LDC functionality	1) Promotion of active CSO participation in planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation, 2) Need to conduct capacity building activities for LDC members.
Capacity building needs of CSOs	1) Development planning and budgeting, 2) Roles and functions of LDC members, 3) Participation on local governance, and 4) Laws and policies, including and in-depth understanding of the Local Government Code and related policies on decentralization.

The above findings show high awareness of CSOs on the LGC and the functions of the LSBs. It also reflects moderate compliance of LGUs on the CSO accreditation process. Moreover, there are diverse views in terms of assessing the LDCs' functionality, with some respondents providing high marks for their LGUs, while others citing the inefficiencies and biases in the selection of CSO representatives to the LDC. It is also worth noting that

a modest number of LGUs, as reported by the respondents, pursue enabling mechanisms for citizens' participation and are promoting transparency and accessibility of information.

The study also shows that there are areas where CSO participation can be enhanced, though there are documented cases where the LGU and CSO interface resulted to productive partnerships. Comparing the findings of this study to the 2001 DILG study, some of the issues and concerns remain the same. For instance, lack of information dissemination on the activities, functions, and venues for participation in the local special bodies still persist. There is also the urgent call to monitor the functionality of these local special bodies, particularly the LDCs. Further, capacity building for LDC members (for both LGU and CSO representatives) is imperative to enhance the performance of the LDC.

APPENDIX 7. CASE STUDIES ON COMMUNITY ORGANIZING AND ASSET REFORM

Community Organizing, Asset Reform, and Poverty Reduction

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"Nonprofit participation in the policy process takes advantage of the special insights, competencies, and perspectives that nonprofit organizations have by virtue of their involvement with important societal issues and their ties to a wide range of different social groups, including many that might otherwise be excluded from involvement in public affairs." Participants agreed there were many benefits to nonprofit engagement in policy advocacy, including bringing public attention to key social issues, increasing the base of knowledge for sound policy formation, ensuring access for new and unheard constituencies, fostering government accountability, promoting democratic values, and giving people civic skills and a sense of community attachment… Thus, it is all the more disturbing that advocacy and civic engagement have been threatened by under funding and other challenges. Community groups struggle to raise the resources needed to engage in this important work…

"It takes time to connect leaders and members to one another across places and institutions; yet this is the only way to draw large numbers of people into a movement and the best way to generate sustained leverage to make a difference beyond one issue battle or election."

—Lisa Rangheli, Recent Literature on Measuring Impact: Advocacy, Community Organizng and Civic Engagement

I. Introduction

This paper asserts the importance of civil society, government, and donor institutions investing in community organizing work in the Philippine context and zeroes in on the substantive implementation of existing asset reform legislations to achieve meaningful poverty reduction agenda. Six case studies were undertaken and synthesized in this paper to provide a sample of evidence in support of community organizing work. The paper starts with the broader historical context of poverty and powerlessness, the state of organization of key basic sectors (small farmers, fishers, indigenous peoples, and the urban poor), and the profile of organizing institutions involved in the case studies. Then, it moves to discuss the processes involved in organizing communities, including their level of achievement and impacts, and ends with the lessons and challenges.

II. Context

Three hundred thirty three years of Spanish and 47 years of American colonization successfully subdued the majority of diverse Malayo-Polenesian ethnic groups, 95 percent of them live in three major island groups of the the 7,100 islands comprising the Philippine archipelago. The Tagalogs, Kapampangans, Ilocanos, Bicolanos, Warays, Cebuanos, and Ilonggos assimilated the Spanish and American cultures and religions, and eventually their political and economic system. The Spanish-imposed feudal encomienda system,[32] forced labor (polo), and vandala, sugarcane and tobacco monopolies, and the American Free Trade and forward deployment security interests all needed the cooperation of the local economic and political elite, thus, ensuring the servitude of majority of the Filipinos, especially the peasants. Even the friar lands bought by the American taxpayers from Spain were distributed largely to the Filipino illustrados. To maintain their way of life, the lumads or the indigenous peoples,[33] who started their migration to these islands 30,000 years ago, left the plains and the coasts and settled in the forests of Northern Luzon, Palawan, and Mindanao highlands. But even there, extractive mining and logging businesses in the 30s and 50s to the present have continued their assault, dislocating them and destroying their cultures.

The colonial governments which adopted a systematic local elite-cooptation strategy, transforming local asset holders, the nobles and datus, into local administrators and later as legislators and justices, left a post-World War 2 (WW2) nation suffering from serious poverty and social injustice. While now highly developed Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea immediately implemented broad-range agrarian reform programs, post-WW2 Philippine administrations engaged themselves in land reform tokenism more to quell peasant unrest rather than seriously addressing their concerns. Marcos' much vaunted agrarian reform program only managed to distribute ten percent of total targeted 700,000 rice and corn lands and the 14-year dictatorship further consolidated coconut and sugar landowners led by crony monopolists and the best lands were continued to be leased to multinational pineapple planters. The small fishers also suffered considerably during these years as their traditional fishing grounds were transformed into pearl farms (e.g., Jewelmer case in Balabac) and fishpens (e.g., Laguna Lake), their mangroves into fishponds. Their municipal waters continued to be encroached by big commercial fishing vessels, all owned by the elite and protected by the Marcos military and the local mayors/governors. Rural misery and militarization increased rural outmigration swelling the urban population while a big number of skilled workers made it overseas. In the early 80s, one out of four residents of Manila was an informal settler.[34]

[32]Awarding large parcels of land to Spanish principals administering economic and spiritual needs of the colonized peoples

[33]The Indigenous Peoples, representing nearly 14% of the country's population, were among the poorest and the most disadvantaged social groups in the country. Illiteracy, unemployment and incidence of poverty were much higher among them than the rest of the population. IP settlements were remote, without access to basic services, and were characterized by a high incidence of morbidity, mortality, and malnutrition. Most of the 110 major indigenous groups in the Philippines did not have legal recognition over their traditional lands, thus limiting their ability to freely conduct their livelihood activities and have been denied access to other natural resources in their communities.

[34]According to the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), they are the underprivileged or homeless sector of society—the unemployed, underemployed and the irregularly employed, who, because of lack of income become informal settlers and slum dwellers. They are most visible in sidewalks, dumpsites, cemeteries, unoccupied government or private lands and danger areas like railroad tracks, riverbanks, road right-of-way. Their combined family income falls below the poverty line as defined by the National Economic Development Authority.

Socio-politically-motivated resistance against Spanish, American, and Japanese excesses and the corruption and misrule of the succeeding Filipino administrations dotted the history of the Filipino people. Lapu-lapu delayed by 44 years the eventual Spanish colonization in 1565, Dagohoy revolt in Bohol challenged the Spanish administration for 85 years, Bonifacio and later Aguinaldo-led Katipunan succeeded to eventually install in 1899 the first republic in Asia.[35] The Huk rebellion and eventually the CPP-NPA-led insurgency largely focusing on land issues continued to pose serious challenges to the American, Japanese, and the post WW2 elite democratic regimes.

Self-help cooperatives, as well as open-legal national federation and movement of peasants formed in the 1920s (NFPFP), 1930s (PKM), 1950s (FFF), struggled for land reform and credit access, among others. In the tumultuous cold-war, the 1960s and 70s saw the Catholic Church and the youth exploring the books of Gandhi, Luther King, Saul Alinsky and Paolo Freire. Community Organizing principles and techniques and theology of liberation guided the unarmed response to poverty and oppression especially after Martial Law was imposed in 1972. A good number of basic Christian communities and NGOs and people's organizations addressing issues of the small farmers, fishers, indigenous peoples, and the urban poor were established nationwide. Amidst the exploding social volcano following the 1983 assassination of Ninoy Aquino, a systematic active non-violence training course was introduced[36] in the country getting adherents from important church and social movement institutions and individuals culminating in the 1986 People Power Revolution, saving the lives of coup plotters and the country from civil war. The 15-year dictatorship ended when the Marcos family and his cronies were non-violently forced to flee the country and the revolutionary government of Cory Aquino was installed.

The People Power Constitution that was overwhelmingly ratified a year after contained strong provisions on social justice, human rights, nationality, environmental, and people empowerment. However, most of these provisions needed enabling laws. The elections that followed brought many traditional politicians representing big landowning, real estate, commercial mining, logging, and commercial fishing interests back to Congress, local governments, and subsequently, the judiciary.

Thus, it was through mass and community mobilizations and intensive lobbying that asset reform legislations promised by the Constitution were enacted in an elite dominated Congress. To pass the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, traditionally opposing national peasant federations united under the Congress for a People's Agrarian Reform (CPAR) coalition which organized a nationwide farmers' mobilization dubbed Agrarian Reform Express. The nation was also jolted by the

[35]There were other several uprisings and revolts focused on land grabbing, land rent, friars and civil leaders excesses from 1600s to 1800s waged in different parts of the country, among them, the Tablot Rebellion in Bohol (1661). Bangcao rebellion in Limasawa (1622). Sumuroy Rebellion in Samar (1650), Malong of Pangasinan (1660), Almazan of Ilocos (1661), Maniago of Pampanga (1661), Tapar of Oton, Panay (1663), Palaris of Pangasinan (1662-1764), and Diego and Gabriela Silang of Ilocos (1762), Lungao (1811), and Apolinario de la Cruz (1849-51).

[36]It was conducted by Jean and Hildegard Goss-Mayr of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR) in 1984, attended by several prominent social and political movement leaders and activists and progressive Catholic bishops.

massacre of peasants at the foot of Mendiola Bridge, where 18 farmers were killed and hundreds wounded. This event applied greater pressure on Congress to pass the agrarian reform law, which it did on June 10, 1988.

Through the strong lobby and advocacy of urban poor groups and the Roman Catholic Church, the Urban Development and Housing Act (UDHA) was enacted in 1991. However, asset reform legislation for Indigenous Peopls and small fishers would take longer to enact. The passage of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 is attributed mainly to the sustained vigilance and advocacy of the IP sector and its partners over a ten year period. Likewise, the passage of the Fisheries Code was delayed by 11 years due to the strong and effective lobby by the commercial fisheries sector. The Fisheries Code sets government policy on the use of fisheries and coastal resources and contained provisions that protect the interest of small fishers.

These pieces of asset reform legislation are a product of legislative compromises and have built-in loopholes. Nevertheless, these laws provide possibilities for some six millions of landless farmers to own the land they till,[37] a million indigenous peoples families to get back their ancestral lands,[38] 1.5 million small fisher households to have control over their municipal waters,[39] and three million urban poor settlers to own pieces of land they can build their homes.[40]

Given the elite capture of state institutions, asset reform legislations proved very difficult to implement. Among the indicators of this regulatory capture were the very limited budget allotment, the appointments of Cabinet members who do not have the political will to implement the laws, and adversarial decisions of the Courts. These were further aggravated by the passage of Mining Act of 1995 undermining especially IPRA and provisions in the Local Government Code on land classification, and the enactment of other laws limiting coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). While CARP and IPRA were centrally implemented, UDHA and the Fisheries Code were implemented through the local governments. The rate of accomplishments seem to point to the idea that while there are advantages for greater powers and resources

[37]The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL, 1988) provided for the distribution of some 10.3 million of hectares of agricultural land, both public and private, regardless of crops planted, over a ten-year period to more than six million landless farmers.

[38]The law recognized the rights of Indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains and provided for a process of titling of lands through the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Domain Titles (CADT). The law gave jurisdiction of all ancestral domain claims to the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) including those previously awarded by the DENR and all future claims that shall be filed. The new law provided the basis for filing new claims which included the submission of a valid perimeter map, evidences and proofs, and the accomplishment of an Ancestral Domain Sustainable Protection Plan (ADSPP). All existing ancestral domain claims previously recognized through the issuance of CADCs are required to pass through a process of affirmation for titling.

[39]R.A. 8550 or the Fisheries Code grants preferential rights to marginalized fishers in the judicious utilization of 918 municipal waters, 15-kilometers seaward, in the country. As a concession to the commercial fishers, R.A. 8550 allows commercial fishing within the 10.1-15 kilometers as long as the local government units (LGUs) permit it with due consultation with the local FARMCs.

[40]It provides for mechanism for the urban poor to have secure land and housing tenure. Among its provisions is the adequate safeguard to informal settlers against arbitrary evictions. "Within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, the Local government units, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and in other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds. The local government unit, in coordination with the National Housing Authority, shall provide relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment and livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families." The law will be implemented primarily by the local government units, a big departure from the earlier centralized housing policy.

given to local governments, allowing them to implement asset reform legislations may not be a good idea after all. The local elite's vested interests seemed to have become very prominent and dominant over the past decade. CARP and IPRA have 4% and 1% accomplishment over total target per year while UDHA and Fisheries Code have miserable .5% and .25% rate of accomplishments respectively.

In 2010, 22 years after CARP, one million hectares of vast prime agricultural lands controlled and owned by powerful landowners were left undistributed; 13 years after IPRA, only 8 % of the estimated 9.6 million hectares have been awarded to indigenous peoples[41]; 19 years after UDHA, only 10 percent of urban poor received housing lots; and 12 years after the Fisheries Code, only 3% of the 918 municipal waters have been delineated for small fishers. Given the rate of asset reform implementation, it will take at least 51 years to complete the distribution of 685,000-hectare of big private agricultural lands subject for compulsory acquisition, 100 years to give back the ancestral lands to all indigenous peoples, 130 years to provide homelots to all urban poor settlers, and 240 years to finish the delineation of all municipal waters.

III. State of Organization in the Sectors: 6 Case Studies

As demonstrated by six case studies discussed below, asset reforms were implemented faster and more meaningfully in areas where systematic community organizing work has been deployed. Immediately after the various asset reform legislations were enacted, NGOs and peoples organizations engaged government in the implementation of the asset reform programs. They participated in formulating implementing rules and regulations and deployed community organizers in a small number of communities to establish implementation prototypes. Community organizers' roles were to catalyse the organization of claimants to become effective countervailing forces to work in principled and critical partnership with government implementing agencies. They facilitated the education of claimants on the processes involved and mobilized them in each of the stages, providing the necessary "public pressure" to counteract the landowners' or commercial fishers' "vested interests' pressure," providing implementing agencies the "reasons" to implement the law faster.

While there were a significant number of NGOs and POs and donor agencies that invested in helping implement the asset reform laws especially immediately after the enactment of laws, their number progressively thinned down through the years until they eventually covered only a very limited number of communities.[42] It is estimated that less than ten percent of the total asset reform beneficiaries[43] have been

[41]34 CADTs, 808,267 has. registered out of 4,276,639 has. approved as of Feb 2011.

[42]Among the more prominent NGOs and POs in CARP implementation are Task Force MAPALAD, KATARUNGAN, UNORKA, PAKISAMA, CARRD, PhilDHRRA, Peace Fdtn, Rights Net, CSI, PDI, PARRDS, ARNow!, ALG (Kaisahan, SALIGAN, Balaod-Mindanao), and BMFI; in IPRA implementation are PAFID, Mangyan Mission, KASAPI, Anthro-Watch, and LRC; in UDHA implementation are UP-ALL, PhilSSA, COPE, UPA, COM, Pagtambayayong Fdtn; and in Fisheries Code esp delineation of municipal waters are SIKAT, ISO, CERD, KM, PAMANA KA SA PILIPINAS, NGOs for Fisheries Reform, Kilusang Mangingisda.

[43]Of the 4.7 million farmers reported by the Department of Agrarian Reform as beneficiaries, less than ten percent belong to organized agrarian reform community associations and cooperatives. All national federations of fisherfolk organizations cannot claim more than a hundred thousand total memberships out of 1.5 million small fishers.

organized both by NGOs/POs and government workers. Among the organized, very few have affiliations to municipal, provincial, and national federations and therefore have very limited political and economic voice.[44] Most of the current and target beneficiaries remain un-organized and therefore are not able to make their claims over government assets, resources, and services more effectively.[45] Despite the big return on investment (ROI)[46] it generates and the big demand for it, most NGOs and POs now do not engage in direct community organizing work focused on asset reform implementation. This is so perhaps because such programs are "political," "controversial," and "dangerous"[47] or maybe because there is very little funding availablare for such programs. Many NGOs and POs are currently more involved in community development work focused on direct basic services delivery, micro-finance and enterprises.[48]

A. The Organizing Institutions and the Six Communities

A few of the NGOs and POs that took on the challenge of investing in community organizing around asset reform implementation, defense of communities from encroachment of multi-national mining interest and "inhuman evictions" will be highlighted in the following synthesis of six case studies. Formed in the late 60s and early 80s these were institutions relatively independent from political parties and movements and worked under the ambit of or in partnership with the Roman Catholic Church. These institutions are part of national and international networks and believe in the importance of building alternative centers of power. They followed/adapted at varying intensity the teachings of Saul Alinsky, Paolo Freire, and the principles and methods of active non-violence in conscientizing, organizing, and mobilizing people for power.

Experimenting on fast tracking agrarian reform implementation, PhilDHRRA and its partners/members facilitated the formation of the 426-member Pecuaria Development Cooperative in Lanipga, Bula, Camarines Sur and the systematic implementation of agrarian reform in the community. Likewise, KAANIB Foundation, Balay Mindanaw Foundation, Inc. (BMFI), Balaod Mindanao, and PAKISAMA joined forces in assisting 163 landless farmers of San Vicente,

[44]Most of the more than 6,000 agrarian reform community associations and cooperatives in the 80 provinces of the country operate only at the village level and are not affiliated with any municipal/provincial/national federations.

[45]Without viable organizations, Land Bank of the Philippines is reluctant to give production and marketing loans, Department of Agriculture could not provide the necessary extension services, the National Irrigation Authority would not be able to invest in irrigation canals and systems and hope to recoup its investments, the Department of Agrarian Reform would not be able to distribute lands especially when the landowner is demonstrating resistance.

[46]See section on Impacts of Community Organizing

[47]Several community organizers, peasant and indigenous peoples' leaders were victims of extra-judicial killings over the past two decades.

[48]This is the prevailing observations among NGOs and POs in a couple of workshops one among NGO workers and leaders in Mindanao in 2007 and another among first and second generation of NGO workers in 2008. PhilDHRRA, a network of 70 NGOs focusing on Asset Reform implementation and advocacy has only a few members now implementing serious agrarian reform (CARRD), IPRA (PAFID, KAPWA Upliftment, Mangyan Mission), and municipal water delineation (ISO). The Peace and Equity Foundation, which is the largest Filipino funding facility, has over the past decade (2002-2008) funded more than a thousand projects and released 1 billion pesos but invested only .03% for CARP implementation, 1% for UDHA implementation and none for IPRA and Fisheries Code implementation. On the other hand it invested 69% of its total budget to micro-finance, enterprise, and potable water supply projects.

Sumilao, Bukidnon in their 20-year claim over 144-hectare ancestral land under CARP. Responding to a request from the Tagbanuas of Coron Island in Palawan regarding the intrusion of migrants to their ancestral lands, PAFID facilitated the organizing process of SARAGPUNTA to claim title over their thousands of hectares of ancestral land and waters. SIKAT formed a fishers' federation in Romblon, Romblon to facilitate delineation of municipal waters. An anti-mining alliance (Alyansa Laban sa Mina-ALaMin) was formed in Mindoro to effectively resist INTEX mining operation. Finally, COPE formed a federation of estero dwellers to stop MMDA-initiated forced evictions of 13,000 informal settlers in Pasay City, in violation of UDHA law.

Table 1. Basic Profile of Six Cases

Key Information	Pecuaria	Sumilao	Coron	Romblon	Mindoro	Pasay
Key Issues	Agrarian Reform Implementation	Land Distribution	IPRA Implementation	Delineation of Municipal Waters	Stopping Commercial Mining	Stopping Forced Evictions
Key Targets	DAR Secretary	President, Supreme Court, DAR Secretary	DENR Secretary/ NCIP Head	LGU: Mayor and Sangguniang Bayan	DENR Secretary	President, Mayor, Sangguniang Bayan
Main CO Approach/ Entry Point	Issue-based Partnership	Issue-based Conflict Confrontation	Issue-based Conflict Confrontation	Issue-based Partnership	Issue-based Conflict Confrontation	Issue-based Conflict Confrontation
Number of Claimants	426 landless farmers	163 landless farmers	1,195 Tagbanuas of Coron	655 small fishers	One city and five municipalities	3,743 informal settlers in 16 barangays
Number of full time COs deployed	2	8	2 with 4 technical staff			4 with 8 student practicumers
Key Organizing Objectives	988 hectares of land distributed, productivity systems developed, cooperative and partnerships strengthened	144 hectares of land distributed; help pass CARP extension bills 1997-1998 and 2007-2009 campaigns	50,000 hectares of ancestral land and water distributed to Tagbanuas of Coron and Calauit	Municipal water of Romblon, Romblon delineated	Operation of INTEX Mining stopped in Mindoro island	13,000 slum dwellers not evicted forcibly

[49]Karagatan Aalagaan ng Pederasyon ng Alyansa ng Mangingisda na Itataguyod ang Likas Yaman at Agrikultura ng Romblon (KAPAMILYA)
[50]Alyansa Laban sa Mina (ALAMIN)

People's Organizations Formed and Waging the Struggle	Pecuaria Development Cooperative, Inc (PDCI)-426 members	PANAW-Sumilao-163 members (Mapalad Multi-Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente Landless Farmers Association)	Tagbanua Coron Foundation, Inc (TFCI)	KAPAMILYA[49] -655 individual members.	ALAMIN[50]-People of Mindoro esp from 5 municipalities and City	Federation of estero dwellers of Pasay-3,743 members
Catalyst NGO/PO	PhilDHRRA, KOSOG-PAKISAMA, PAGBICOL, PDAP	KAANIB Fdtn, BMFI, Balod-Mindanao, PAKISAMA	PAFID	SIKAT	SANAMA, KAMTI, KPLN, Apostolic Vicariate of Calapan, Peasant-Net, SALAKMMA[51]	COPE

B. Community Organizing Process

"Community Organizing is a collective, participatory, transformative, liberative, sustained and systematic process of building people's organizations by mobilizing and enhancing the capabilities and resources of the people for the resolution of their issues and concerns towards effecting change in their existing and oppressive exploitative conditions."

—Brenda Batistiana and Denis Murphy,
Rural Community Organizing in the Philippines (2002)

[51]SANAMA (Samahan ng Nagkakaisang Mangyan Alangan) and KAMTI (Kapyan Agpaysarigan Mangyan Tadyawan), both members of the Kapulungan Para sa Lupaing Ninuno (KPLN), the provincial federation of Mangyan organizations, started to express their opposition to this mining project. Subsequently, the Apostolic Vicariate of Calapan, various church-based organizations like Peasant-Net as well as SALAKMMA (organization of farmers and fisherfolks) also expressed their opposition. Other NGOs and individuals from the private sector and the local government also joined the opposition.

[52]"CO begins and builds upon local, small, concrete issues which people want to resove. It emphasizes intensive and discipline prepatation of as many people a s possible, from the identification and the clarification of the issues, the decision-making on courses of action, and the evaluation of and reflection on the action taken. As such, CO is dynamic cycle that builds upon the previous phase, from local to national, and from concrete to more abstract issues." (Batistiana and Murphy,2002: 76)

[53]Ten Steps to Community Organization: Integration, Social Investigation, Tentative Program, Groundwork, Meeting, Role Play, Mobilization, Evaluation, Reflection, Organization

[54]In Pecuaria, Lany Rebagay, a valedictorian from Ateneo de Naga was the main community organizer representing KOSOG-PAKISAMA and PhilDHRRA; In Sumilao, the COs were: Alex Martinez from KAANIB, Felix Vergara from BMFI, Kaka Bag-ao, Carlito Gallego, Jr., and Frank Atilo from BALAOD-Mindanao; Elgenito, Maya, and Peter Gutierrez from PAKISAMA; To facilitate the partnership for the Tagbanwa Ancestral Lands and Waters claim in Coron Island, PAFID initially deployed 2 community organizers who established the basis of partnership and foundation for the initiative to secure land tenure security over the ancestral domains of the Tagbanwa. PAFID later deployed 2 full-time staff composed of an Ibaloi Agriculturist and a Community Organizer. The team was supported by a technical support group composed of Cartographers, a Researcher, a Community Planning and Land Tenure Officer and an Australian Volunteer from the Overseas Service Bureau. The technical support group was deployed periodically on a specific schedule from the other PAFID operating units from Manila, Northern Luzon and Mindanao. ALAMIN COs came from church, NGOs, and PO members of the Coalition. COPE staff involved in this case were Soti Sabarre – CO Coordinator, Fatimah Cosare, Robert Mulhadi, and Andy Marcelino – Community Organizers; Kreeger Bonagua, Frisca Rose Gutierrez, Monica Balogo, Ruel Cervantes, Irishbel Belmonte, Meralyn Campos, Leila Lalisan, Juan Palacios – CCM student practicumers.

The main community organizing approach used in the six cases was the issue-based approach. The progressive cycle of action-reflection[52] and the more elaborate ten steps to community organization[53] were generally employed as important processes in building community's capacity to claim for their rights. In all cases, professional community organizers were deployed in the communities[54]. They conducted their respective integration and social investigation or careful analysis of the issues. In Pecuaria, the problem was the unity among CARP claimants groups made more complicated by illegal entrants. In Sumilao, the problem was the strong resistance by the landowners who used their influence in the local and national government executive and judicial branches to block land distribution. In the case of Coron, there was local government resistance to the implementation of IPRA. In Romblon, the local government was lethargic in delineating its municipal waters. In Mindoro, communities were opposed to national mining policies and strong international mining interest. In Pasay, communities faced inhuman and illegal demolitions being enforced by Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) Chair.

After analyzing the issues, a tentative program or plan was made, focusing on the identified target decision maker in each case (see Table 1). In five of six cases, their targets were the President, DAR Secretary, DENR Secretary or NCIP Commissioner. They did their groundwork, conducted a lot of meetings and role playings before mobilizations/direct action or meetings with power-holders/authorities. In more conflict-heavy cases, direct action took the form of land occupation, hunger strike or a very long walk to gain broader public opinion and support and Presidential intervention/action. They evaluated their action, conducted reflection sessions and continued to strengthen the people's organizations.

The community organizers together with the community studied very well the existing laws and their implementing rules and regulations. They mobilized at every step to move their claims until consummation. Except for the Tagbanuas who have their own indigenous system of leader selection, all other communities democratically elected their leaders based on the people's experience of their capabilities demonstrated through the numerous mobilizations/action they waged. Membership, allies and networks were expanded. Some communities also became more gender and age-sensitive allowing greater participation of women and the younger generation. Most of the community organizers began their work around felt needs, tangible and local issues, allowing them to gain the confidence of the community and moved on to mobilize around systemic, legislative and national issues. Direct community organizing interventions in the community did not end with the 3-year or five-year project period but lasted, in at least three of the six cases, over 20 years. To present a clearer picture, the experience of the community organizing work in Pecuaria is presened in Table 2.

Table 2. Sample CO Processes in Pecuaria

Critical Areas	CO processes
Land Tenure improvement	Mobilizing people, chasing papers, and synergizing partner - learning sessions on LTI processes - creation of land management committee - facilitating discussions on innovative modalities of tenurial instrument eg. collective ownership through mother CLOA supplemented with Certificate of Permanent Stewardship Award
Building consensus	Dialogue among various land claimants and creation of peace council Facilitating the formulation of common vision concretized in clear area development plan Assist in setting-up of Unified structure within the community
Leadership development / value formation	Identification of leaders / Core-group building Task –testing of leaders / Mentoring / coaching Value formation session / reflection / processing
Capacity Building	Link farmers with groups that provide Technical skills training (facilitating meetings, financial management, documentation, etc) Gender awareness sessions
Organizational system development	Mobilization of smaller units of members participation e.g. Housing unit development Setting-up organizational system and policies Securing legal personality and complying with legal requirements
Productivity Systems Development	Sustainable Production Technology Training Cooperative Enterprise development
Partnership Development	Inter-agency linkaging / networking
Participation in community development / Governance	Accreditation at BDC, MDC Participation in electoral processes e.g. voter's education, fielding/supporting farmers to get leadership post in the community Facilitate affiliation with local and national farmer federation and other networks, coalitions

C. Output and Impact

Measuring impact of community organizing. Over the last decade, concerted efforts by key organizations, foundations, and researchers have resulted in a rich body of literature that looks at ways to assess and document the impacts of community organizing. The Rural CO Standard, a common framework to assess organizing work is presented in *Rural Community Organizing (CO) in the Philippines* (Batistiana and Murphy, 2002). Under this framework, success indicators are identified in each of these key result areas:

- *Critical, Creative and Collective Consciousness Raising*
- *Organizational Development (OD)*
- *Coalition Effort and Advocacy Work*

- *Overcoming Gender and other Biases*
- *Basic Services and Infrastructure*
- *Resource Tenure Improvement (RTI)*
- *Economic Self-reliance Strengthening*
- *Agricultural Development and Ecological*
- *Democratic Participation in Governance*

Swarts' recent book on secular and faith-based organizing went further, documenting the impacts of ACORN, PICO, and the Gamaliel Foundation, another FBCO network. Swarts studied an ACORN affiliate and a PICO affiliate in San Jose, as well as an ACORN affiliate and a Gamaliel affiliate in St. Louis. She compared the four local organizations in five areas:

- *Organizational strength, including mobilization capacity, leadership continuity, organizational reputation, regular access to authorities, and ability to influence political and policy agendas*
- *Civic engagement and political action, especially among underrepresented groups*
- *Advancing issues important to poor*
- *Building coalitions across race and class lines*
- *Delivering policy outcomes*

Both examples above have recognized that CO work is comprehensive and geared towards empowerment. CO work is not just a mere program delivery strategy confined to very specific project deliverables rather it is an approach that uses specific development need as entry point then genuinely pursue the empowerment of the people that builds their capacity to sustainably address their concerns by actively participating in governance which ensures the passage of responsive policies and programs which promotes the common good and aspiration of the people.

Recognizing the challenges in valuing the impact of community organizing,[55] following are the discernible output and impact of the six initiatives. They all won tangible outcomes such as control and ownership over significant area of land and water and basic and/or production, and marketing services from various institutions.

[55]One important challenge for CSOs is how to quantify the impact of its CO work which are mostly difficult to measure due to the absence of tool to calculate its monetary value. The cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and the more recent Social Return on Investment (SROI) are some tools which can partly help in quantifying the impact of community organizing but are not yet sufficient to resolve the issue of valuation of non-economic benefits resulting to CO processes.

Table 3. Major Output and Impact of Six Cases

	Pecuaria	Sumilao	Coron	Romblon	Mindoro	Pasay
Key Output and Impact	988 hectares of land distributed to 425 farmers, now the number one producer of red organic rice in the market	211 hectares of land distributed to 163 farmers; helped pass CARP extension with Reform law (RA 9700, July 7, 2009)	50,000 hectares of ancestral land and water distributed to Tagbanuas of Coron and Calauit	Ordinance delineating municipal waters of Romblon, Romblon passed, doubling apprehension cases and also doubling income of a thousand small fishers in the municipality within a year after delineation	Operation of INTEX Mining stopped in Mindoro island saving 40,000 hectares of productive and ancestral lands and ensuring sustainable livelihoods to communities	City Ordinance passed, 13,000 of slum dwellers saved from forced and inhumane eviction
Key Contribution to Social Development	A well-documented successful model of an agrarian reform community	Waging effective non violent land rights campaign	First Ancestral land and waterdistributed to an indigenous community in the country	First documented case of impact of municipal water delineation	First successful anti-mining campaign with broadest support to include local government units	First forced eviction ordinance passed by a City Government

In a span of 21 years, PDCI obtained the title and possession of 800 hectares of sugar and rice land, generated 30 million peso assets such as irrigation facilities, farm to market roads, rice mill, production capital, and organic fertilizer plant from government and non-government agencies and gained ready market access to more than 300 retailers/malls.

In 20 years, PANAW-SUMILAO got title and control over a total of 211 hectares of agricultural lands, 2-million peso production loan from DAR, water system, production, and marketing support and access from various government, non-government, PO federation and business organizations.

In a span of more than two decades, SARAGPUNTA and later, the Calauit IPs got hold of their Certificate of Ancestral Domain Titles over 50,000 hectares of ancestral land and waters, and have now, in the case of Coron Tagbanuas, a very lucrative community-based eco-tourism business employing hundreds and generating more than a million peso yearly income to Tagbanua households.

In just two years of organizing work, the federation of small fisherfolks in Romblon (KAPAMILYA) was able to get the municipal council to issue an ordinance delineating Romblon's municipal waters, improving the apprehension of illegal fishers and therefore local government income from fees making it possible to increase budget for coastal resource management and therefore increased fish yield, diversity and income for small fishers.

Mindorenos succeeded to get a DENR's decision stopping INTEX mining that threatens the destruction of 40,000 hectares of ricefields and the livelihood of some 20 thousand small rice farmers, fishers, and indigenous peoples and the food security of the entire Mindoro population.

COPE and the city federation of estero dwellers in Pasay City succeeded in getting a city ordinance, one of its kind in Metro Manila, prohibiting forced eviction benefiting 13,000 families of informal settlers.

Four cases affected legislations that have broader impact, such as the impact of the Sumilao case on the enactment of the extension and reforms of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, which committed government to allocating P150 billion for land tenure improvement of 1.2 million landless farmers and support services to 5.6 million agrarian reform beneficiaries. The Sumilao case was able to mobilize very broad public support such as the Sumilao Campaign, mobilizing 300 hundred civil society institutions nationally and internationally and thousands of individuals and achieving 46% awareness level and 90% virtual unanimity of support among millions of Filipino voters.

Analyzing Costs and Benefits: the case of Pecuaria. Community organizing is a continuing process in the life of the Pecuaria Development Cooperative. Investment in CO process can then be identified in the various stages of development of PDCI. Below is the list of PDCI's key partners and their investment in CO process:

Table 4. Sample Cost estimates related to community organizing

PDCI Major partners	**Key areas of CO intervention**	**Estimated Cost of CO intervention**
PHILDHRRA through the TriPARRD program	**1990 - 1997** Land transfer processes Cooperative Building Mobilization of Support services Partnership Building	P 240,000 / year x 8 years = P 1,920,000
PDAP through the PPSE program	**1998 – 2005** Enhancing the Integrated Area Development Plan Enterprise and Market development	P 600,000/ year x 7 years = P 4,200,000
TRIAS	**2006 - 2010** Organic Rice production and marketing expansion to other municipalities	P 600,000/ year x 5 years = P 3,000,000
PAKISAMA	**1990- 2010** Linking PDCI in Advocacy for CARPER	P 50,000/year x 20 years = P 1,000,000
Total		P 10,120,000 for 20 years Ave. annual CO cost: 506,000 Ave. annual CO cost per farmer beneficiary: P 1,187.79

Based on the study made by Dr. Macario Jusayan, the community organizing intervention through the TriPARRD program has indeed made a significant impact to the socio-economic conditions of the agrarian reform farming household in Pecuaria. Specifically, the study has gathered significant findings (both qualitative and quantitative) under the following variables that were used in analyzing the impact:

1. On land tenure improvement. One hundred percent (100%) of the beneficiary-farmers now have security of ownership over the farms wherein each of them has been equally provided with 1.7 hectares of land to till and another 600 square meters to build their houses.

2. On employment. There is a noticeable shift from mere farm employees (before) to diversified employment, i.e., farming, part-time laborer in construction works, hired laborer in other farms, business, handicraft making, etc.

3. Household Income. Unlike before, the source of household income has become diversified (e.g., farming, business, construction work, handicraft making, etc.). Before, the only source of household income was the salary from employment as farm workers in the estate.

4. House improvement. Unlike before, majority of the houses are now made up of durable materials. Houses are already built in the permanent resettlement areas as provided for in its integrated area development plan.

5. Household Consumption. There is a noticeable change in household consumption relative to the sources of major food needs wherein 40% and 68.9% of the total households are now producing their own vegetables and rice, respectively, from their own farms. Household consumption now extends to acquisition of various home appliances like radio cassette, television set, gas stove, refrigerator, etc.

6. Acquisition of farm equipment. Thirty nine point five percent (39.5%) of the total households now own the necessary farm equipment like hand tractor, rice blower/thresher, sprayer, and carabao-drawn plow. This happened only now when they already became owners of their farms.

7. Acquisition of farm animals. A good number of the total households (74.5%) have acquired major farm animals like carabao and cow.

8. Capacity to send children to school. A good number of the respondent households are now capable to send their children to school, where 57.8% have an average of 2 siblings in elementary, 44.2% have 1 or 2 siblings in secondary level, and 15.5% have 1 or 2 siblings in college.

9. Participation in community and other socio-civic organizations. Through their PO, beneficiary-farmers are duly represented in different development bodies like PDC, RDC, PARCC, and other PO federations at the provincial, regional, and national level.

10. Land productivity. In a separate study of Ms.Shihomi Ara of Kobe University, productivity particularly in organic rice production have steadily increase from the chemical farming towards full organic farming

In addition to the economic benefits at the household level, there are other important outcomes which relate to improved social well-being of the farmers that are difficult to quantify these include the following:

1. Peace of mind brought about by the security of tenure over their land

2. Increased self-confidence of farmer leaders/farmer technicians/cooperative staffs due to greater interaction with people in authority in the government, media, academe, church and other institutions; improved knowledge and skills due to trainings

3. Improved self-esteem and pride as a national awardee (outstanding farmer of the year); interviewed by media people, explained their cooperative experience with foreign visitors, chosen as housing unit head, etc.

4. Improved socialization and interaction through more spaces for cooperative and community activities (increased social capital)

The abovementioned impact can be related to the type of economic development which is defined by Amartya Sen, as a process of expansion of the positive freedom that people enjoy and the "entitlements and capabilities" of people to live in ways we have reason to value. it is not just a matter of increasing the number of commodities available to people (choice); but the capability of the person to transform or use the commodity i.e. "functionings"

Beyond the tangible and intangible benefits experienced at the individual and household level, there are significant benefits of the CO process which are both quantifiable and unquantifiable at various levels – organizational, community, national and even global to wit:

1. Claimed Support Services by the Cooperative from various government and other agencies: irrigation system, warehouse / grain center, rice mill with separator, solar / mechanical dryer, thresher, organic fertilizer plant, inoculant laboratory, agricultural credit / production loan, cattle loan, potable water, electrification, 3.5 km farm to market road, livestock training center

2. Invited and Claimed Spaces for participation: Barangay and Municipal Development Council, PARCCOM

3. Contribution to the farmer sector: Support to MAGSAKA-CA (leadership in the federation, inspiration to fellow primary cooperatives, patronage of facilities, custody of equipments, etc); Solidarity with Banasi Farmers (warm bodies during mobilization/rallies, donation of rice); Solidarity with Sumilao Farmers (warm bodies during mobilizations and financial report; Active membership in various networks

4. Contribution to social movement / CSO networks: Metro South Cooperative Bank (MSCB), Cooperative Bank of Camarines Sur (CoopBank), Federation of Peoples' Sustainable Development Cooperative (FPSDC)

5. Contribution to national agrarian reform: CARPER advocacy

6. Contribution to global investment in agriculture: PDCI video production used to generate attention to small-farmers in various international conferences

IV. Lessons, Insights, and Challenges

1. In the context of a post EDSA Philippine society, guided by people-power and social justice-biased Constitution and legislations, yet largely led and run by economic and political elite, all cases affirmed the importance and relevance of active non-violent, issue-based community organizing as a social technology in building grassroots people power or relatively permanent structures of autonomous peoples organizations that are able to effectively and efficiently make their claims, exact greater government accountability, confront and overcome powerful vested interests, and yield faster and meaningful asset reform implementation. Community organizing investments yield very high economic, social, political, and environmental Return on Investment (ROI) for the target communities and the nation as a whole as shown in the six cases. The cases further affirmed the various studies especially in agrarian reform done over the past years revealing "that Agrarian Reform Communities (ARCs), when properly established and supported, improve the economic conditions, social capital, civic entrepreneurship and democratic participation of the communities."

2. Most Community Organizing principles and processes that help build autonomous people's organizations such as: starting where the people are but not ending where they are, mobilizing and organizing from tangible/simple issues to more complex and systemic issues, maximum peoples' participation, progressive cycle of action-reflection and the ten steps to community organizing and, mass-based leadership, and the issue-based confrontation/partnership approaches have

been affirmed important and most useful in achieving the desired outcomes. Noted among the cases is the need to emphasize culture- sensitivity and building on the practices and perspectives of indigenous peoples as they deal collectively with the process of solving land tenure and other issues (e.g., health).

3. Multi-stakeholder institutional partnership among POs, NGOs, Churches, media, government and even business (i.e., medium-sized commercial fishers of Romblon) from local to international and comprehensive and participatory area development planning (Pecuaria case) , building broad electoral constituencies focused on an issue (Mindoro case), participatory technical mapping and culture-sensitive interventions (Coron case), creative and bold tactics (hunger strike and cross-country walk) that mobilize broad alliances and public opinion (Sumilao case), lobbying and mass mobilizations for local legislations (Romblon and Pasay City cases) were the most prominent and promising community organizing approaches that can be adapted in many more areas.

4. The main challenge lies in the great demand for community organizing work around asset reform implementation yet there are very few NGOs, POs, and donor agencies which focus their development interventions in this field. Many NGO-PO development workers and institutions have not even heard of the above-mentioned cases and therefore have not learned from them. If this situation is not reversed and government has not shown decisive steps in finishing asset reform (e.g., demonstrating political will in hacienda luisita) and has not helped in particular in mobilizing financing community organizing work, it is safe to assume that asset reforms cannot be implemented significantly in the next five years of the Aquino administration, and poverty may not be strategically and substantially reduced.

5. A Capacity Building Fund for the basic sectors (managed by the National Anti Poverty Commission) to ensure the systematic organization of these sectors and to effectively make their claims over resources promised by existing asset reform laws may be a good idea for the Aquino government to pursue.

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